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PLATO
LACHES

Text, with Introduction, Commentary and Vocabulary by

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Preface

This edition of Plato's *Laches* is aimed at readers of Greek who, while requiring detailed help with grammar, syntax and vocabulary, also wish to have an opportunity to gain a mature appreciation of the subtleties, philosophical and literary, of Plato's Dialogue form. I make no apology for devoting considerable space to the literary aspect since with *Laches*, perhaps even more than with other Socratic Dialogues of Plato, questions of dramatic construction, characterisation and style are crucial for an understanding of the Dialogue as a whole.

I wish to express my thanks to Marga Emlyn-Jones, Lorna Hardwick, William Preddy and Robert Sharples for reading an earlier draft of the Introduction and Commentary and making valuable suggestions, and also to Wendy Clarke and Priya Punchihewa for typing successive drafts of the manuscript. Acknowledgement is due to Oxford University Press for permission to reproduce John Burnet's Oxford Text of *Laches*.

Chris Emlyn-Jones
The Open University
December 1994

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Notes on this Edition

1. The text reproduced in this edition is that of John Burnet, in *Plato*, Vol. III, Oxford, 2nd edn., 1909. I have not included an *apparatus criticus* as the number of textual problems is very small and each case is discussed in the Commentary as it arises. The system of reference to sections and lines of the Greek text found in this edition (178a3 etc.) is by page, letter and number of the sixteenth-century AD edition of Stephanus, which is standard in almost all modern editions of Plato.

2. References to secondary sources by name and page reference in Introduction and Commentary relate to the Bibliography.

3. The following abbreviations are used in this edition:

(a) Works of Plato

Alc.	*Alcibiades*	*Hp.Ma.*	*Hippias Major*
Ap.	*Apology*	*La.*	*Laches*
Chrm.	*Charmides*	*Ly.*	*Lysis*
Cra.	*Cratylus*	*Men.*	*Meno*
Cri.	*Crito*	*Phd.*	*Phaedo*
Euthd.	*Euthydemus*	*Prt.*	*Protagoras*
Euthyphr.	*Euthyphro*	*R.*	*Republic*
Grg.	*Gorgias*	*Tht.*	*Theaetetus*

(b) Other Greek authors

Arist.	Aristotle
Ath. Pol.	*Athenaion Politeia*
EN	*Nichomachean Ethics*
Hdt.	Herodotus
Hom.	Homer
Il.	*Iliad*
Od.	*Odyssey*
Thuc.	Thucydides
Xen.	Xenophon
Mem.	*Memorabilia*

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(c) Other abbreviations

GP Denniston, R.D., *The Greek Particles* (see Bibliography).

LSJ Liddell-Scott-Jones, *A Greek English Lexicon*, 9th edn.

(d) Characters in *Laches*

For convenience of reference in the Commentary, the characters in *Laches* will be abbreviated as Lys. (Lysimachos), M. (Melesias), L. (Laches), N. (Nikias) and S. (Socrates).

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Introduction

This introduction has two functions: first, it aims to provide basic information and a preliminary discussion of matters relevant to an initial reading of the text (Sections 1, 2 and 5); secondly, to set out in more detail and depth issues raised by the text (Sections 3 and 4). Accordingly, 1 and 2 are best read before tackling *Laches*, and Section 5 is an outline structure of the Dialogue, for guidance as and when needed. Section 3, the detailed discussion of the philosophical argument, should ideally be postponed until reading the relevant sections of the text (frequent cross-reference is given), whereas 4, a more wide-ranging discussion of issues raised by *Laches*, is best left until the Dialogue has been completed.

1. *LACHES*: SETTING AND CONTEXT

Plato's short Dialogue *Laches* takes the form of a conversation between five Athenians on the subject of a suitable education for the sons of two of them. The initial topic soon develops, however, into a characteristically Socratic attempt at definition, in this case, of *ἀνδρεία* = 'courage' or 'bravery'—an attempt which, again in Socratic manner, ultimately fails, ending in *impasse* (*aporia*).

The two main participants, other than Socrates, are Nikias and Laches, Athenian generals and men of affairs. They are drawn into the discussion through the request of an elderly friend, Lysimachos, who, along with his friend Melesias, wishes to ensure that their sons receive an education to make them worthy of their respective grandparents, who are in fact the distinguished Athenian statesmen Aristeides and Thucydides (not the historian). Lysimachos feels that their parents' public prominence resulted in their own educational neglect, an experience which they do not wish to repeat with their own children. As in some other Socratic Dialogues (e.g. *Euthyphro*), so in *Laches* Plato creates a social context as the initial impetus for the philosophical argument.

The Dialogue does not remain at this level, however. Discussion of the educative value of *hoplomachia* (weapons training), a demonstration of which the group has just witnessed, is swiftly transformed under

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Socrates' questioning into a more searching enquiry into what the ultimate objectives of the education are, and who ought to be considered suitable teachers. This, in turn, leads to the question which Socrates considers central to the discussion: how does one define *ἀρετή* (excellence)—in this case 'courage' or 'bravery'—in which a teacher must be able to claim expertise? Failure to discover the definition rules out all the participants, Socrates included.

Laches is one of the earliest group of Plato's Dialogues (for further details of the order of Dialogues, see Intro. 4 (ii) below). A characteristic of these Dialogues (known collectively as 'Socratic' because their concerns and method of enquiry may reflect those of the historical Socrates) is the attempt to define certain key virtues such as temperance, justice, holiness and, as here, courage (known traditionally as the 'cardinal virtues'). The choice of courage in *Laches* makes this particular Dialogue interesting for us in a number of ways: firstly, the participants debate a concept which was central to the value-system of fifth- and fourth-century Athenian males, and the conduct of this debate reflects many of the social tensions inherent in a society geared to competitive excellence in war. Secondly, attempts in the Dialogue to define *ἀνδρεία* raise questions concerning the relation between intellectual, psychological and moral aspects of courage which, despite clear differences between the ancient and modern ethical debate, still have a certain contemporary relevance (see below 4 (ii)). Finally, *Laches*, like many other Socratic Dialogues, is a vehicle for the posthumous rehabilitation of Plato's teacher. Socrates, the man recently executed after a trial for *ἀσέβεια* (impiety), which included corruption of the youth of Athens as one of the specific charges (399 BC), is portrayed in *Laches* as a person of the highest moral integrity and as an eminently suitable teacher for the children of Lysimachos and Melesias. He has, moreover, the respect of Nikias and Laches, two citizens highly placed in Athenian public life (see further below Intro. 2 (ii)).

2. THE DRAMATIC STRUCTURE

(i) *Laches*: dramatic venue and date

The precise venue of the conversation is not stated; the exhibition of *hoplomachia* the participants have just been watching (178a1) may be presumed to have taken place in one of the Athenian *Gymnasia*, the dramatic setting for many of Plato's Dialogues and where Socrates often converses (see e.g. *Ly.* 204a).

The dramatic date can be narrowed down to within a few years by the prominence of two of the participants, Laches and Nikias. Laches died in 418 BC while commanding at the battle of Mantinea against the Spartans (Thuc. 5.74). A *terminus post quem* is provided by a reference to the

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battle of Delium (424 BC) from which Laches states that he and Socrates as comrades retreated together (181b1–4). The absence of direct reference to any current conflict in the Peloponnesian War suggests some period during the 'Peace of Nikias' (421–418, Thuc. 5.13 ff.; see further Hoerber, 95 ff.). Plato however does not always make his dramatic contexts precise or even consistent in all details. As to the Dialogue's historicity, while it cannot be conclusively proved that no such conversation took place, there is no evidence that it did (and it must be remembered that Plato would have been about eight years old at the time!). Any historical basis the conversation possessed would have been overlaid and recast by Plato's literary and philosophical skill. On the other hand, the degree to which Plato intends historical allusions in *Laches* is not so easily decided: some are explicit (e.g. the retreat from Delium mentioned above, 181b1–4), others are more doubtful, e.g. a possible ironic allusion to Nikias' reliance on soothsayers when fighting at Syracuse (Thuc. 7.50) at 198e4 ff. (see note ad loc.).

(ii) *Laches*: Characters

The characters in *Laches* are all historical figures whose existence is attested outside the pages of Plato:

(a) LYSIMACHOS AND MELESIAS. For details, see notes to Commentary Section 1, Intro, 179a2, 4; 184d8 ff. The only historical fact which is significant for *Laches* is that they both have very distinguished fathers and are themselves relatively insignificant.

(b) LACHES. A general of the middle years of the Peloponnesian War (see above Intro. 2 (i)). His military distinction, together with an absence of familiarity with intellectual debate (e.g. 188c4 ff.), is an important element in the Dialogue, informing his attitudes and assumptions.

(c) NIKIAS. A very prominent Athenian politician, espousing a moderate democratic position, frequently elected as *στρατηγός* (general). He was disastrously defeated and killed in 413 BC in Sicily. There is a great deal about Nikias' personality and achievements in Thucydides (and, to a less important extent, in Plutarch). In *Laches*, he presents a contrast to Laches, as a man familiar with current intellectual developments (see 180d1 ff.) and Socrates' techniques of argument (187e6 ff.).

(d) SOCRATES. Clearly Socrates cannot be treated in the same way as the other participants. For them, their historical *personae* are largely incidental to the Dialogue (though see further Intro. 4 (iii) below). For Socrates, the relationship between the historical person and the dramatic character is much more complex. It is known for certain that in 399 BC, Socrates was prosecuted for *ἀσέβεια* (impiety) in a *γραφή* (public suit) by Meletos. The *ἀντωμοσία* (affidavit) survived up to the second

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century AD in the Metroon, the building in the Athenian Agora where public archives were kept: 'Meletos, the son of Meletos, of the deme Pitthos has made the following charge against Socrates, the son of Sophroniskos, of the *deme* Alopeke: Socrates is guilty of not acknowledging the gods which the city acknowledges, but of introducing different, new divinities. And he is guilty of corrupting the young. The penalty demanded is death' (Diogenes Laertius II.40, quoting the orator and philosopher Favorinus; a paraphrase of the indictment is quoted by Plato in *Ap.* 24b8 ff.).

Apart from Plato's Dialogues, the only other substantial sources for Socrates' life and activities are Aristophanes' comedy *Clouds* (a humorous and, arguably, largely fictitious portrait) and the Dialogues of Xenophon (*c.* 428 – *c.* 354 BC), a soldier and wealthy Athenian citizen who associated with Socrates. His writings, like those of Plato, purported to recall the conversations of his teacher.

The major discrepancies in these accounts of Socrates, especially between those of Plato and Xenophon, have given rise to the intricacies of the 'Socratic problem', the question of the recovery of the historical Socrates. As suggested above, the Socratic Dialogues of Plato are not strong historical evidence. With the exception of *Apology*, Plato's account of the trial of Socrates which is atypical in a number of respects, Plato does not signal his own presence in any Dialogue (in *Phd.* 59b he notes his own absence). What may go back to Socrates is the concentration on moral values (as opposed to questions of scientific interest, see n. on 186c2) and the construction of philosophical argument by questioning prominent individuals (*Ap.* 21c ff., Xen. *Mem.* I.1.16). Most significant for *Laches*, as for the other early Dialogues, is the personality of the Platonic Socrates, the artistic creation through which Plato wished both to develop philosophical ideas and defend and preserve the revered memory of his master. In executing the latter of these aims, Plato may have drawn on features in the alleged character of the historical Socrates: in *Laches* notably his physical bravery in battle, at 181b, 189b (see also *Ap.* 28e and *Chrm.* 153a ff.), and his reputation as a teacher among upstanding citizens (180c1 ff. and 200c4 ff.)—features at odds with the charge which led to his condemnation and execution.

(iii) *Laches*: dramatic form

Plato's philosophical works, unlike those of, say, Aristotle, take the form of dramatised conversations in which the interplay of character and situation plays a part—in the earliest Socratic Dialogues especially, an equal part—with the philosophical argument. In *Laches*, as in the other early Dialogues, a clearly articulated structure is contrived (concealed, one might say) by dramatically subtle transitions (see Intro. 5, below).

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The tendency to preface the philosophical argument with an introduction, which sets the scene, and introduces the characters and their concerns, is taken to its extreme in *Laches*, where the so-called 'Introduction' extends to just under half the total Dialogue (178a1–189d3)! However, this half is much more than introductory: it not only sets the scene, but raises issues which have an organic structural relationship with the argument proper. In *Laches*, perhaps more than in any of the Socratic Dialogues, narrow concentration on the philosophical sections fails to do justice to the work as a whole.

Each of the two larger sections (1–7; 8–15, see Section 5 below) breaks down quite naturally into two (1–4/5–7; 8–10/11–15). In the first half, the initial reactions of Nikias and Laches in response to Lysimachos' request for their opinion on the suitability of *hoplomachia* as an education give way to Socrates' attempt to refocus the discussion more precisely and with more rigour. In the second half, Laches' attempts to define *ἀνδρεία* give way to those of Nikias. These transitions at no point obtrude. This is at least partly accomplished through interplay of character and style of speech: Lysimachos, elderly, anxiously well-meaning, pedantically verbose, socially out-of-touch and not intellectually up to the level of discussion; Laches, inexperienced in argument but resolute and willing, with a great deal of native wit. His thinly-veiled feelings of intellectual inferiority are brought to the surface in his rather competitive, and, towards the end, acerbic relationship with the urbane, intellectually more sophisticated and often patronising, Nikias (these points are brought out in detail in the notes, *passim*). Moreover, these character traits are not simply dramatic window dressing. The command of Nikias and Laches over a comparatively large share of the dialogue reflects their significance in the development of the argument: Laches, valuing his own experience of personal qualities of bravery etc., tries to define courage in those terms; he is complemented by Nikias the intellectual, for whom courage is principally a question of knowledge.

This assertiveness has a corresponding effect on the role of Socrates. The form of direct speech in which the Dialogue is cast avoids privileging him as a narrator; indeed *Laches* is conspicuous, even among the Socratic Dialogues, for the comparatively modest role played by Socrates himself (see n. at the end of Section 2). See also Socrates' temporary surrender of the questioning role to Laches, n. on 195b2 ff., and his allowing Nikias to develop and himself defend the key final argument of the Dialogue (see n. at the end of Section 12).

This aspect, however, extends not just to the sharing out of the argument but also to its tone and conduct. The continual emphasis on cooperation between the participants, typically overplayed by Lysimachos in his opening speech (see n. at the end of Section 1), is

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demonstrated by Socrates through his frequent insistence that he and his interlocutors are implicated equally in the conclusions and contradictions of their arguments (see n. on 193d11 and n. at the end of Section 11), and that he is himself sharing their ignorance of matters which they are all investigating together (see e.g. 200e3 ff.).

Socrates' assertions of his own ignorance are frequent in the Socratic Dialogues, accompanied by a lesser or greater degree of irony, real or at least perceived by his interlocutors. What is distinctive, however, in *Laches* is the absence of antagonism between Socrates and the other participants (Nikias and Laches fight with each other rather than with him) which may be related dramatically to the absence of bystanders (to which Socrates specifically draws attention at 201a3), allowing those questioned to relax and say what they really think (see n. on 178a4–5) without having to defend their prestige or social position. This distances the tone of *Laches* notably from e.g. the charged and public atmosphere described by Plato's Socrates at *Ap.* 23e ff., and demonstrated in the open hostility shown to Socrates at *Grg.* 481b ff. In *Laches*, Socrates is being consulted privately on a socially delicate matter, and this *ethos* pervades the whole Dialogue.

Yet, as always, Plato's Socrates does retain ultimate control of the argument, effected not, as in e.g. *Gorgias* or *Euthyphro*, by reducing his interlocutors to 'yes men', but by intervention at key points to establish the basic philosophical assumptions from which the argument is to be conducted.

3. THE ARGUMENTATIVE STRUCTURE

The ostensible purpose of *Laches* is to discover by collaborative argument how to define *ἀνδρεία* (190d7–199e12). Yet as the Dialogue progresses, the nature of the question addressed by the group changes. This happens through the agency of Socrates, who asks a series of questions which in each case cause a major change in the basis for discussion.

(1) The first of these occurs at 184d5, where, invited by Lysimachos to arbitrate in the disagreement between Nikias and Laches on the educative value of *hoplomachia*, Socrates questions instead the whole basis of the discussion by introducing the issue of expertise: who is qualified to pronounce and on what grounds? A further shift takes place in the same part of the conversation (185b6), when Socrates asks what they are seeking teachers for, and how is the authority of such teachers to be demonstrated.

(2) At 190d8, Socrates reaches the central question of the *Laches* argument: what is the part of *ἀρετή* called *ἀνδρεία*, for which experts

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(whoever they may be) are to be hired? (The question of who actually are the experts is never reached explicitly, at any rate in *Laches*.)

In each case above, Socrates gives a new direction to a discussion which is threatening to run in circles (see nn. on 184d5–6, 185b6 ff.), and, in each case, moves the argument to a more fundamental level.

(i) 178a–184c8 (Sections 1–4)

This part follows a customary pattern in Plato's Socratic Dialogues, introducing the main participants and their concerns. It is not, however, merely 'scene-setting', but also prepares for the main argumentative structure of the Dialogue:

(a) The whole discussion is fuelled by the particular, practical educational concerns of Lysimachos, and those concerns return at the end (200c7 ff.) as a framework for the argument. The emphasis of Lysimachos on friendly co-operation (178b5 ff.) also gives the later discussion its *tone*.

(b) The Socratic method of argument requiring agreement from those questioned at each stage, relies to a significant degree on a basis in the everyday ethical assumptions of (on the whole) non-expert professionals. In other words, in terms of general belief, Socrates cannot take his interlocutors where they are not willing to go. This is particularly the case with *ἀνδρεία*, on which every self-respecting Athenian, not to say general, would be expected to have a firm view! Thus, what Nikias and Laches say in their speeches for and against *hoplitikon* (Sections 3 and 4) has significance for the later part of the argument. Nikias' emphasis on professional expertise relates closely to his attempt to define *ἀνδρεία* later in the Dialogue in intellectual terms (*ἐπιστήμη* at 182c7/194 e8—in the latter context said by Socrates, but with Nikias' tacit acceptance). On the other hand, Laches, in his opposition to Nikias' thesis, tries to separate dispositional qualities associated with *ἀνδρεία* from expertise (see n. on 184b4–7) anticipating his largely unsuccessful attempt at a definition of courage as 'endurance of the soul' (Section 10). As Nikias implies (see below (ii) (d)) Socrates' interlocutors reveal not just their intellectual powers but also their own characters and attitudes (187e10 ff.).

(c) The first part of the Dialogue is also significant for the unreflective use of key value-terms such as *ἀρετή* (excellence) and *κλέος* (fame, reputation) and *ἀγαθός* (good). At 179b2, for example, Lysimachos assumes that Nikias and Laches will wish, as the goal of education, to make their children *ἄριστοι* ('the best') and to avoid them being *ἀκλεεῖς* (without reputation, d4); their search, moreover, is for a *μάθημα* which is *καλόν* ('a discipline which is fine'). All these terms are

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highly charged and clearly represent a focus of high aspiration for these users, but they are unspecific. *ἀρετή* is *the* key term here, since its use in non-philosophical Greek is often as a near-synonym for *ἀνδρεία* (see n. on 184c2, and Dover, 164–6). These usages in the first part of the Dialogue have particular significance for the final argument (Section 14), where Socrates appears to be implying the falsity of the view that *ἀνδρεία* is a *part* of *ἀρετή* rather than the whole of it. The dilemma with which the Dialogue ends therefore has its roots firmly in the non-philosophical assumptions (the lack of clarity, one might say) about value terms with which it begins (on this topic see esp. Stokes, 41 ff.).

(ii) 184c9–189d3 (Sections 5–7)

This part is significant for Socrates' increasing hand in the dialogue: he brings a sharper focus to bear on what the discussion is really about—a 'ground clearing' exercise in which he is given considerable assistance by Nikias and Laches (cf. their major speeches in Sections 6 and 7). Some basic Socratic positions are rehearsed (rather than argued for):

(a) *The need to respect expertise rather than numbers or status/social influence* (Laches makes this point at 189a8–b1). The establishment of authority based on knowledge is a familiar issue from other Socratic Dialogues (cf. *Ap.* 20b, 22a ff.; *Euthyphr.* 4e ff.; *Cri.* 47b; *Grg.* 471e–72b, this last example a close parallel to *La.* 184d in elaborating on the legal/political analogy; see also n. on 184c9). It is interesting to note that Socrates' interlocutors, while presumably (in *Laches*, certainly) giving formal allegiance to the Athenian democratic system, which emphasised numerical majority in decision-making on political or legal questions, nevertheless always assent without demur to Socrates' assertions that in matters concerning *ἀρετή* one should always defer to the individual expert over the majority (e.g. *Ap.* 25a ff.). One possible reason for this is the force of the frequent analogies which Socrates customarily brings to bear between technical knowledge of a craft and what we would call moral knowledge (cf. e.g. *Grg.* 460b, *Ap.* 25b ff.). No interlocutor in the Socratic Dialogues ever seriously questions the force of this analogy, the 'Craft Analogy', (see n. on 190b7); it seems to have been regarded as self-evident. In the case of Melesias at 184e4 ff., the respect for *ἐπιστήμη* (e8) may be a key factor, or Plato may be relying on the plausibility of suggesting the latent elitist sympathies of many of his characters. In the broader context of the Dialogue, establishing that what they need is an 'expert' for the souls of their sons has significance for the later attempts to define *ἀνδρεία* also in terms of knowledge and expertise(194c7 ff.).

(b) *The importance of the subject.* Lysimachos' emphasis on

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ἐπιμέλεια (see 179a8, b1 etc.) is made more important and specific by Socrates' introduction of the soul (ψυχή) at 185e1–2 (see n. ad loc.). There is no more important issue (185a3 ff.). If *hoplomachia* is a μάθημα, i.e. a coherent body of knowledge to be learned (this hasn't been settled), it is undertaken, Socrates maintains, for the sake of something else more fundamental—a means to an end (185c5 ff., where Socrates uses an analogy from medicine viewed as a means to an end rather than as an end in itself). As Nikias states (187e6 ff.), Socrates' enquiries are about ends—about individuals and how they should live.

(c) *Socrates' professed ignorance, cf.* (a) above. (Cf. *Ap.* 22 ff., *Euthyphr.* 5 ff.) Socrates' lack of knowledge about the matter discussed is a fundamental position, which he maintains throughout *Laches*. Socrates implicates himself in the failure to define ἀνδρεία which, he maintains, emphatically rules him out as a teacher of Lysimachos' sons (200e1 ff.). The sincerity or otherwise of this position is a central issue. Socrates certainly had the popular reputation of asking questions to which he already knew the answer (Xen. *Mem.* I.2.36). In other Dialogues Socrates combines professions of ignorance with ironically expressed respect for the teaching powers of his interlocutors (e.g. *Euthyphr.* 5 ff.). There are touches of this irony in *Laches* especially with reference to the powers of the sophists (who were professional teachers frequenting Athens in the latter half of the fifth century BC, see esp. 186c2 ff. and nn.) and Nikias and Laches' greater age and financial means (186c7–8). Yet in *Laches*, on the whole, there is, compared with other Socratic Dialogues, less of the ironic element in Socrates' profession of ignorance, and this is combined with strong expression of his moral certainty in the value of the search, the therapeutic effect of his examination of those professing knowledge, and repeated testimonials to his bravery in battle (see Nikias and Laches in Section 7). For contrasted views on the sincerity of Plato's Socrates in his professions of ignorance see Gulley, 69 ff., Kraut, 245 ff.; and, for the argument that Plato's Socrates is working with two types of knowledge, see Vlastos (2), 34–66.

(d) *Psychological aspects of Socrates' method of enquiry.* Before the formal arguments are reached (Sections 9–14), we are told by Nikias (who is portrayed as familiar with Socrates' procedures) what it is like to be questioned by Socrates, with image of trap and torture, ἐμπέσῃ (187e10) βασανίζεσθαι (188b5), which is nevertheless not unpleasant (188b5). (Compare the comparatively good-humoured reactions in *Laches* with those of Thrasymachos in *Republic* I, Kallikles in *Gorgias* and Anytos in *Meno*; it is interesting that in *Laches* the interlocutors get angry *with each other*, rather than with Socrates.) The *emotional* aspect of taking part in the exercise is given considerable prominence through

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the individual reactions of Nikias and Laches, especially in (1) their antagonism with each other and (2) the emotional effect of failure in argument; see also summary of Section 11, 'Interlude'. The need for sincere and wholehearted participation is only lightly touched on in *Laches* (178a4–5, 193c7); compare the much more elaborate treatment of the issue in *Grg.* 521a6 ff. etc. On the significance of emotion in Plato's Socratic Dialogues, see, most recently, Blank.

(iii) 189d4–199e12 (Sections 8–14)

The core of most of Plato's Socratic Dialogues is a search for a definition. This is an important aspect of Socratic enquiry because to know what X is (where X is 'justice', 'holiness', 'courage' etc.) is not only to prove oneself an 'expert' (on the 'Craft Analogy' see n. on 190b7) but also to *be* just, holy, brave etc., since, for Socrates, knowledge (of X) is sufficient for possession of that particular aspect of *ἀρετή* (excellence) cf. *Grg.* 460a–c. This latter aspect is not given emphasis in *Laches*, but the question of expertise involving the ability to offer a correct definition is central to the educational concern of the Dialogue (and all the participants fail in this endeavour). The testing of a proposed definition (known as *elenchos* 'testing of argument (for purpose of refutation)') takes the form of securing agreement to propositions which in some way or other contradict the original definition, thereby demonstrating firstly that the original definition is false or inadequate, and secondly, that the interlocutor holds beliefs which are logically incompatible with each other.

Laches and Nikias are both set up to answer Socrates at 189d4 ff.; the choice of Laches to begin rather than Nikias is dictated by philosophical considerations and the larger structure of the Dialogue (see n. on 190b2 and Intro. 4 (i) below). Laches just *happens* to answer Socrates' question that the expert must know what *ἀρετή* is if he is to be capable of improving anyone by adding it to them (e.g. the sons of Lysimachos and Melesias). Having established this by means of analogy with other skills (on Socrates' procedure here, see n. on 190b7), Socrates goes on to suggest that, in the present context, they should concentrate on a part of *ἀρετή*, namely *ἀνδρεία*. Laches is asked what it is.

(a) ***Laches' first definition*** (Section 9). Laches follows common practice in Socratic Dialogues, in choosing as definition a predicate which is not wide enough to cover instances which he himself would call *ἀνδρεία*: 'being willing to stand firm against the enemy and not flee' (190e5–6) (on the irony that this would not even cover his own and Socrates' activity at Delium, see n. on 191a7). Socrates, (again following his common practice) cites counter-examples (here from history and traditional poetry). Socrates then demonstrates the inadequacy of the

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definition, rather surprisingly (see n. on 191d4–e1), by widening his scope to a broad range of examples of non-military courage (this line of discussion is not pursued here, but it has significance for the final argument of the Dialogue, which involves attempting to dissolve barriers between specific parts of *ἀρετή*). Socrates then concludes his demonstration that Laches' definition is not wide enough by producing a paradigm (an example or pattern of a definition): *τάχος* = 'quickness' (see n. on 192a1).

(b) ***Laches' second definition*** (Section 10). Laches defines *ἀρετή* as *καρτερία τις τῆς ψυχῆς* ('a certain endurance of the soul'). Socrates immediately suggests a refinement of this, not, as in (a) by means of examples, but in terms of the definition itself: *ἀνδρεία* should be defined as *φρόνιμος καρτερία* ('intelligent' or 'wise' endurance). Socrates secures Laches' agreement to an argument in a series of stages which fall into two parts, as follows:

(A) *The initial argument*

Stage 1 *ἀνδρεία* is *τῶν πάνυ καλῶν πραγμάτων* (courage is one of the very finest things)

Stage 2 *καρτερία* with *φρόνησις* is *καλὴ κἀγαθή* (endurance with wisdom is fine and good)

Stage 3 *καρτερία* without *φρόνησις* is *βλαβερὰ καὶ κακοῦργος* (endurance without wisdom is harmful and injurious)

Stage 4 What is harmful and injurious cannot be *καλόν*

Stage 5 So, *καρτερία* without wisdom cannot be *ἀνδρεία*

Stage 6 *καρτερία* with wisdom is *ἀνδρεία* (*κατὰ τὸν σὸν* (i.e. *Laches'*) *λόγον*) : 192d10: Stages 1 and 2).

(B) *Socrates proceeds to undermine* (A) Stage 6

Stage 1 Not all *καρτερία* with wisdom is *ἀνδρεία* (192e–193a1)

Stage 2 Perhaps no *καρτερία* with wisdom is *ἀνδρεία* and perhaps *καρτερία* without wisdom is *ἀνδρεία* (193a3–c5).

In Stage (B) 1, Socrates gives examples of *φρόνιμος καρτερία* which are not *ἀνδρεία*, i.e. *φρόνησις* is not a sufficient condition (contrary to Stage (A) 6).

In Stage (B) 2, Socrates gives examples of *καρτερία* with *ἀφροσύνης* which may be *ἀνδρεία* or more *ἀνδρεῖα* than *καρτερία* with *φρόνησις* i.e. *φρόνησις* is not even a necessary condition (contrary to Stage (A) 5).

So: the original definition (Stage (A) 6) cannot be correct. There is *aporia*.

Comment on the argument:

(1) Laches gets into *aporia* because he accepts Stage (A) 3 which is

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subsequently contradicted by examples cited and agreed to by him under Stage (B) 2. He may have been forced into agreeing to (A) 3 because of the underlying inability of the unreflective Athenian to detach favourable qualities from success. This later puts him in trouble when he has to admit that *unsuccessful* καρτερία may be courageous because the actions Socrates describes at 193a3 ff. and b5 ff. are praiseworthy (since 'courage is fine and good'); the argument exposes the underlying inconsistencies in Laches' attitudes and beliefs (Stokes, 84). Socrates deftly leads Laches into the impasse and then abandons him (d9).

(2) Underlying the formal contradictions there are other forces at work. Laches' initial definition in terms of *disposition* (καρτερία τῆς ψυχῆς) is immediately (192c8) turned by Socrates into a polarised definition terms of *knowledge* or *skill* (τέχνη in 193b10). Laches lacks the ability in argument to counter Socrates at 193a3 ff. and make distinctions which Socrates does not draw (see esp. Santas, 192–4). The act of the man exercising καρτερία for example in a weaker position or with less expertise, i.e. without ἐπιστήμη, may well be more βλαβερόν and κακοῦργον than that of the skilled man and yet still be thought καλόν and so 'courageous' if individual circumstances are taken into account (*contra* (A) 4). A more quick-witted and experienced Laches might have turned the tables on Socrates by quoting Homer back at him (in *Iliad* 22 Hektor's καρτερία with τέχνη inferior to that of Achilles might be justified as καλή ('fine') as an attempt to save Troy) or by citing the stand of the Spartans at Thermopylae: was not this harmful and injurious act courageous in the wider context? It might all depend on how the agent regards the value of his/her attempt and the value of the end involved. What is excluded by the argument of Laches and Socrates, and specifically Laches' over-hasty agreement to define ἀνδρεία solely in terms of skill or expertise, is the possibility of discovering a distinction between *knowledge of a fact* and *knowledge of value* (a distinction which becomes explicit in the conversation with Nikias in Section 12). (For the broader implications of the Laches argument, see below Intro. 4 (i).)

(c) ***Nikias' definition.*** Following the interlude (Section 11) in which Laches expresses his frustration and Socrates urges καρτερία (a joke surely at 194a1–5, but see n. ad loc. and Intro. 4 (i) below), Nikias is called on to help them in their difficulty.

Nikias' suggests a way towards a definition which both reveals his familiarity with Socrates' teaching and reflects his earlier concern with expertise in Section 3: 'each person is good in respect of those things in which he is wise: bad in respect of those things in which he is unwise' (194d1–2).

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So if a brave man is good, it follows that he is wise (d4). (For the sense in which this does not strictly follow in logic, see n. on 194d4–5.)

Socrates enquires what sort of ἐπιστήμη (e8) is involved for the courageous man (he asked Laches the same question at 192e1 ff., but here he lets Nikias answer more readily). Nikias' definition is best seen as Stage 1 of the subsequent argument (see below (d)):

Stage 1 Courage is knowledge of what is fearful and what is encouraging in war and in all other situations (194e11–195a1) (Nikias' definition).

(1) *Nikias clarifies his definition by excluding certain types of knowledge.* In response to Laches' questioning (Laches takes on the Socratic role for a period, see n. on 195b3 ff.), Nikias excludes conventional ἐπιστήμη in farmers, doctors etc.) as being simply knowledge of a skill. The courageous man, unlike others, knows whether the application of the skill is *better or worse* for the individual involved (e.g. in the case of doctors, whether it is better for the patient to live or die, 195c12; for a close parallel for this distinction between the exercise of a skill and its ultimate value, see *Grg.* 511e). This introduces an essential element missing from the *Laches* argument (above (b)), the element of *value* (cf. 195c12, 196a2).

(2) In response to pressure from Socrates, Nikias makes a further distinction: between courage and fearlessness (thus separating 'fearless' animals, children etc. from those who are courageous, 197a ff.). Courage, as the definition states, must involve *knowledge* (of what is fearful and encouraging).

It is to be noted that Nikias' defence up to this point is a successful one: he is not refuted in either (1) or (2) above.

(d) ***Socrates examines Nikias' definition.*** His argument is laid out, as with that of Laches above, in stages (for Stage 1, see (c) above).

Stage 2 Courage is a part of ἀρετή (198a1–2). Note that Socrates has not, strictly speaking, agreed to this formulation, see n. on 198a4

Stage 3 What is fearful is expected evil, what is encouraging is expected good (198b5–8)

Stage 4 Expected evil/good is future evil/good (198b9–10)

Stage 5 What is fearful is future evil, what is encouraging is future good (198c 2–4) (Stages 3 + 4)

Stage 6 Courage is the knowledge of future good and evil (198c6–7) (Stages 1 + 5)

Stage 7 Knowledge of future good/evil is the same as knowledge of all good and evil (198d1 ff.)

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Stage 8 Courage is the same as the knowledge of all good and evil (199c5–d2) (Stages 6 + 7)

Stage 9 Knowledge of all good and evil is not part of *ἀρετή* but the whole of it (199d4–e1)

Stage 10 Courage is not a part of *ἀρετή*, but the whole of it (199e3–4) (Stages 8 + 9)

Stage 11 Therefore Stage 10 contradicts Stage 2 (199e6–10).

There is *aporia*: they have not discovered what *ἀνδρεία* is.

Comment on the argument:

(1) Nikias' definition (Stage 1) seems successfully to supply something not present in Laches' argument ((b) above), the element of value, which implicity answers problems of contradiction between wisdom and courage encountered in the earlier definition. Laches' irritation at 195a6 ff. (see nn.) is undoubtedly provoked by his initial (mistaken) belief that Nikias is trying to cover old ground (i.e. the idea that courage is a *τέχνη* like any other).

There appears, therefore, to be a *progressive* aspect in the development of arguments between that of Laches with Socrates (b) and that of Nikias (c) above.

(2) The validity of Socrates' deductions in (d). There is no reason for supposing that Socrates is not arguing in good faith from Stages 3–10. (See recently Vlastos, (2) 118 ff.), although it is possible that his argument at Stages 6 and 7 can be questioned if we fail to accept the validity of the move between future good/evil and *all* good/evil; it is possible to argue that there is a class of (future) good and evil which relates specifically to the part of *ἀρετή* traditionally known as 'courage' (Santas, 204). But, of course 'known as' begs the question, and raises the key issue of whether Socrates is here implicitly suggesting that all virtues are the same (i.e. defined as 'knowledge of good and evil'), despite his explicit statement of failure (at 199e11) to define 'courage' at all.

(3) To sum up: the end of *Laches* does not make it immediately clear *whether*: Socrates is accepting Stage 10 (Unity of Virtue often known as UV) and therefore rejecting Stage 2; *or* accepting Stage 2, and therefore rejecting Stage 10, *or* not expressing or implying a view either way (see, on either side of the argument, Irwin, 54 ff. and 89 n. 62; Kraut, 258–62). For the argument that Socrates is careful to avoid direct and unambiguous implication in Stage 2, see n. on 198a4 (which might suggest that Socrates wants to leave the possibility of UV open). However, against this, the final section of the Dialogue after the arguments are concluded (Section 15) strongly emphasises Socrates' awareness of his own failure to say what *ἀνδρεία* is (200e2 ff.). *Laches* shares in this respect a problem of other aporetic Dialogues, e.g. *Euthyphro*: it is not

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clear to what extent Plato wishes his audience (reader) to understand a 'positive' conclusion from the state of *aporia* with which the Dialogue ends. In *Laches*, however, the post-argument discussion (with overtones of unconscious irony, see conclusion to Section 15 in Commentary) seems to tell firmly against a *simple* demonstration of the Unity of Virtue thesis. (*contra* e.g. Irwin, 89). For further discussion, see immediately below, Intro. 4 (i).

4. THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF *LACHES*

(i) Does *Laches* have a 'message'?

Considered as a philosophical treatise designed to produce positive argued conclusions, *Laches* yields very little. In the conversation with Laches it is established that 'endurance with wisdom' does not define *ἀνδρεία*, and in that with Nikias, that 'knowledge of what is to be feared and dared' is too broad for 'courage'; it turns out to be the whole of *ἀρετή*, whereas what they wished to do was to define a part. The thesis that all virtues (*ἀρεταί*) are the same one (normally known as UV) or the slightly different thesis that possession of each virtue entails possession of the others (UVV) is argued by Socrates in a number of Dialogues (e.g. *Prt.* 329c ff., 349; *Grg.* 507b) and it is assumed by a number of commentators (e.g. Irwin, 89 n. 62; Penner, 61) that this is the positive thesis which we should accept from *Laches*.

That all *ἀρεταί* can be expressed in terms of knowledge, and so unified, is a central tenet of Socratic thought, sharply distinguished from later Platonic thought (see below 4 (ii)). If, however, we confine our attention to *Laches*, the identity of courage with 'all goodness' is presented not as a valid conclusion but as a deduction which, in a classic Socratic *elenchos*, contradicts the original definition (Stages 10 and 2). The *aporia* explicitly stated by Socrates at 199e6–12 is reinforced by the reactions of the participants in the concluding section of the Dialogue, especially Socrates himself.

Another attempt to find a positive conclusion in *Laches* involves considering the two unsuccessful arguments of Laches and Nikias as both containing significant but incomplete aspects of the desired definition: Laches supplies the essential dispositional aspect of *ἀνδρεία–καρτερία* (endurance), whereas Nikias is concerned with knowledge. The two definitions complement each other (O'Brien), and reveal the one-sided personalities of their authors. The implication of *Laches* is that it is Socrates who, despite his denials, provides the synthesis (Lane, 76–7).

Yet, *Laches* is not simply a 'covert treatise' (Stokes, 10). It is not merely an argument ornamented with dramatic setting. The detailed attention given by Plato to the social dilemma out of which the dialogue develops (see below (iii)), the dramatic subtlety of the interactions of

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the participants and the space given to their opinions, is incompatible with a purely didactic purpose. Rather than pronounce on the problem, Plato's Socrates associates himself with the dilemmas into which Laches and Nikias fall and, like them, finally admits defeat.

Despite the negative conculsion, however, Socrates emerges from *Laches* as the teacher whom Lysimachos is still anxious to consult in connection with the education of his (and Melesias') son. On a dramatic level this determination to continue to consult Socrates can perhaps be seen simply as part of Plato's humorous portrait of the elderly man who doesn't really know what is going on (see e.g. n. on 189d3); but Lysimachos' admiration is largely shared (for different reasons) by Laches and the philosophically more sophisticated Nikias. Socrates' moral status is a major theme to emerge from *Laches*, and it appears to depend not on success in argument but on his own character as reported by Laches (bravery in battle) and Nikias (tenacity in examining others and forcing them to give an account of their life). If, as is often suggested, these portraits of Socrates in the early Dialogues are part of Plato's retrospective 'testimonial' to his master, the portrait in *Laches* has some distinctive features: in particular it lacks the urgency and menace of other early Dialogues e.g. *Euthyphro* and, notably, *Gorgias*. In *Laches*, the early dramatic date (*c.* 423 BC) appears to match the impression derived from the content of the Dialogue that the conversation is placed fairly early in Socrates' career: there is no dissenting voice in the admiration he evokes and no hint of the social disapproval which led to his accusation and trial. On the contrary, the approval of two 'establishment' figures such as Laches and Nikias, as well as the discussion itself, suggests a Socrates quite well in tune with his society (but see further below (iii)).

Yet, important though these elements are, they are not the whole picture; the 'drama analogy' must not be taken too far. Unlike a drama, Socratic Dialogues have an explicit commitment to a search for truth by means of logical argument—a truth which Plato's Socrates equates with knowledge. The dominance of Plato's Socrates over the argument is maintained with the lightest of touches in *Laches*, but it is there nevertheless.

Can these two aspects, the philosophical and the dramatic, be reconciled to form any kind of purpose or intention in the composition of *Laches*? Lack of evidence makes it impossible to be definite about Plato's intentions. Yet his choice of the dialogue form and the way he used it doubtless reflects a variety of aims and intentions relevant to the desires and needs of his circle in the immediate aftermath of Socrates' death. Uppermost may have been a use of the Dialogue form to create an 'updated' version of conversations which the historical Socrates may

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have held (and in which, from about 415 onwards, the youthful Plato may have participated)—a synthesis of the historical Socrates at work on the ideas, tensions and dilemmas of late fifth-century Athenian Society, and Plato's own reflections on this, mediated by the beginnings of his own developing thought.

(ii) *Laches* in the development of thought on 'courage'

Laches is one of the group of early Platonic Dialogues known as 'Socratic', a group which includes *Apology* (not, strictly speaking a dialogue, but included for classification purposes), *Charmides, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Hippias Major, Ion, Lysis, Menexenus, Protagoras* and *Republic I* (which, whether written with the rest of the *Republic* or not, is composed in early Socratic Dialogue style). These Dialogues, most of which are short, reflect what are considered to be Socratic concerns: the search for definitions of virtues such as justice, courage, holiness, temperance, concentrated exclusively on ethical questions, to the exclusion of metaphysics, e.g. the theory of Forms (*Meno* is a transitional Dialogue in this respect, see in general, Vlastos (1), 46 ff.). In the early Dialogues, which are generally assumed to have been composed in the decade or so after Socrates' death, Plato appears to be probing and testing (usually with ostensibly negative result) a number of positions with regard to values, education and the conduct of life. Since each Dialogue deals with only a part of the picture and each has a very distinctive content, setting and style, it is possible to gain a comprehensive view of Socratic thought only by reading a number of Dialogues (hence the numerous references in this edition to other Socratic Dialogues where apposite parallels occur).

While there is no external evidence for order of composition within the Socratic group (and use of internal evidence needs great care), there are indications that *Laches* may be one of the earliest: in particular an *absence* of semi-technical vocabulary, e.g. no use of εἶδος (in its semi-technical sense of 'characteristic' or 'form') to describe the object of the quest for a definition (e.g. *Euthyphr.* 6d11) and, more significantly perhaps, only brief exploration of themes dealt with in more detail elsewhere, such as: the difficulty (impossibility) of finding teachers of ἀρετή (186a3 ff., cf. *Prt., Men.*) Socrates' professed ignorance (*Chrm.*) his attitude to sophists (*Ap., Prt.*), the issue of fathers as teachers of their sons (*Men.*), the Craft Analogy (*Cr., Grg., Men.*) the social stigma of adults studying philosophy (*Grg.*). These criteria do not, however, *conclusively* place *Laches* at the very beginning of Plato's literary career, since it is impossible to know to what extent, if at all, Plato's dramatic contexts reflect his own philosophical development.

The most significant thematic link in *Laches* is with *Protagoras*; both

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Dialogues explore the 'Unity of Virtue' thesis, *Protagoras* more directly, with Socrates actually appearing to argue for it against Protagoras (331b ff.). In the same Dialogue, Socrates also emphasises the role of knowledge as a defining factor in courage (at 349e ff.), using the same examples at 350a1 ff. as Socrates used with Laches at 193b5 ff., a correspondence which is surely expressly intended. Yet the example in *Laches* is more complex since, in that context, the presence of ἐπιστήμη is held by Laches (and Socrates does not, at that point in the Dialogue disagree) to *detract* from courage (see 193b1 ff. and nn.). It seems that in the Laches *elenchos* and, more obviously in the Nikias definition (Section 12), Plato's Socrates is arguing differently from his position in *Protagoras* by introducing the idea of value, a view which has recently been forcefully argued in an (unfinished) article by Vlastos ((2), 115–17) with the assumption that *Laches* is therefore the later composition.

The view that *Laches* does make a distinction between technical knowledge and knowledge of value is supported here in the Commentary (see esp. n. on 195c9–10) but this view is not universal; Irwin, 47 n. 11 (295) argues that Socrates does not suggest that 'knowledge of good and bad' is anything other than 'craft knowledge', i.e. knowing facts about good and evil. Moreover, there are perhaps also other reasons not to argue too much on the basis of the order of Dialogues: (1) knowledge of the *Laches* distinction between knowledge of value and technical knowledge could, if the *Laches* is earlier, help the reader to appreciate better what is going on in *Protagoras*; (2) reverting to the 'Unity of Virtue' thesis, it *could* be argued that the distinction between UV and UVV, of which Socrates is clearly aware in *Prt.* 329b ff., is a more advanced statement than that of *Laches* 199d which might be (and has been) taken to imply *either* UV or UVV (see e.g. Vlastos (2), 121–4).

If *Laches* does imply a Socratic distinction between moral and technical knowledge, it represents a stage on the route to the *Republic*, in which, having dispensed with the purely cognitive Socratic definition of ἀρετή (normally known as the thesis that 'knowledge is sufficient for virtue'), Plato (in *Republic IV)* presents courage in terms of a tripartite division of the ψυχή, in which the cognitive element is allied with disposition (the spirited element), as Laches might have more successfully argued at *La.* 192e6 ff.

Aristotle in his *Nichomachean Ethics* treats courage, among other virtues, in terms of his theory of the Mean (where courage lies between overconfidence and fearfulness) and, like Plato, admitted non-cognitive elements into his analysis, while at the same time narrowing the application of 'courageous' in the strict sense to courage displayed in battle, allowing other instances 'by analogy' (EN 1115a20, contrast Socrates' wide definition in *La.* 191d1 ff. and n.).

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(iii) *Laches* in historical context

The significance of non-philosophical discussions of *ἀρετή* for the argument of the Dialogue has been mentioned earlier in the Introduction and in the Commentary (see above 3 (i) (c) and Commentary nn. on 179b2 and 184b4–7). The blurring of distinctions in ordinary Greek usage between a 'core' meaning and a more general term of approbation which at times seems to cover a very wide range of values, gives immediate plausibility to the hypothesis of *ἀνδρεία* = 'knowledge of all good and evil', the rejection of which ends the Dialogue.

Yet the links with non-philosophic literature go further. There is, for example, a striking resemblance between Nikias' definition at 194e11–195a1 and Thucydides' account of Pericles' description of Athenian bravery, in the Funeral Speech: 'Others are brave out of ignorance; and, when they stop to think, they begin to fear. But men who can most truly be accounted brave are *those who best* know the meaning of what is sweet in life and what is terrible (*τὰ τε δεινὰ καὶ ἡδέα σαφέστατα γιγνώσκοντες*) and because of this do not turn away from dangers' (Thuc. 2.40.3 tr. R. Warner (adapted)). The link between courage, military success and intellect at Athens is a pervasive theme of the Funeral Speech, in contrast to Spartan laborious *ἄσκησις* (exercise) (Thuc. 2.39.1). In *Laches*, likewise, Nikias' (Athenian) championship of intellect and skill is strongly contrasted with Laches' emphasis on *καρτερία* ('guts', Stokes, 47) coupled with a definite, if indirectly expressed, acknowledgement of the qualities of Spartan courage (the historical Laches had been active in attempts to make peace with Sparta in 423 BC, Thuc. 4.118).

The small but vital distinction between the example quoted from Thucydides above and Nikias' definition offers a clue to the purpose of *Laches*: Plato is concerned with *τὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα...καὶ τὰ κακά* (*Laches* 199d5–6) rather than what is agreeable or expedient, and the Dialogue as a whole progresses from the rather vague educational aims of Lysimachos, couched in traditional terms of success and renown (179b1–d6), to the more sharply focused aims of Socrates. Although, as mentioned above (4 (i)) Socrates' heterodoxy is muted in *Laches* by comparison with other Dialogues, his frequent emphasis upon *θεραπεία* of the *ψυχή* and the search for *ἀρετή* via knowledge, distinguishes him sharply (and in, e.g. *Gorgias*, antagonistically) from the conventional 'success ethic' of the Athenian *polis*.

In *Laches*, the placing of Plato's Socrates in a historical context is subtle, but none the less effective. The elaborate Introduction to the Dialogue, with late entry of Socrates, has a clear dramatic function (see Commentary, note at end of Section 2 'S's entry into the dialogue'), but equally important is the prominence it allows to a leisurely development

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of the situation. What Lysimachos is referring to is a failure in education, which, by implication, extends to his generation (see Laches at 180b1 ff.). His and Melesias' father, eminent statesmen of the Persian War and its aftermath, failed to educate their children in effective civic responsibility, choosing instead inappropriate 'old fashioned' accomplishments such as wrestling and horsemanship instead of political and military skills (*La.* 179c2–5) which lead to *καλὰ ἔργα* (see Davies (2), 176). Moreover, Lys.' new 'discovery' of *hoplomachia* with its socially exclusive connotations (Nikias, at 182a1–2) and its somewhat old-fashioned ethos (Marrou, 65) looks like being equally irrelevant to what is really required by contemporary society.

There is here an implied choice if they are not simply fated to repeat their fathers' mistakes: Lysimachos and Melesias are 'quietists' (*ἀπράγμονες*), part of a significant group of (mainly) aristocratic Athenian citizens who took little or no part in the political and military affairs of the city, the object of Pericles' disapproval in the Funeral Speech (Thuc. 2.40.2). Nikias and Laches were, as generals, not in exactly the same position but stood at some distance from the radical aspects of the Athenian democracy in the 420s (see esp. Carter, 117 ff.). Socrates and his circle (not entirely separate from the others, as Nikias' position makes clear) represent yet another aspect of *ἀπραγμοσύνη*, involving, as we have seen, a radical rejection of values associated with civic renown, and a negative attitude (to put it no more strongly) to the teaching of the sophists (see n. on 186c3) and their professional associates. Composing *Laches* in the 390s, Plato may have been giving a certain significance to the dramatic date at which he chose to set the Dialogue, creating a 'dual focus' (see above 4 (i) end) in which he is able simultaneously to set out, and comment on, his version of Athenian civic decline in the last quarter of the fifth century in terms of a 'lost generation' of Athenians whose education, whether irrelevant to the radical democracy or only too relevant, failed to address what he considered vital issues. In substituting his programme for that of Lysimachos and Laches, Plato's Socrates suggests the beginning of a radical alternative. This is, surely, the significance of Socrates' arrangement to 'meet tomorrow' (201c5), not with any expectation of progress with Lysimachos, but on the assumption that, as he proclaims in *Apology* (21b–23b), Socrates must continue to obey the oracle of the god at Delphi. *Laches* sounds as if it stands quite near the beginning of this quest.

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5. *LACHES*: SYNOPSIS AND FORMAL STRUCTURE
(the divisions to be followed in the commentary)

Section 1: *Lysimachos' Introduction, 178a1–80a5*
Lys. asks his friends for help in choosing a worthwhile accomplishment for his and M.'s sons. Would *hoplomachia* be suitable?

Section 2: *Reactions of Interlocutors, 180a6–81d7*
L. and N. are very ready to oblige, but suggest S. as someone with an interest in such questions. In response to Lys.' questions as to S.'s identity, L. reveals S.'s reputation as a soldier. S. agrees to help, but first defers to his seniors.

Section 3: *N.'s speech in defence of* hoplomachia, *181d8–82d5*
N. recommends *hoplomachia* as a training worthy of free citizens, which also has practical relevance for actual combat.

Section 4: *L.'s speech attacking* hoplomachia, *182d6–84c8*
L. doubts the value of *hoplomachia*: the major military power of Sparta doesn't practise it, instructors don't make effective practitioners (e.g. Stesilaus), and a reputation for skill in it hinders both cowards and brave.

Section 5: *S.'s initial questioning, 184c9–86a2*
Lys. is at a loss how to arbitrate between N. and L.; S. introduces, first, the need for authority based on *episteme* rather than numbers. There is, however, need, before that, to consider the subject in which expertise is to be sought—the *psyche* of the young. And experts need to offer proof of their expertise.

Section 6: *S.'s speech on the quest for teachers, 186a3–87d5*
It is essential to find proven teachers; S. is not and has never been one, but N. and L. with their financial means and seniority have had the means to acquire expertise. Yet they need to make good their claims. Lys. consults N. and L. over S.'s proposal.

Section 7: *The reaction of N. and L. to Socrates' proposals, 187d6–89d3*
N. points out that enquiries with S. turn into self-examination which, since it is not unpleasant, he is willing to undergo. L. rates highly a harmony of words and deeds. S.'s deeds are proven and so L. is prepared to be questioned by him. Lys., giving his age as a pretext, concedes the discussion (also on behalf of M.) to N. and L.

Section 8: *The argument between L. and S.: preliminaries, 189d4–90d6*
There is a more basic question: what are we looking for which, by addition, will improve the *psyche*? Answer *ἀρετή*. We need to know what this is or at least the part of it relevant to the present discussion, namely *ἀνδρεία*.

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Section 9: *L.'s first attempt to define ἀνδρεία, 190d7–92b4*
Courage is to stand in the ranks and resist the enemy and avoid flight. S. explains that flight can be consistent with courage; courage moreover, can be exhibited in a wide range of circumstances. What is their common factor (on analogy with swiftness)?

Section 10: *L.'s second attempt to define ἀνδρεία, 192b5–93e5*
Courage is a certain endurance of the *psyche*. S. secures agreement that wise endurance is required: foolish endurance is not courage. But φρόνησις is not a sufficient or perhaps even a necessary condition for bravery. In certain cases wise endurance is less courageous than foolish endurance. So there is *aporia*, and no 'Doric' match between words and deeds.

Section 11: *Interlude, 193e6–94c6*
S. suggests that they show καρτερία in persevering with the enquiry. L. is confused and S. suggests that they ask N. to help.

Section 12: *N.'s attempt to define ἀνδρεία, 194c7–96c9*
N. bases his argument on what he claims as S.'s definition of good and bad in terms of knowledge: therefore the courageous man must be wise. N. further refines his definition in the face of questioning from S. and L.: courage is knowledge of what is fearful and encouraging in war and all other situations. L. equivocates and leaves S. to question N. further.

Section 13: *S.'s first examination of N.'s definition, 196c10–97e10*
S. attempts to refine N.'s definition: knowledge is not that of e.g. a physician or soothsayer. Nor are animals courageous; in response to L., N. makes a distinction between rashness and courage. L. is irritated by N.'s argument, and S. suggests that N. has acquired his distinctions between terms from Prodikos, by way of Damon.

Section 14: *S's second examination of N's definition, 197e10–99e12*
Courage is a part of ἀρετή along with other parts. But knowledge of what is to be feared and dared is equivalent to knowledge of all good and evil. So courage is the whole of ἀρετή. Since this again contradicts the initial assumption—that courage is a *part* of ἀρετή, we again have *aporia*.

Section 15: *Conclusion, 199e13–201c5*
L. and N. clash, questioning each other's competence and knowledge, agreeing finally that S. is more competent than either of them. In response to Lys.' request to S. that he should take over the education of the boys, S. professes himself unfit because he knows no more than the others. So further advice must be sought. Lys. proposes further consultation on the morrow, and S. agrees.

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ΛΑΧΗΣ

ΛΥΣΙΜΑΧΟΣ, ΜΕΛΗΣΙΑΣ, ΝΙΚΙΑΣ, ΛΑΧΗΣ, ΠΑΙΔΕΣ ΛΥΣΙΜΑΧΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΛΗΣΙΟΥ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ

St. II p. 178

ΛΥ. Τεθέασθε μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα μαχόμενον ἐν ὅπλοις, ὦ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης· οὗ δ' ἕνεκα ὑμᾶς ἐκελεύσαμεν συνθεάσασθαι ἐγώ τε καὶ Μελησίας ὅδε, τότε μὲν οὐκ εἴπομεν, νῦν δ' ἐροῦμεν. ἡγούμεθα γὰρ χρῆναι πρός γε ὑμᾶς παρρησιάζεσθαι. εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἳ τῶν τοιούτων καταγελῶσι, καὶ ἐάν τις αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύσηται, οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν ἃ νοοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ συμβουλευομένου ἄλλα λέγουσι παρὰ τὴν αὑτῶν δόξαν· ὑμᾶς δὲ ἡμεῖς ἡγησάμενοι καὶ ἱκανοὺς γνῶναι καὶ γνόντας ἁπλῶς ἂν εἰπεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ ὑμῖν, οὕτω παρελάβομεν ἐπὶ τὴν συμβουλὴν περὶ ὧν μέλλομεν ἀνακοινοῦσθαι. ἔστιν οὖν τοῦτο, περὶ οὗ πάλαι τοσαῦτα προοιμιάζομαι, τόδε. ἡμῖν 179 εἰσὶν υἱεῖς οὑτοί, ὅδε μὲν τοῦδε, πάππου ἔχων ὄνομα Θουκυδίδης, ἐμὸς δὲ αὖ ὅδε—παππῷον δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὄνομ' ἔχει τοὐμοῦ πατρός· Ἀριστείδην γὰρ αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν—ἡμῖν οὖν τούτων δέδοκται ἐπιμεληθῆναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, καὶ μὴ ποιῆσαι ὅπερ οἱ πολλοί, ἐπειδὴ μειράκια γέγονεν, ἀνεῖναι αὐτοὺς ὅτι βούλονται ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄρχεσθαι αὐτῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καθ' ὅσον οἷοί τ' ἐσμέν. εἰδότες οὖν καὶ ὑμῖν υἱεῖς ὄντας ἡγησάμεθα μεμεληκέναι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἴπερ τισὶν ἄλλοις, πῶς ἂν θεραπευθέντες γένοιντο ἄριστοι· εἰ δ' ἄρα πολλάκις μὴ προσεσχήκατε τὸν νοῦν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὑπομνήσοντες ὅτι οὐ χρὴ αὐτοῦ ἀμελεῖν, καὶ παρακαλοῦντες ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπιμέλειάν τινα ποιήσασθαι τῶν υἱέων κοινῇ μεθ' ἡμῶν. ὅθεν δὲ ἡμῖν ταῦτ' ἔδοξεν, ὦ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης, χρὴ ἀκοῦσαι, κἂν ᾖ ὀλίγῳ μακρότερα. συσσιτοῦμεν γὰρ δὴ ἐγώ τε καὶ Μελησίας ὅδε, καὶ ἡμῖν τὰ μειράκια παρασιτεῖ. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον τοῦ λόγου, παρρη-

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σιασόμεθα πρὸς ὑμᾶς. ἡμῶν γὰρ ἑκάτερος περὶ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ πατρὸς πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἔχει λέγειν πρὸς τοὺς νεανίσκους, καὶ ὅσα ἐν πολέμῳ ἠργάσαντο καὶ ὅσα ἐν εἰρήνῃ, διοικοῦντες τά τε τῶν συμμάχων καὶ τὰ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως· ἡμέτερα δ' αὐτῶν ἔργα οὐδέτερος ἔχει λέγειν. ταῦτα δὴ ὑπαισχυνόμεθά τε τούσδε καὶ αἰτιώμεθα τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν ὅτι ἡμᾶς μὲν εἴων τρυφᾶν, ἐπειδὴ μειράκια ἐγενόμεθα, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων πράγματα ἔπραττον· καὶ τοῖσδε τοῖς νεανίσκοις αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐνδεικνύμεθα, λέγοντες ὅτι εἰ μὲν ἀμελήσουσιν ἑαυτῶν καὶ μὴ πείσονται ἡμῖν, ἀκλεεῖς γενήσονται, εἰ δ' ἐπιμελήσονται, τάχ' ἂν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἄξιοι γένοιντο ἃ ἔχουσιν. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν φασιν πείσεσθαι· ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν, τί ἂν οὗτοι μαθόντες ἢ ἐπιτηδεύσαντες ὅτι ἄριστοι γένοιντο. εἰσηγήσατο οὖν τις ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα, ὅτι καλὸν εἴη τῷ νέῳ μαθεῖν ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι· καὶ ἐπῄνει τοῦτον ὃν νῦν ὑμεῖς ἐθεάσασθε ἐπιδεικνύμενον, κἄτ' ἐκέλευε θεάσασθαι. ἔδοξε δὴ χρῆναι αὐτούς τε ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ θέαν τἀνδρὸς καὶ ὑμᾶς συμπαραλαβεῖν ἅμα μὲν συνθεατάς, ἅμα δὲ συμβούλους τε καὶ κοινωνούς, ἐὰν βούλησθε, περὶ τῆς τῶν υἱέων ἐπιμελείας. ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ ἐβουλόμεθα ὑμῖν ἀνακοινώσασθαι. ἤδη οὖν ὑμέτερον μέρος συμβουλεύειν καὶ περὶ τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος, εἴτε δοκεῖ χρῆναι μανθάνειν εἴτε μή, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἴ τι ἔχετε ἐπαινέσαι μάθημα νέῳ ἀνδρὶ ἢ ἐπιτήδευμα, καὶ περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας λέγειν ὁποῖόν τι ποιήσετε.

ΝΙ. Ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε καὶ Μελησία, ἐπαινῶ τε ὑμῶν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ κοινωνεῖν ἕτοιμος, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Λάχητα τόνδε.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ γὰρ οἴει, ὦ Νικία. ὡς ὅ γε ἔλεγεν ὁ Λυσίμαχος ἄρτι περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ Μελησίου, πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ εὖ εἰρῆσθαι καὶ εἰς ἐκείνους καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς καὶ εἰς ἅπαντας ὅσοι τὰ τῶν πόλεων πράττουσιν, ὅτι αὐτοῖς σχεδόν τι ταῦτα συμβαίνει ἃ οὗτος λέγει καὶ περὶ παῖδας καὶ περὶ τἆλλα, τὰ ἴδια ὀλιγωρεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἀμελῶς διατίθεσθαι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Λυσίμαχε· ὅτι δ' ἡμᾶς μὲν συμβούλους παρακαλεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν νεανίσκων

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παιδείαν, Σωκράτη δὲ τόνδε οὐ παρακαλεῖς, θαυμάζω, πρῶτον μὲν ὄντα δημότην, ἔπειτα ἐνταῦθα ἀεὶ τὰς διατριβὰς ποιούμενον ὅπου τί ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων ὧν σὺ ζητεῖς περὶ τοὺς νέους ἢ μάθημα ἢ ἐπιτήδευμα καλόν.

ΛΥ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Λάχης; Σωκράτης γὰρ ὅδε τινὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμέλειαν πεποίηται;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε.

ΝΙ. Τοῦτο μέν σοι κἂν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν οὐ χεῖρον Λάχητος· καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ μοι ἔναγχος ἄνδρα προυξένησε τῷ υἱεῖ διδάσκαλον μουσικῆς, Ἀγαθοκλέους μαθητὴν Δάμωνα, ἀνδρῶν χαριέστατον οὐ μόνον τὴν μουσικήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τἆλλα ὑπόσου βούλει ἄξιον συνδιατρίβειν τηλικούτοις νεανίσκοις.

ΛΥ. Οὗτοι, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Νικία καὶ Λάχης, οἱ ἡλίκοι ἐγὼ ἔτι γιγνώσκομεν τοὺς νεωτέρους, ἅτε κατ' οἰκίαν τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβοντες ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας· ἀλλ' εἴ τι καὶ σύ, ὦ παῖ Σωφρονίσκου, ἔχεις τῷδε τῷ σαυτοῦ δημότῃ ἀγαθὸν συμβουλεῦσαι, χρὴ συμβουλεύειν. δίκαιος δ' εἶ· καὶ γὰρ πατρικὸς ἡμῖν φίλος τυγχάνεις ὤν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ σὸς πατὴρ ἑταίρω τε καὶ φίλω ἦμεν, καὶ πρότερον ἐκεῖνος ἐτελεύτησε, πρίν τι ἐμοὶ διενεχθῆναι. περιφέρει δέ τίς με καὶ μνήμη ἄρτι τῶνδε λεγόντων· τὰ γὰρ μειράκια τάδε πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἷκοι διαλεγόμενοι θαμὰ ἐπιμέμνηνται Σωκράτους καὶ σφόδρα ἐπαινοῦσιν· οὐ μέντοι πώποτε αὐτοὺς ἀνηρώτησα εἰ τὸν Σωφρονίσκου λέγοιεν. ἀλλ', ὦ παῖδες, λέγετέ μοι, 181 δδ' ἐστὶ Σωκράτης, περὶ οὗ ἐκάστοτε ἐμέμνησθε;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ πάτερ, οὗτος.

ΛΥ. Εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὀρθοῖς τὸν πατέρα, ἄριστον ἀνδρῶν ὄντα, καὶ ἄλλως καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι οἰκεῖα τά τε σὰ ἡμῖν ὑπάρξει καὶ σοὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα.

ΛΑ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, μὴ ἀφίεσό γε τἀνδρός· ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλοθί γε αὐτὸν ἐθεασάμην οὐ μόνον τὸν πατέρα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πατρίδα ὀρθοῦντα· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἀπὸ Δηλίου b φυγῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ συνανεχώρει, κἀγώ σοι λέγω ὅτι εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι ἤθελον τοιοῦτοι εἶναι, ὀρθὴ ἂν ἡμῶν ἡ πόλις ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔπεσε τότε τοιοῦτον πτῶμα.

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ΛΥ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος μέντοι ὁ ἔπαινός ἐστιν καλός, ὃν σὺ νῦν ἐπαινῇ ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν ἀξίων πιστεύεσθαι καὶ εἰς ταῦτα εἰς ἃ οὗτοι ἐπαινοῦσιν. εὖ οὖν ἴσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἀκούων χαίρω ὅτι εὐδοκιμεῖς, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡγοῦ με ἐν τοῖς εὐνούστατόν σοι εἶναι. χρῆν μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερόν γε φοιτᾶν αὐτὸν παρ' ἡμᾶς καὶ οἰκείους ἡγεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ δίκαιον· νῦν δ' οὖν ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας, ἐπειδὴ ἀνεγνωρίσαμεν ἀλλήλους, μὴ ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ σύνισθί τε καὶ γνώριζε καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ τούσδε τοὺς νεωτέρους, ὅπως ἂν διασῴζητε καὶ ὑμεῖς τὴν ἡμετέραν φιλίαν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ ποιήσεις καὶ ἡμεῖς σε καὶ αὖθις ὑπομνήσομεν· περὶ δὲ ὧν ἠρξάμεθα τί φατε; τί δοκεῖ; τὸ μάθημα τοῖς μειρακίοις ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι ἢ οὔ, τὸ μαθεῖν ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων πέρι, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, ἔγωγε πειράσομαι συμβουλεύειν ἄν τι δύνωμαι, καὶ αὖ ἃ προκαλῇ πάντα ποιεῖν. δικαιότατον μέντοι μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐμὲ νεώτερον ὄντα τῶνδε καὶ ἀπειρότερον τούτων ἀκούειν πρότερον τί λέγουσιν καὶ μανθάνειν παρ' αὐτῶν· ἐὰν δ' ἔχω τι ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτων λεγόμενα, τότ' ἤδη διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν καὶ σὲ καὶ τούτους. ἀλλ', ὦ Νικία, τί οὐ λέγει πότερος ὑμῶν;

ΝΙ. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες. δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἐμοὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα τοῖς νέοις ὠφέλιμον εἶναι ἐπίστασθαι πολλαχῇ. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἄλλοθι διατρίβειν, ἐν οἷς δὴ φιλοῦσιν οἱ νέοι τὰς διατριβὰς ποιεῖσθαι ὅταν σχολὴν ἄγωσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ, εὖ ἔχει, ὅθεν καὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον ἴσχειν ἀνάγκη—οὐδενὸς γὰρ τῶν γυμνασίων φαυλότερον οὐδ' ἐλάττω πόνον ἔχει—καὶ ἅμα προσήκει μάλιστ' ἐλευθέρῳ τοῦτό τε τὸ γυμνάσιον καὶ ἡ ἱππική· οὗ γὰρ ἀγῶνος ἀθληταί ἐσμεν καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγὼν πρόκειται, μόνοι οὗτοι γυμνάζονται οἱ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς [τὸν] περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ὀργάνοις γυμναζόμενοι. ἔπειτα ὀνήσει μέν τι τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα καὶ ἐν τῇ μάχῃ αὐτῇ, ὅταν ἐν τάξει δέῃ μάχεσθαι μετὰ πολλῶν ἄλλων· μέγιστον μέντοι αὐτοῦ ὄφελος, ὅταν λυθῶσιν αἱ τάξεις καὶ ἤδη τι δέῃ μόνον πρὸς μόνον ἢ διώκοντα ἀμυνομένῳ τινὶ ἐπιθέσθαι ἢ καὶ ἐν φυγῇ ἐπιτιθεμένου ἄλλου

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ἀμύνασθαι αὐτόν· οὔτ' ἂν ὑπό γε ἑνὸς εἷς ὁ τοῦτ' ἐπιστάμενος οὐδὲν ἂν πάθοι, ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ ὑπὸ πλειόνων, ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ ἂν ταύτῃ πλεονεκτοῖ. ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἰς ἄλλου καλοῦ μαθήματος ἐπιθυμίαν παρακαλεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον· πᾶς γὰρ ἂν μαθὼν ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι ἐπιθυμήσειε καὶ τοῦ ἑξῆς μαθήματος τοῦ περὶ τὰς τάξεις, καὶ ταῦτα λαβὼν καὶ φιλοτιμηθεὶς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ πᾶν ἂν τὸ περὶ τὰς στρατηγίας ὁρμήσειε· καὶ ἤδη δῆλον ὅτι τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα καὶ μαθήματα πάντα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ καλὰ καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξια ἀνδρὶ μαθεῖν τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεῦσαι, ὧν καθηγήσαιτ' ἂν τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα. προσθήσομεν δ' αὐτῷ οὐ σμικρὰν προσθήκην, ὅτι πάντα ἄνδρα ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ θαρραλεώτερον καὶ ἀνδρειότερον ἂν ποιήσειεν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ὀλίγῳ αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη. μὴ ἀτιμάσωμεν δὲ εἰπεῖν, εἰ καί τῳ σμικρότερον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι καὶ εὐσχημονέστερον ἐνταῦθα οὗ χρὴ τὸν ἄνδρα εὐσχημονέστερον φαίνεσθαι, οὗ ἅμα καὶ δεινότερος τοῖς ἐχθροῖς φανεῖται διὰ τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, ὥσπερ λέγω, δοκεῖ τε χρῆναι διδάσκειν τοὺς νεανίσκους ταῦτα καὶ δι' ἃ δοκεῖ εἴρηκα· Λάχητος δ', εἴ τι παρὰ ταῦτα λέγει, κἂν αὐτὸς ἡδέως ἀκούσαιμι.

ΛΑ. Ἀλλ' ἔστι μέν, ὦ Νικία, χαλεπὸν λέγειν περὶ ὁτουοῦν μαθήματος ὡς οὐ χρὴ μανθάνειν· πάντα γὰρ ἐπίστασθαι ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ ὁπλιτικὸν τοῦτο, εἰ μέν ἐστιν μάθημα, ὅπερ φασὶν οἱ διδάσκοντες, καὶ οἷον Νικίας λέγει, χρὴ αὐτὸ μανθάνειν· εἰ δ' ἔστιν μὲν μὴ μάθημα, ἀλλ' ἐξαπατῶσιν οἱ ὑπισχνούμενοι, ἢ μάθημα μὲν τυγχάνει ὄν, μὴ μέντοι πάνυ σπουδαῖον, τί καὶ δέοι ἂν αὐτὸ μανθάνειν; λέγω δὲ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τάδε ἀποβλέψας, ὅτι οἶμαι ἐγὼ τοῦτο, εἴ τι ἦν, οὐκ ἂν λελῆθέναι Λακεδαιμονίους, οἷς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μέλει ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἢ τοῦτο ζητεῖν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν, ὅτι ἂν μαθόντες καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσαντες πλεονεκτοῖεν τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τὸν πόλεμον. εἰ δ' ἐκείνους λέληθεν, ἀλλ' οὐ τούτους γε τοὺς διδασκάλους αὐτοῦ λέληθεν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων σπουδάζουσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ ὅτι παρ' ἐκείνοις ἄν τις τιμηθεὶς εἰς ταῦτα καὶ παρὰ τῶν

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ἄλλων πλεῖστ' ἂν ἐργάζοιτο χρήματα, ὥσπερ γε καὶ τραγῳδίας ποιητὴς παρ' ἡμῖν τιμηθείς. τοιγάρτοι ὃς ἂν οἴηται τραγῳδίαν καλῶς ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἔξωθεν κύκλῳ περὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν
b κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιδεικνύμενος περιέρχεται, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς δεῦρο φέρεται καὶ τοῖσδ' ἐπιδείκνυσιν εἰκότως· τοὺς δὲ ἐν ὅπλοις μαχομένους ἐγὼ τούτους ὁρῶ τὴν μὲν Λακεδαίμονα ἡγουμένους εἶναι ἄβατον ἱερὸν καὶ οὐδὲ ἄκρῳ ποδὶ ἐπι-
5 βαίνοντας, κύκλῳ δὲ περιιόντας αὐτὴν καὶ πᾶσι μᾶλλον ἐπιδεικνυμένους, καὶ μάλιστα τούτοις οἳ κἂν αὐτοὶ ὁμολογήσειαν πολλοὺς σφῶν προτέρους εἶναι πρὸς τὰ τοῦ πολέμου.
c ἔπειτα, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, οὐ πάνυ ὀλίγοις ἐγὼ τούτων παραγέγονα ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔργῳ, καὶ ὁρῶ οἷοί εἰσιν. ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν ἡμῖν σκέψασθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπίτηδες οὐδεὶς πώποτ' εὐδόκιμος γέγονεν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀνὴρ τῶν τὰ ὁπλιτικὰ
5 ἐπιτηδευσάντων. καίτοι εἴς γε τἆλλα πάντα ἐκ τούτων οἱ ὀνομαστοὶ γίγνονται, ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευσάντων ἕκαστα· οὗτοι δ', ὡς ἔοικε, παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους οὕτω σφόδρα εἰς τοῦτο δεδυστυχήκασιν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτον τὸν Στησίλεων, ὃν ὑμεῖς
d μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐν τοσούτῳ ὄχλῳ ἐθεάσασθε ἐπιδεικνύμενον καὶ τὰ μεγάλα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγοντα ἃ ἔλεγεν, ἐτέρωθι ἐγὼ κάλλιον ἐθεασάμην ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιδεικνύμενον οὐχ ἑκόντα. προσβαλούσης γὰρ τῆς νεὼς ἐφ' ἣ ἐπεβάτευεν
5 πρὸς ὁλκάδα τινά, ἐμάχετο ἔχων δορυδρέπανον, διαφέρον δὴ ὅπλον ἅτε καὶ αὐτὸς τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρων. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν περὶ τἀνδρός, τὸ δὲ σόφισμα τὸ τοῦ δρεπάνου
e τοῦ πρὸς τῇ λόγχῃ οἷον ἀπέβη. μαχομένου γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐνέσχετό που ἐν τοῖς τῆς νεὼς σκεύεσιν καὶ ἀντελάβετο· εἵλκεν οὖν ὁ Στησίλεως βουλόμενος ἀπολῦσαι, καὶ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦν, ἡ δὲ ναῦς τὴν ναῦν παρῄει. τέως μὲν οὖν παρέθει
5 ἐν τῇ νηὶ ἀντεχόμενος τοῦ δόρατος· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ παρημείβετο ἡ ναῦς τὴν ναῦν καὶ ἐπέσπα αὐτὸν τοῦ δόρατος ἐχόμενον,
184 ἐφίει τὸ δόρυ διὰ τῆς χειρός, ἕως ἄκρου τοῦ στύρακος ἀντελάβετο. ἦν δὲ γέλως καὶ κρότος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ὁλκάδος ἐπί τε τῷ σχήματι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐπειδὴ βαλόντος τινὸς λίθῳ παρὰ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ κατάστρωμα ἀφίεται τοῦ

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δόρατος, τότ' ἤδη καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς τριήρους οὐκέτι οἷοί τ' ἦσαν τὸν γέλωτα κατέχειν, ὁρῶντες αἰωρούμενον ἐκ τῆς ὁλκάδος τὸ δορυδρέπανον ἐκεῖνο. ἴσως μὲν οὖν εἴη ἂν τὶ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ Νικίας λέγει· οἷς δ' οὖν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα, τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐστίν. ὃ οὖν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶπον, εἴτε οὕτω σμικρὰς ὠφελίας ἔχει μάθημα ὄν, εἴτε μὴ ὂν φασὶ καὶ προσποιοῦνται αὐτὸ εἶναι μάθημα, οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν. καὶ γὰρ οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, εἰ μὲν δειλός τις ὢν οἷοιτο αὐτὸ ἐπίστασθαι, θρασύτερος ἂν δι' αὐτὸ γενόμενος ἐπιφανέστερος γένοιτο οἷος ἦν, εἰ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος, φυλαττόμενος ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ καὶ σμικρὸν ἐξαμάρτοι, μεγάλας ἂν διαβολὰς ἴσχειν· ἐπίφθονος γὰρ ἡ προσποίησις τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιστήμης, ὥστ' εἰ μή τι θαυμαστὸν ὅσον διαφέρει τῇ ἀρετῇ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἄν τις φύγοι τὸ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι φάσκων ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην. τοιαύτη τις ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, ἡ περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα εἶναι σπουδή· χρὴ δ' ὅπερ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, καὶ Σωκράτη τόνδε μὴ ἀφιέναι, ἀλλὰ δεῖσθαι συμβουλεύειν ὅτῳ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου.

ΛΥ. Ἀλλὰ δέομαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐπιδιακρινοῦντος δοκεῖ μοι δεῖν ἡμῖν ἡ βουλή. εἰ μὲν γὰρ συνεφερέσθην τώδε, ἧττον ἂν τοῦ τοιούτου ἔδει· νῦν δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν γάρ, ὡς ὁρᾷς, Λάχης Νικίᾳ ἔθετο, εὖ δὴ ἔχει ἀκοῦσαι καὶ σοῦ ποτέρῳ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν σύμψηφος εἶ.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ Λυσίμαχε; ὁπότερ' ἂν οἱ πλείους ἐπαινῶσιν ἡμῶν, τούτοις μέλλεις χρῆσθαι;

ΛΥ. Τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ποιοῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ σύ, ὦ Μελησία, οὕτως ἂν ποιοῖς; κἂν εἴ τις περὶ ἀγωνίας τοῦ υἱέος σοι βουλὴ εἴη τί χρὴ ἀσκεῖν, ἆρα τοῖς πλείοσιν ἂν ἡμῶν πείθοιο, ἢ ἐκείνῳ ὅστις τυγχάνει ὑπὸ παιδοτρίβῃ ἀγαθῷ πεπαιδευμένος καὶ ἠσκηκώς;

ΜΕ. Ἐκείνῳ εἰκός γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Αὐτῷ ἄρ' ἂν μᾶλλον πείθοιο ἢ τέτταρσιν οὖσιν ἡμῖν;

ΜΕ. Ἴσως.

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ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμῃ γὰρ οἶμαι δεῖ κρίνεσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ πλήθει τὸ μέλλον καλῶς κριθήσεσθαι.

ΜΕ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν χρὴ πρῶτον αὐτὸ τοῦτο σκέψασθαι, εἴ ἐστιν τις ἡμῶν τεχνικὸς περὶ οὗ βουλευόμεθα ἢ οὔ· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἔστιν, ἐκείνῳ πείθεσθαι ἑνὶ ὄντι, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἐᾶν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλον τινὰ ζητεῖν. ἢ περὶ σμικροῦ οἴεσθε νυνὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Λυσίμαχος ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τούτου τοῦ κτήματος ὃ τῶν ὑμετέρων μέγιστον ὂν τυγχάνει; ὑέων γάρ που ἢ χρηστῶν ἢ τἀναντία γενομένων καὶ πᾶς ὁ οἶκος ὁ τοῦ πατρὸς οὕτως οἰκήσεται, ὁποῖοι ἄν τινες οἱ παῖδες γένωνται.

ΜΕ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πολλὴν ἄρα δεῖ προμηθίαν αὐτοῦ ἔχειν.

ΜΕ. Πάνυ γε.

b ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν, ὃ ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ἐσκοποῦμεν ἄν, εἰ ἐβουλόμεθα σκέψασθαι τίς ἡμῶν περὶ ἀγωνίαν τεχνικώτατος; ἆρ' οὐχ ὁ μαθὼν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσας, ᾧ καὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγονότες ἦσαν αὐτοῦ τούτου;

ΜΕ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἔτι πρότερον, τίνος ὄντος τούτου [οὗ] ζητοῦμεν τοὺς διδασκάλους;

ΜΕ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὧδε ἴσως μᾶλλον κατάδηλον ἔσται. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῖν ὡμολογῆσθαι τί ποτ' ἔστιν περὶ οὗ βουλευόμεθα [καὶ σκεπτόμεθα], ὅστις ἡμῶν τεχνικὸς καὶ τούτου c ἕνεκα διδασκάλους ἐκτήσατο, καὶ ὅστις μή.

ΝΙ. Οὐ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τοῦ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι σκοποῦμεν, εἴτε χρὴ αὐτὸ τοὺς νεανίσκους μανθάνειν εἴτε μή;

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Νικία. ἀλλ' ὅταν περὶ φαρμάκου τίς του πρὸς ὀφθαλμοὺς σκοπῆται, εἴτε χρὴ αὐτὸ ὑπαλείφεσθαι εἴτε μή, πότερον οἴει τότε εἶναι τὴν βουλὴν περὶ τοῦ φαρμάκου ἢ περὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν;

ΝΙ. Περὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν.

d ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅταν ἵππῳ χαλινὸν σκοπῆταί τις εἴ

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προσοιστέον ἢ μή, καὶ ὁπότε, τότε που περὶ τοῦ ἵππου βουλεύεται ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τοῦ χαλινοῦ;

ΝΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ὅταν τίς τι ἕνεκά του σκοπῇ, περὶ ἐκείνου ἡ βουλὴ τυγχάνει οὖσα οὗ ἕνεκα ἐσκόπει, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τοῦ ὃ ἕνεκα ἄλλου ἐζήτει.

ΝΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τὸν σύμβουλον σκοπεῖν ἄρα τεχνικός ἐστιν εἰς ἐκείνου θεραπείαν, οὗ ἕνεκα σκοπούμενοι σκοποῦμεν.

ΝΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν φαμεν περὶ μαθήματος σκοπεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκα τῆς τῶν νεανίσκων;

ΝΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις ἄρα ἡμῶν τεχνικὸς περὶ ψυχῆς θεραπείαν καὶ οἷός τε καλῶς τοῦτο θεραπεῦσαι, καὶ ὅτῳ διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.

ΛΑ. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὔπω ἑώρακας ἄνευ διδασκάλων τεχνικωτέρους γεγονότας εἰς ἔνια ἢ μετὰ διδασκάλων;

ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε, ὦ Λάχης· οἷς γε σὺ οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις πιστεῦσαι, εἰ φαῖεν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι δημιουργοί, εἰ μή τί σοι τῆς αὐτῶν τέχνης ἔργον ἔχοιεν ἐπιδεῖξαι εὖ εἰργασμένον, καὶ ἓν καὶ πλείω. 186

ΛΑ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡμᾶς ἄρα δεῖ, ὦ Λάχης τε καὶ Νικία—ἐπειδὴ Λυσίμαχος καὶ Μελησίας εἰς συμβουλὴν παρεκαλεσάτην ἡμᾶς περὶ τοῦν υἱέοιν, προθυμούμενοι αὐτοῖν ὅτι ἀρίστας γενέσθαι τὰς ψυχάς—εἰ μέν φαμεν ἔχειν, ἐπιδεῖξαι αὐτοῖς καὶ διδασκάλους οἵτινες [ἡμῶν γεγόνασιν] αὐτοὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες καὶ πολλῶν νέων τεθεραπευκότες ψυχὰς ἔπειτα καὶ ἡμᾶς διδάξαντες φαίνονται· ἢ εἴ τις ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἑαυτῷ διδάσκαλον μὲν οὔ φησι γεγονέναι, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔργα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐπιδεῖξαι τίνες Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ξένων, ἢ δοῦλοι ἢ ἐλεύθεροι, δι' ἐκεῖνον ὁμολογουμένως ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἡμῖν τούτων ὑπάρχει, ἄλλους

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κελεύειν ζητεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐν ἑταίρων ἀνδρῶν ὑέσιν κινδυνεύειν διαφθείροντας τὴν μεγίστην αἰτίαν ἔχειν ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκειοτάτων. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Λυσίμαχέ τε καὶ Μελησία, πρῶτος
c περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ λέγω ὅτι διδάσκαλός μοι οὐ γέγονε τούτου πέρι. καίτοι ἐπιθυμῶ γε τοῦ πράγματος ἐκ νέου ἀρξάμενος. ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἔχω τελεῖν μισθούς, οἵπερ μόνοι ἐπηγγέλλοντό με οἱοί τ' εἶναι ποιῆσαι καλόν τε κἀγαθόν·
5 αὐτὸς δ' αὖ εὑρεῖν τὴν τέχνην ἀδυνατῶ ἔτι νυνί. εἰ δὲ Νικίας ἢ Λάχης ηὗρηκεν ἢ μεμάθηκεν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι· καὶ γὰρ χρήμασιν ἐμοῦ δυνατώτεροι, ὥστε μαθεῖν παρ' ἄλλων, καὶ ἅμα πρεσβύτεροι, ὥστε ἤδη ηὑρηκέναι. δοκοῦσι
d δή μοι δυνατοὶ εἶναι παιδεῦσαι ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε ἀδεῶς ἀπεφαίνοντο περὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων νέῳ χρηστῶν τε καὶ πονηρῶν, εἰ μὴ αὐτοῖς ἐπίστευον ἱκανῶς εἰδέναι. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ἔγωγε τούτοις πιστεύω· ὅτι δὲ διαφέρεσθον ἀλλήλοιν,
5 ἐθαύμασα. τοῦτο οὖν σου ἐγὼ ἀντιδέομαι, ὦ Λυσίμαχε· καθάπερ ἄρτι Λάχης μὴ ἀφίεσθαί σε ἐμοῦ διεκελεύετο ἀλλὰ ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν παρακελεύομαί σοι μὴ ἀφίεσθαι Λάχητος μηδὲ Νικίου, ἀλλ' ἐρωτᾶν λέγοντα ὅτι ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης οὔ
e φησιν ἐπαΐειν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος οὐδ' ἱκανὸς εἶναι διακρῖναι ὁπότερος ὑμῶν ἀληθῆ λέγει—οὔτε γὰρ εὑρετὴς οὔτε μαθητὴς οὐδενὸς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων γεγονέναι—σὺ δ', ὦ Λάχης καὶ Νικία, εἴπετον ἡμῖν ἑκάτερος τίνι δὴ δεινοτάτῳ
5 συγγεγόνατον περὶ τῆς τῶν νέων τροφῆς, καὶ πότερα μαθόντε παρά του ἐπίστασθον ἢ αὐτὼ ἐξευρόντε, καὶ εἰ μὲν μαθόντε,
187 τίς ὁ διδάσκαλος ἑκατέρῳ καὶ τίνες ἄλλοι ὁμότεχνοι αὐτοῖς, ἵν', ἂν μὴ ὑμῖν σχολὴ ᾖ ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων, ἐπ' ἐκείνους ἴωμεν καὶ πείθωμεν ἢ δώροις ἢ χάρισιν ἢ ἀμφότερα ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων
5 παίδων, ὅπως μὴ καταισχύνωσι τοὺς αὑτῶν προγόνους φαῦλοι γενόμενοι· εἰ δ' αὐτοὶ εὑρεταὶ γεγονότε τοῦ τοιούτου, δότε παράδειγμα τίνων ἤδη ἄλλων ἐπιμεληθέντες ἐκ φαύλων καλούς τε κἀγαθοὺς ἐποιήσατε. εἰ γὰρ νῦν πρῶτον ἄρξεσθε
b παιδεύειν, σκοπεῖν χρὴ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ Καρὶ ὑμῖν ὁ κίνδυνος κινδυνεύηται, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὑέσι τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν φίλων

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παισί, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ὑμῖν συμβαίνῃ ἐν πίθῳ ἡ κεραμεία γιγνομένη. λέγετε οὖν τί τούτων ἢ φατὲ ὑμῖν ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ προσήκειν ἢ οὔ φατε. ταῦτ', ὦ Λυσίμαχε, παρ' αὐτῶν πυνθάνου τε καὶ μὴ μεθίει τοὺς ἄνδρας.

ΛΥ. Καλῶς μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες, Σωκράτης λέγειν· εἰ δὲ βουλομένοις ὑμῖν ἐστι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐρωτᾶσθαί τε καὶ διδόναι λόγον, αὐτοὺς δὴ χρὴ γιγνώσκειν, ὦ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ Μελησίᾳ τῷδε δῆλον ὅτι ἡδομένοις ἂν εἴη εἰ πάντα ἃ Σωκράτης ἐρωτᾷ ἐθέλοιτε λόγῳ διεξιέναι· καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐντεῦθεν ἠρχόμην λέγων, ὅτι εἰς συμβουλὴν διὰ ταῦτα ὑμᾶς παρακαλέσαιμεν, ὅτι μεμεληκέναι ὑμῖν ἡγούμεθα, ὡς εἰκός, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ἄλλως καὶ ἐπειδὴ οἱ παῖδες ὑμῖν ὀλίγου ὥσπερ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἡλικίαν ἔχουσι παιδεύεσθαι. εἰ οὖν ὑμῖν μή τι διαφέρει, εἴπατε καὶ κοινῇ μετὰ Σωκράτους σκέψασθε, διδόντες τε καὶ δεχόμενοι λόγον παρ' ἀλλήλων· εὖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο λέγει ὅδε, ὅτι περὶ τοῦ μεγίστου νῦν βουλευόμεθα τῶν ἡμετέρων. ἀλλ' ὁρᾶτε εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι οὕτω ποιεῖν.

ΝΙ. Ὦ Λυσίμαχε, δοκεῖς μοι ὡς ἀληθῶς Σωκράτη πατρόθεν γιγνώσκειν μόνον, αὐτῷ δ' οὐ συγγεγονέναι ἀλλ' ἢ παιδὶ ὄντι, εἴ που ἐν τοῖς δημόταις μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκολουθῶν ἐπλησίασέν σοι ἢ ἐν ἱερῷ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τῳ συλλόγῳ τῶν δημοτῶν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ πρεσβύτερος γέγονεν, οὐκ ἐντετυχηκὼς τῷ ἀνδρὶ δῆλος ἔτι εἶ.

ΛΥ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Νικία;

ΝΙ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖς εἰδέναι ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἐγγύτατα Σωκράτους ᾖ [λόγῳ ὥσπερ γένει] καὶ πλησιάζῃ διαλεγόμενος, ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ περὶ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἄρξηται διαλέγεσθαι, μὴ παύεσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου περιαγόμενον τῷ λόγῳ, πρὶν ⟨ἂν⟩ ἐμπέσῃ εἰς τὸ διδόναι περὶ αὑτοῦ λόγον, ὁντινα τρόπον νῦν τε ζῇ καὶ ὁντινα τὸν παρεληλυθότα βίον βεβίωκεν· ἐπειδὰν δ' ἐμπέσῃ, ὅτι οὐ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀφήσει Σωκράτης, πρὶν ἂν βασανίσῃ ταῦτα εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς ἅπαντα. ἐγὼ δὲ συνήθης τέ εἰμι τῷδε καὶ οἶδ' ὅτι ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ τούτου

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πάσχειν ταῦτα, καὶ ἔτι γε αὐτὸς ὅτι πείσομαι ταῦτα εὖ οἶδα· χαίρω γάρ, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, τῷ ἀνδρὶ πλησιάζων, καὶ οὐδὲν οἶμαι κακὸν εἶναι τὸ ὑπομιμνήσκεσθαι ὅτι μὴ καλῶς ἢ πεποιήκαμεν ἢ ποιοῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα βίον προμηθέστερον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸν ταῦτα μὴ φεύγοντα ἀλλ' ἐθέλοντα κατὰ τὸ τοῦ Σόλωνος καὶ ἀξιοῦντα μανθάνειν ἕωσπερ ἂν ζῇ, καὶ μὴ οἰόμενον αὐτῷ τὸ γῆρας νοῦν ἔχον προσιέναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἄηθες οὐδ' αὖ ἀηδὲς ὑπὸ Σωκράτους βασανίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλαι σχεδόν τι ἠπιστάμην ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῶν μειρακίων ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἔσοιτο Σωκράτους παρόντος, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν. ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει Σωκράτει συνδιατρίβειν ὅπως οὗτος βούλεται· Λάχητα δὲ τόνδε ὅρα ὅπως ἔχει περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου.

ΛΑ. Ἁπλοῦν τό γ' ἐμόν, ὦ Νικία, περὶ λόγων ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ βούλει, οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἀλλὰ διπλοῦν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξαιμί τῳ φιλόλογος εἶναι καὶ αὖ μισόλογος. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἀκούω ἀνδρὸς περὶ ἀρετῆς διαλεγομένου ἢ περί τινος σοφίας ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντος ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἀξίου τῶν λόγων ὧν λέγει, χαίρω ὑπερφυῶς, θεώμενος ἅμα τόν τε λέγοντα καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ὅτι πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἁρμόττοντά ἐστι. καὶ κομιδῇ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἁρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμοσμένος οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι [ζῆν ἡρμοσμένος οὗ] αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τὸν βίον σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀτεχνῶς δωριστὶ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἰαστί, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ φρυγιστὶ οὐδὲ λυδιστί, ἀλλ' ἥπερ μόνη Ἑλληνική ἐστιν ἁρμονία. ὁ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος χαίρειν με ποιεῖ φθεγγόμενος καὶ δοκεῖν ὀτῳοῦν φιλόλογον εἶναι—οὕτω σφόδρα ἀποδέχομαι παρ' αὐτοῦ τὰ λεγόμενα—ὁ δὲ τἀναντία τούτου πράττων λυπεῖ με, ὅσῳ ἂν δοκῇ ἄμεινον λέγειν, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον, καὶ ποιεῖ αὖ δοκεῖν εἶναι μισόλογον. Σωκράτους δ' ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν λόγων οὐκ ἔμπειρός εἰμι, ἀλλὰ πρότερον, ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν ἔργων ἐπειράθην, καὶ ἐκεῖ αὐτὸν ηὗρον ἄξιον ὄντα λόγων καλῶν καὶ πάσης παρρησίας. εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἔχει, συμβούλομαι τἀνδρί, καὶ ἥδιστ' ἂν ἐξεταζοίμην ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀχθοίμην μανθά-

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νων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ τῷ Σόλωνι, ἓν μόνον προσλαβών, συγχωρῶ· γηράσκων γὰρ πολλὰ διδάσκεσθαι ἐθέλω ὑπὸ χρηστῶν μόνον. τοῦτο γάρ μοι συγχωρείτω, ἀγαθὸν καὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν διδάσκαλον, ἵνα μὴ δυσμαθὴς φαίνωμαι ἀηδῶς μανθάνων· εἰ δὲ νεώτερος ὁ διδάσκων ἔσται ἢ μήπω ἐν δόξῃ ὢν ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων ἔχων, οὐδέν μοι μέλει. σοὶ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἐπαγγέλλομαι καὶ διδάσκειν καὶ ἐλέγχειν ἐμὲ ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ, καὶ μανθάνειν γε ὅτι αὖ ἐγὼ οἶδα· οὕτω σὺ παρ' ἐμοὶ διάκεισαι ἀπ' ἐκείνης τῆς ἡμέρας ᾗ μετ' ἐμοῦ συνδιεκινδύνευσας καὶ ἔδωκας σαυτοῦ πεῖραν ἀρετῆς ἣν χρὴ διδόναι τὸν μέλλοντα δικαίως δώσειν. λέγ' οὖν ὅτι σοι φίλον, μηδὲν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἡλικίαν ὑπόλογον ποισύμενος.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τὰ ὑμέτερα, ὡς ἔοικεν, αἰτιασόμεθα μὴ οὐχ ἕτοιμα εἶναι καὶ συμβουλεύειν καὶ συσκοπεῖν.

ΛΥ. Ἀλλ' ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον, ὦ Σώκρατες—ἕνα γάρ σε ἔγωγε ἡμῶν τίθημι—σκόπει οὖν ἀντ' ἐμοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν νεανίσκων ὅτι δεόμεθα παρὰ τῶνδε πυνθάνεσθαι, καὶ συμβούλευε διαλεγόμενος τούτοις. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνομαι ἤδη τὰ πολλὰ διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὧν ἂν διανοηθῶ ἐρέσθαι καὶ αὖ ἃ ἂν ἀκούσω· ἐὰν δὲ μεταξὺ ἄλλοι λόγοι γένωνται, οὐ πάνυ μέμνημαι. ὑμεῖς οὖν λέγετε καὶ διέξιτε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ ὧν προυθέμεθα· ἐγὼ δ' ἀκούσομαι καὶ ἀκούσας αὖ μετὰ Μελησίου τοῦδε ποιήσω τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν καὶ ὑμῖν δοκῇ.

ΣΩ. Πειστέον, ὦ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης, Λυσιμάχῳ καὶ Μελησίᾳ. ἃ μὲν οὖν νυνδὴ ἐπεχειρήσαμεν σκοπεῖν, τίνες οἱ διδάσκαλοι ἡμῖν τῆς τοιαύτης παιδείας γεγόνασιν ἢ τίνας ἄλλους βελτίους πεποιήκαμεν, ἴσως μὲν οὐ κακῶς εἶχεν ἐξετάζειν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡμᾶς αὐτούς· ἀλλ' οἶμαι καὶ ἡ τοιάδε σκέψις εἰς ταὐτὸν φέρει, σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴη ἄν. εἰ γὰρ τυγχάνομεν ἐπιστάμενοι ὁτουοῦν πέρι ὅτι παραγενόμενόν τῳ βέλτιον ποιεῖ ἐκεῖνο ᾧ παρεγένετο, καὶ προσέτι οἷοί τέ ἐσμεν αὐτὸ ποιεῖν παραγίγνεσθαι ἐκείνῳ, δῆλον ὅτι αὐτό γε ἴσμεν τοῦτο οὗ πέρι σύμβουλοι ἂν γενοίμεθα ὡς ἄν τις αὐτὸ ῥᾷστα καὶ ἄριστ' ἂν κτήσαιτο. ἴσως οὖν σὺ μανθάνετέ μου ὅτι λέγω, ἀλλ' ὧδε ῥᾷον μαθήσεσθε.

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εἰ τυγχάνομεν ἐπιστάμενοι ὅτι ὄψις παραγενομένη ὀφθαλμοῖς βελτίους ποιεῖ ἐκείνους οἷς παρεγένετο, καὶ προσέτι οἷοί τ' ἐσμὲν ποιεῖν αὐτὴν παραγίγνεσθαι ὄμμασι, δῆλον ὅτι ὄψιν γε ἴσμεν αὐτὴν ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν, ἧς πέρι σύμβουλοι ἂν γενοίμεθα ὡς ἄν τις αὐτὴν ῥᾷστα καὶ ἄριστα κτήσαιτο. εἰ γὰρ μηδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰδεῖμεν, ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν ὄψις ἢ ὅτι ἔστιν ἀκοή, σχολῇ ἂν σύμβουλοί γε ἄξιοι λόγου γενοίμεθα καὶ ἰατροὶ ἢ περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ἢ περὶ ὤτων, ὄντινα τρόπον ἀκοὴν ἢ ὄψιν κάλλιστ' ἂν κτήσαιτό τις.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Λάχης, καὶ νῦν ἡμᾶς τώδε παρακαλεῖτον εἰς συμβουλήν, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῖς υἱέσιν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴ παραγενομένη ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀμείνους ποιήσειε;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτο γ' ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή; εἰ γάρ που μηδ' ἀρετὴν εἰδεῖμεν τὸ παράπαν ὅτι ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τούτου σύμβουλοι γενοίμεθ' ἂν ὀρθοῦν, ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸ κάλλιστα κτήσαιτο;

ΛΑ. Οὐδένα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Φαμὲν ἄρα, ὦ Λάχης, εἰδέναι αὐτὸ ὅτι ἔστιν.

ΛΑ. Φαμὲν μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὃ γε ἴσμεν, κἂν εἴποιμεν δήπου τί ἐστιν.

ΛΑ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, περὶ ὅλης ἀρετῆς εὐθέως σκοπῶμεθα—πλέον γὰρ ἴσως ἔργον—ἀλλὰ μέρους τινὸς πέρι πρῶτον ἴδωμεν εἰ ἱκανῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι· καὶ ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ῥᾷων ἡ σκέψις ἔσται.

ΛΑ. Ἀλλ' οὕτω ποιῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ βούλει.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν προελοίμεθα τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μερῶν; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τοῦτο εἰς ὃ τείνειν δοκεῖ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις μάθησις; δοκεῖ δέ που τοῖς πολλοῖς εἰς ἀνδρείαν. ἦ γάρ;

ΛΑ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν πρῶτον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν, ὦ Λάχης, εἰπεῖν, ἀνδρεία τί ποτ' ἐστίν· ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο σκεψόμεθα

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καὶ ὅτῳ ἂν τρόπῳ τοῖς νεανίσκοις παραγένοιτο, καθ' ὅσον e
οἷόν τε ἐξ ἐπιτηδευμάτων τε καὶ μαθημάτων παραγενέσθαι.
ἀλλὰ πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ὃ λέγω, τί ἐστιν ἀνδρεία.

ΛΑ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν·
εἰ γάρ τις ἐθέλοι ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς πολε- 5
μίους καὶ μὴ φεύγοι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἀνδρεῖος ἂν εἴη.

ΣΩ. Εὖ μὲν λέγεις, ὦ Λάχης· ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐγὼ αἴτιος,
οὐ σαφῶς εἰπών, τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ τοῦτο ὃ διανοού-
μενος ἠρόμην, ἀλλ' ἕτερον.

ΛΑ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; 10

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ φράσω, ἐὰν οἷός τε γένωμαι. ἀνδρεῖός που 191
οὗτος, ὃν καὶ σὺ λέγεις, ὃς ἂν ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων μάχηται
τοῖς πολεμίοις.

ΛΑ. Ἐγὼ γοῦν φημι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ τί αὖ ὅδε, ὃς ἂν φεύγων 5
μάχηται τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλλὰ μὴ μένων;

ΛΑ. Πῶς φεύγων;

ΣΩ. Ὥσπερ που καὶ Σκύθαι λέγονται οὐχ ἧττον φεύ-
γοντες ἢ διώκοντες μάχεσθαι, καὶ Ὅμηρός που ἐπαινῶν
τοὺς τοῦ Αἰνείου ἵππους κραιπνὰ μάλ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα 10
ἔφη αὐτοὺς ἐπίστασθαι διώκειν ἠδὲ φέβεσθαι· καὶ αὐτὸν b
τὸν Αἰνείαν κατὰ τοῦτ' ἐνεκωμίασε, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ φόβου
ἐπιστήμην, καὶ εἶπεν αὐτὸν εἶναι μήστωρα φόβοιο.

ΛΑ. Καὶ καλῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· περὶ ἁρμάτων γὰρ
ἔλεγε. καὶ σὺ τὸ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἱππέων πέρι λέγεις· τὸ μὲν 5
γὰρ ἱππικὸν [τὸ ἐκείνων] οὕτω μάχεται, τὸ δὲ ὁπλιτικὸν τό
γε τῶν Ἑλλήνων], ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω.

ΣΩ. Πλήν γ' ἴσως, ὦ Λάχης, τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων. Λακε-
δαιμονίους γάρ φασιν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς, ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τοῖς c
γερροφόροις ἐγένοντο, οὐκ ἐθέλειν μένοντας πρὸς αὐτοὺς
μάχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ φεύγειν, ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐλύθησαν αἱ τάξεις
τῶν Περσῶν, ἀναστρεφομένους ὥσπερ ἱππέας μάχεσθαι
καὶ οὕτω νικῆσαι τὴν ἐκεῖ μάχην. 5

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὅτι ἐγὼ αἴτιος μὴ

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καλῶς σε ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς ἠρόμην—βουλόμενος
d γάρ σου πυθέσθαι μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὁπλιτικῷ ἀνδρείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἱππικῷ καὶ ἐν σύμπαντι τῷ πολεμικῷ εἴδει, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κινδύνοις ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ ὅσοι
5 γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, καὶ ἔτι αὖ μὴ μόνον ὅσοι πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν ἢ φόβους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἡδονὰς δεινοὶ
e μάχεσθαι, καὶ μένοντες καὶ ἀναστρέφοντες—εἰσὶ γάρ πού τινες, ὦ Λάχης, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδρεῖοι—

ΛΑ. Καὶ σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνδρεῖοι μὲν πάντες οὗτοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ
5 μὲν ἐν ἡδοναῖς, οἱ δ' ἐν λύπαις, οἱ δ' ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις, οἱ δ' ἐν φόβοις τὴν ἀνδρείαν κέκτηνται· οἱ δέ γ' οἶμαι δειλίαν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις.

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε δὴν ἑκάτερον τούτων; τοῦτο ἐπυνθανόμην.
10 πάλιν οὖν πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἀνδρείαν πρῶτον τί δὴν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ταὐτόν ἐστιν· ἢ οὔπω καταμανθάνεις ὃ λέγω;

ΛΑ. Οὐ πάνυ τι.

192 ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὧδε λέγω, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τάχος ἠρώτων τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ὃ καὶ ἐν τῷ τρέχειν τυγχάνει ὂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ κιθαρίζειν καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν καὶ ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, καὶ σχεδόν τι αὐτὸ κεκτήμεθα, οὗ καὶ πέρι
5 ἄξιον λέγειν, ἢ ἐν ταῖς τῶν χειρῶν πράξεσιν ἢ σκελῶν ἢ στόματός τε καὶ φωνῆς ἢ διανοίας· ἢ οὐχ οὕτω καὶ σὺ λέγεις;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ τοίνυν τίς με ἔροιτο· "Ὦ Σώκρατες, τί λέγεις
10 τοῦτο ὃ ἐν πᾶσιν ὀνομάζεις ταχυτῆτα εἶναι;" εἴποιμ' ἂν
b αὐτῷ ὅτι τὴν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πολλὰ διαπραττομένην δύναμιν ταχυτῆτα ἔγωγε καλῶ καὶ περὶ φωνὴν καὶ περὶ δρόμον καὶ περὶ τἆλλα πάντα.

ΛΑ. Ὀρθῶς γε σὺ λέγων.

5 ΣΩ. Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Λάχης, τὴν ἀνδρείαν οὕτως εἰπεῖν τίς οὖσα δύναμις ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἐν λύπῃ καὶ

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ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀνδρεία κέκληται.

ΛΑ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καρτερία τις εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, εἰ τό γε διὰ πάντων [περὶ ἀνδρείας] πεφυκὸς δεῖ εἰπεῖν. c

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ, εἴ γε τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινούμεθα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε φαίνεται· οὔτι πᾶσά γε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, καρτερία ἀνδρεία σοι φαίνεται. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐνθένδε· σχεδὸν γάρ τι οἶδα, ὦ Λάχης, ὅτι τῶν πάνυ καλῶν 5 πραγμάτων ἡγῇ σὺ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

ΛΑ. Εὖ μὲν οὖν ἴσθι ὅτι τῶν καλλίστων.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν μετὰ φρονήσεως καρτερία καλὴ κἀγαθή;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε. 10

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἡ μετ' ἀφροσύνης; οὐ τοὐναντίον ταύτῃ d βλαβερὰ καὶ κακοῦργος;

ΛΑ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καλὸν οὖν τι φήσεις σὺ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃν κακοῦργόν τε καὶ βλαβερόν; 5

ΛΑ. Οὔκουν δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τήν γε τοιαύτην καρτερίαν ἀνδρείαν ὁμολογήσεις εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ οὐ καλή ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία καλόν ἐστιν.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἡ φρόνιμος ἄρα καρτερία κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον 10 ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη.

ΛΑ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἴδωμεν δή, ἡ εἰς τί φρόνιμος; ἢ ἡ εἰς ἅπαντα καὶ e τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ σμικρά; οἷον εἴ τις καρτερεῖ ἀναλίσκων ἀργύριον φρονίμως, εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀναλώσας πλέον ἐκτήσεται, τοῦτον ἀνδρεῖον καλοῖς ἄν;

ΛΑ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. 5

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οἷον εἴ τις ἰατρὸς ὤν, περιπλευμονίᾳ τοῦ υἱέος ἐχομένου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς καὶ δεομένου πιεῖν ἢ φαγεῖν δοῦναι, μὴ κάμπτοιτο ἀλλὰ καρτεροῖ; 193

ΛΑ. Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν οὐδ' αὖτη.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐν πολέμῳ καρτεροῦντα ἄνδρα καὶ ἐθέλοντα

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μάχεσθαι, φρονίμως λογιζόμενον, εἰδότα μὲν ὅτι βοηθήσουσιν ἄλλοι αὐτῷ, πρὸς ἐλάττους δὲ καὶ φαυλοτέρους μαχεῖται ἢ μεθ' ὧν αὐτός ἐστιν, ἔτι δὲ χωρία ἔχει κρείττω, τοῦτον τὸν μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης φρονήσεως καὶ παρασκευῆς καρτεροῦντα ἀνδρειότερον ἂν φαίης ἢ τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ στρατοπέδῳ ἐθέλοντα ὑπομένειν τε καὶ καρτερεῖν;

ΛΑ. Τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀφρονεστέρα γε ἡ τούτου ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἑτέρου καρτερία.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸν μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἄρα ἱππικῆς καρτεροῦντα ἐν ἱππομαχίᾳ ἧττον φήσεις ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης.

ΛΑ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸν μετὰ σφενδονητικῆς ἢ τοξικῆς ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς τέχνης καρτεροῦντα.

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅσοι ἂν ἐθέλωσιν εἰς φρέαρ καταβαίνοντες καὶ κολυμβῶντες καρτερεῖν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ, μὴ ὄντες δεινοί, ἢ ἔν τινι ἄλλῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνδρειοτέρους φήσεις τῶν ταῦτα δεινῶν.

ΛΑ. Τί γὰρ ἄν τις ἄλλο φαίη, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν, εἴπερ οἴοιτό γε οὕτως.

ΛΑ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἶμαί γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν που ἀφρονεστέρως γε, ὦ Λάχης, οἱ τοιοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσίν τε καὶ καρτεροῦσιν ἢ οἱ μετὰ τέχνης αὐτὸ πράττοντες.

ΛΑ. Φαίνονται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αἰσχρὰ ἡ ἄφρων τόλμα τε καὶ καρτέρησις ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐφάνη ἡμῖν οὖσα καὶ βλαβερά;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δέ γε ἀνδρεία ὡμολογεῖτο καλόν τι εἶναι.

ΛΑ. Ὡμολογεῖτο γάρ.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δ' αὖ πάλιν φαμὲν ἐκεῖνο τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὴν ἄφρονα καρτέρησιν, ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

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ΛΑ. Ἐοίκαμεν.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς οὖν σοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν;

ΛΑ. Μὰ τὸν Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὔ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα που κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον δωριστὶ ἡρμόσμεθα ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ὦ Λάχης· τὰ γὰρ ἔργα οὐ συμφωνεῖ ἡμῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἔργῳ μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, φαίη ἄν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνδρείας μετέχειν, λόγῳ δ', ὡς ἐγῷμαι, οὐκ ἄν, εἰ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀκούσειε διαλεγομένων.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι οὕτως ἡμᾶς διακεῖσθαι;

ΛΑ. Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν ᾧ λέγομεν πειθώμεθα τό γε τοσοῦτον;

ΛΑ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο, καὶ τίνι τούτῳ;

ΣΩ. Τῷ λόγῳ ὃς καρτερεῖν κελεύει. εἰ οὖν βούλει, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ζητήσει ἐπιμείνωμέν τε καὶ καρτερήσωμεν, ἵνα καὶ μὴ ἡμῶν αὐτὴ ἡ ἀνδρεία καταγελάσῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνδρείως αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις αὐτὴ ἡ καρτέρησίς ἐστιν ἀνδρεία.

ΛΑ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἕτοιμος, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ προαφίστασθαι. καίτοι ἀήθης γ' εἰμὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων· ἀλλά τίς με καὶ φιλονικία εἴληφεν πρὸς τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγανακτῶ εἰ οὕτωσὶ ἃ νοῶ μὴ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ εἰπεῖν. νοεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκῶ περὶ ἀνδρείας ὅτι ἔστιν, οὐκ οἶδα δ' ὅπῃ με ἄρτι διέφυγεν, ὥστε μὴ συλλαβεῖν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὴν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ φίλε, τὸν ἀγαθὸν κυνηγέτην μεταθεῖν χρὴ καὶ μὴ ἀνιέναι.

ΛΑ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν καὶ Νικίαν τόνδε παρακαλῶμεν ἐπὶ τὸ κυνηγέσιον, εἴ τι ἡμῶν εὐπορώτερός ἐστιν;

ΛΑ. Βούλομαι· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, ὦ Νικία, ἀνδράσι φίλοις χειμαζομένοις ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσιν βοήθησον, εἴ τινα ἔχεις δύναμιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡμέτερα ὁρᾷς ὡς ἄπορα· σὺ δ' εἰπὼν ὅτι ἡγῇ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, ἡμᾶς τε τῆς ἀπορίας ἕκλυσαι καὶ αὐτὸς ἃ

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νοεῖς τῷ λόγῳ βεβαίωσαι.

ΝΙ. Δοκεῖτε τοίνυν μοι πάλαι οὐ καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρίζεσθαι τὴν ἀνδρείαν· ὃ γὰρ ἐγὼ σοῦ ἤδη καλῶς λέγοντος ἀκήκοα, τούτῳ οὐ χρῆσθε.

ΣΩ. Ποίῳ δή, ὦ Νικία;

d ΝΙ. Πολλάκις ἀκήκοά σου λέγοντος ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὸς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἅπερ σοφός, ἃ δὲ ἀμαθής, ταῦτα δὲ κακός.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ μέντοι νὴ Δία λέγεις, ὦ Νικία.

ΝΙ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ἀγαθός, δῆλον ὅτι σοφός ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἤκουσας, ὦ Λάχης;

ΛΑ. Ἔγωγε, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα γε μανθάνω ὃ λέγει.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ δοκῶ μανθάνειν, καί μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ σοφίαν τινὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν λέγειν.

ΛΑ. Ποίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφίαν;

e ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τόνδε τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς;

ΛΑ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, αὐτῷ εἰπέ, ὦ Νικία, ποία σοφία ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. οὐ γάρ που ἥ γε αὐλητική.

ΝΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἡ κιθαριστική.

ΝΙ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ αὕτη ἢ τίνος ἐπιστήμη;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ εἰπέτω γε τίνα φησὶν αὐτὴν εἶναι.

ΝΙ. Ταύτην ἔγωγε, ὦ Λάχης, τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαο-
195 ῥαλέων ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.

ΛΑ. Ὡς ἄτοπα λέγει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες βλέψας, ὦ Λάχης;

ΛΑ. Πρὸς ὅτι; χωρὶς δήπου σοφία ἐστὶν ἀνδρείας.

ΣΩ. Οὔκουν φησί γε Νικίας.

ΛΑ. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία· ταῦτά τοι καὶ ληρεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διδάσκωμεν αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ λοιδορῶμεν.

ΝΙ. Οὔκ, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, Λάχης ἐπιθυμεῖν κἀμὲ φανῆναι μηδὲν λέγοντα, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρτι τοιοῦτός

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τις ἐφάνη. b

ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Νικία, καὶ πειράσομαί γε ἀποφῆναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ λέγεις. ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἐν ταῖς νόσοις οὐχ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ δεινὰ ἐπίστανται; ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαι; ἢ τοὺς ἰατροὺς σὺ ἀνδρείους καλεῖς;

ΝΙ. Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.

ΛΑ. Οὐδέ γε τοὺς γεωργοὺς οἶμαι. καίτοι τά γε ἐν τῇ γεωργίᾳ δεινὰ· οὗτοι δήπου ἐπίστανται, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ ἅπαντες τὰ ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν τέχναις δεινά τε καὶ θαρραλέα ἴσασιν· ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὗτοι ἀνδρεῖοί c εἰσιν.

ΣΩ. Τί δοκεῖ Λάχης λέγειν, ὦ Νικία; ἔοικεν μέντοι λέγειν τι.

ΝΙ. Καὶ γὰρ λέγει γέ τι, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθές γε.

ΣΩ. Πῶς δή;

ΝΙ. Ὅτι οἴεται τοὺς ἰατροὺς πλέον τι εἰδέναι περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἢ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν †εἰπεῖν οἷόν τε καὶ νοσῶδες. οἱ δὲ δήπου τοσοῦτον μόνον ἴσασιν· εἰ δὲ δεινόν τῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ κάμνειν, ἡγῇ σὺ τουτί, ὦ Λάχης, τοὺς ἰατροὺς ἐπίστασθαι; ἢ σὺ πολλοῖς οἴει ἐκ τῆς νόσου ἄμεινον εἶναι μὴ ἀναστῆναι ἢ ἀναστῆναι; τοῦτο γὰρ εἰπέ· σὺ πᾶσι φῂς ἄμεινον εἶναι ζῆν καὶ οὐ πολλοῖς κρεῖττον d τεθνάναι;

ΛΑ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε τοῦτό γε.

ΝΙ. Οἷς οὖν τεθνάναι λυσιτελεῖ, ταὐτὰ οἴει δεινὰ εἶναι καὶ οἷς ζῆν;

ΛΑ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΝΙ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ σὺ δίδως τοῖς ἰατροῖς γιγνώσκειν ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ δημιουργῷ πλὴν τῷ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἐπιστήμονι, ὃν ἐγὼ ἀνδρεῖον καλῶ;

ΣΩ. Καταγνοεῖς, ὦ Λάχης, ὅτι λέγει;

ΛΑ. Ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε τοὺς μάντεις καλεῖ τοὺς ἀνδρείους· e τίς γὰρ δὴ ἄλλος εἴσεται ὅτῳ ἄμεινον ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι; καίτοι σύ, ὦ Νικία, πότερον ὁμολογεῖς μάντις εἶναι ἢ οὔτε μάντις οὔτε ἀνδρεῖος;

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ΝΙ. Τί δέ; μάντει αὖ οἴει προσήκει τὰ δεινὰ γιγνώσκειν καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα;

ΛΑ. Ἔγωγε· τίνι γὰρ ἄλλῳ;

ΝΙ. Ὦι ἐγὼ λέγω πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὦ βέλτιστε· ἐπεὶ μάντιν γε τὰ σημεῖα μόνον δεῖ γιγνώσκειν τῶν ἐσομένων, εἴτε τῳ θάνατος εἴτε νόσος εἴτε ἀποβολὴ χρημάτων ἔσται, εἴτε νίκη εἴτε ἧττα ἢ πολέμου ἢ καὶ ἄλλης τινὸς ἀγωνίας· ὅτι δέ τῳ ἄμεινον τούτων ἢ παθεῖν ἢ μὴ παθεῖν, τί μᾶλλον μάντει προσήκει κρῖναι ἢ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν;

ΛΑ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τούτου οὐ μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι βούλεται λέγειν· οὔτε γὰρ μάντιν οὔτε ἰατρὸν οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα δηλοῖ ὄντινα λέγει τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, εἰ μὴ εἰ θεόν τινα λέγει αὐτὸν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν φαίνεται Νικίας οὐκ ἐθέλειν γενναίως ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν λέγει, ἀλλὰ στρέφεται ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἐπικρυπτόμενος τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀπορίαν· καίτοι κἂν ἡμεῖς οἷοί τε ἦμεν ἄρτι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ τοιαῦτα στρέφεσθαι, εἰ ἐβουλόμεθα μὴ δοκεῖν ἐναντία ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς λέγειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι ἦσαν, εἶχεν ἄν τινα λόγον ταῦτα ποιεῖν· νῦν δὲ τί ἄν τις ἐν συνουσίᾳ τοιᾷδε μάτην κενοῖς λόγοις αὐτὸς αὑτὸν κοσμοῖ;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Λάχης· ἀλλ' ὁρῶμεν μὴ Νικίας οἴεταί τι λέγειν καὶ οὐ λόγου ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγει. αὐτοῦ οὖν σαφέστερον πυθώμεθα τί ποτε νοεῖ· καὶ ἐάν τι φαίνηται λέγων, συγχωρησόμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, διδάξομεν.

ΛΑ. Σὺ τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ βούλει πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθάνου· ἐγὼ δ' ἴσως ἱκανῶς πέπυσμαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐδέν με κωλύει· κοινὴ γὰρ ἔσται ἡ πύστις ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ.

ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δή μοι, ὦ Νικία—μᾶλλον δ' ἡμῖν· κοινούμεθα γὰρ ἐγώ τε καὶ Λάχης τὸν λόγον—τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπιστήμην φῂς δεινῶν τε καὶ θαρραλέων εἶναι;

ΝΙ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐ παντὸς δὴ εἶναι ἀνδρὸς γνῶναι, ὁπότε γε μήτε ἰατρὸς μήτε μάντις αὐτὸ γνώσεται μηδὲ ἀνδρεῖος

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ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην προσλάβῃ· οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες;

ΝΙ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἄρα τῷ ὄντι οὐκ ἂν πᾶσα ὗς γνοίη οὐδ' ἂν ἀνδρεία γένοιτο.

ΝΙ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Δῆλον δή, ὦ Νικία, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὴν Κρομμυωνίαν ὗν πιστεύεις σύ γε ἀνδρείαν γεγονέναι. τοῦτο δὲ λέγω οὐ παίζων, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον οἶμαι τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι μηδενὸς θηρίου ἀποδέχεσθαι ἀνδρείαν, ἢ συγχωρεῖν θηρίον τι οὕτω σοφὸν εἶναι, ὥστε ἃ ὀλίγοι ἀνθρώπων ἴσασι διὰ τὸ χαλεπὰ εἶναι γνῶναι, ταῦτα λέοντα ἢ πάρδαλιν ἤ τινα κάπρον φάναι εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως λέοντα καὶ ἔλαφον καὶ ταῦρον καὶ πίθηκον πρὸς ἀνδρείαν φάναι πεφυκέναι τὸν τιθέμενον ἀνδρείαν τοῦθ' ὅπερ σὺ τίθεσαι.

ΛΑ. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, καὶ εὖ γε λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ ἡμῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῦτο ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Νικία, πότερον σοφώτερα φῂς ἡμῶν ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ θηρία, ἃ πάντες ὁμολογοῦμεν ἀνδρεῖα εἶναι, ἢ πᾶσιν ἐναντιούμενος τολμᾷς μηδὲ ἀνδρεῖα αὐτὰ καλεῖν;

ΝΙ. Οὐ γάρ τι, ὦ Λάχης, ἔγωγε ἀνδρεῖα καλῶ οὔτε θηρία οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τὸ τὰ δεινὰ ὑπὸ ἀνοίας μὴ φοβούμενον, ἀλλ' ἄφοβον καὶ μῶρον· ἢ καὶ τὰ παιδία πάντα οἴει με ἀνδρεῖα καλεῖν, ἃ δι' ἄνοιαν οὐδὲν δέδοικεν; ἀλλ' οἶμαι τὸ ἄφοβον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν. ἐγὼ δὲ ἀνδρείας μὲν καὶ προμηθίας πάνυ τισὶν ὀλίγοις οἶμαι μετεῖναι, θρασύτητος δὲ καὶ τόλμης καὶ τοῦ ἀφόβου μετὰ ἀπρομηθίας πάνυ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ θηρίων. ταῦτ' οὖν ἃ σὺ καλεῖς ἀνδρεῖα καὶ οἱ πολλοί, ἐγὼ θρασέα καλῶ, ἀνδρεῖα δὲ τὰ φρόνιμα περὶ ὧν λέγω.

ΛΑ. Θέασαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς εὖ ὅδε ἑαυτὸν δή, ὡς οἴεται, κοσμεῖ τῷ λόγῳ· οὓς δὲ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ἀνδρείους εἶναι, τούτους ἀποστερεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς.

ΝΙ. Οὔκουν σέ γε, ὦ Λάχης, ἀλλὰ θάρρει· φημὶ γάρ σε εἶναι σοφόν, καὶ Λάμαχόν γε, εἴπερ ἐστὲ ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ

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ἄλλους γε συχνοὺς Ἀθηναίων.

ΛΑ. Οὐδὲν ἐρῶ πρὸς ταῦτα, ἔχων εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μή με φῇς ὡς ἀληθῶς Αἰξωνέα εἶναι.

d ΣΩ. Μηδέ γε εἴπῃς, ὦ Λάχης· καὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖς οὐδὲ ᾐσθῆσθαι ὅτι ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν παρὰ Δάμωνος τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἑταίρου παρείληφεν, ὁ δὲ Δάμων τῷ Προδίκῳ πολλὰ πλησιάζει, ὃς δὴ δοκεῖ τῶν σοφιστῶν κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα
5 ὀνόματα διαιρεῖν.

ΛΑ. Καὶ γὰρ πρέπει, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφιστῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον κομψεύεσθαι ἢ ἀνδρὶ ὃν ἡ πόλις ἀξιοῖ αὑτῆς προεστάναι.

e ΣΩ. Πρέπει μέν που, ὦ μακάριε, τῶν μεγίστων προστατοῦντι μεγίστης φρονήσεως μετέχειν· δοκεῖ δέ μοι Νικίας ἄξιος εἶναι ἐπισκέψεως, ὅποι ποτὲ βλέπων τοῦνομα τοῦτο τίθησι τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

5 ΛΑ. Αὐτὸς τοίνυν σκόπει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μέλλω ποιεῖν, ὦ ἄριστε· μὴ μέντοι οἷόν με ἀφήσειν σε τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν καὶ συσκόπει τὰ λεγόμενα.

ΛΑ. Ταῦτα δὴ ἔστω, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι.

10 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ. σὺ δέ, Νικία, λέγε ἡμῖν πάλιν ἐξ
198 ἀρχῆς· οἶσθ' ὅτι τὴν ἀνδρείαν κατ' ἀρχὰς τοῦ λόγου ἐσκοποῦμεν ὡς μέρος ἀρετῆς σκοποῦντες;

ΝΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω ὡς μόριον, ὄντων
5 δὴ καὶ ἄλλων μερῶν, ἃ σύμπαντα ἀρετὴ κέκληται;

ΝΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἅπερ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἐγὼ δὲ καλῶ πρὸς ἀνδρείᾳ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα τοιαῦτα. οὐ καὶ σύ;

b ΝΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἔχε δή. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογοῦμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων σκεψώμεθα, ὅπως μὴ σὺ μὲν ἄλλ' ἄττα ἡγῇ, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἄλλα. ἃ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς ἡγούμεθα, φρά-
5 σομέν σοι· σὺ δὲ ἂν μὴ ὁμολογῇς, διδάξεις. ἡγούμεθα δ'

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ἡμεῖς δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι ἃ καὶ δέος παρέχει, θαρραλέα δὲ ἃ μὴ δέος παρέχει—δέος δὲ παρέχει οὐ τὰ γεγονότα οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκώμενα· δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ—ἢ οὐχ οὕτω καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ὦ Λάχης;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν ἡμέτερα τοίνυν, ὦ Νικία, ἀκούεις, ὅτι δεινὰ μὲν τὰ μέλλοντα κακά φαμεν εἶναι, θαρραλέα δὲ τὰ μὴ κακὰ ἢ ἀγαθὰ μέλλοντα· σὺ δὲ ταύτῃ ἢ ἄλλῃ περὶ τούτων λέγεις;

ΝΙ. Ταύτῃ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δέ γε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνδρείαν προσαγορεύεις;

ΝΙ. Κομιδῇ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον σκεψώμεθα εἰ συνδοκεῖ σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν.

ΝΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δὴ φράσω. δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷδε, περὶ ὅσων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν εἶναι περὶ γεγονότος εἰδέναι ὅπῃ γέγονεν, ἄλλη δὲ περὶ γιγνομένων ὅπῃ γίγνεται, ἄλλη δὲ ὅπῃ ἂν κάλλιστα γένοιτο καὶ γενήσεται τὸ μήπω γεγονός, ἀλλ' ἡ αὐτή. οἷον περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν εἰς ἅπαντας τοὺς χρόνους οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ ἰατρική, μία οὖσα, ἐφορᾷ καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γεγονότα καὶ γενησόμενα ὅπῃ γενήσεται· καὶ περὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς αὖ φυόμενα ἡ γεωργία ὡσαύτως ἔχει· καὶ δήπου τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὶ ἂν μαρτυρήσαιτε ὅτι ἡ στρατηγία κάλλιστα προμηθεῖται τά τε ἄλλα καὶ περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῇ μαντικῇ οἴεται δεῖν ὑπηρετεῖν ἀλλὰ ἄρχειν, ὡς εἰδυῖα κάλλιον τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα· καὶ ὁ νόμος οὕτω τάττει, μὴ τὸν μάντιν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν στρατηγὸν τοῦ μάντεως. φήσομεν ταῦτα, ὦ Λάχης;

ΛΑ. Φήσομεν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; σὺ ἡμῖν, ὦ Νικία, σύμφῃς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐσομένων καὶ γιγνομένων καὶ

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γεγονότων ἐπαίειν;

ΝΙ. Ἔγωγε· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ἄριστε, καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία τῶν δεινῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν καὶ θαρραλέων, ὡς φῄς· ἦ γάρ;

ΝΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ δεινὰ ὡμολόγηται καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ μέλλοντα κακὰ εἶναι.

ΝΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δέ γ' αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μελλόντων καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων εἶναι.

ΝΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μόνον ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ μελλόντων μόνον πέρι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν ἐπαίει, ἀλλὰ καὶ γιγνομένων καὶ γεγονότων καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων, ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιστῆμαι.

ΝΙ. Ἔοικέν γε.

ΣΩ. Μέρος ἄρα ἀνδρείας ἡμῖν, ὦ Νικία, ἀπεκρίνω σχεδόν τι τρίτον· καίτοι ἡμεῖς ἠρωτῶμεν ὅλην ἀνδρείαν ὅτι εἴη. καὶ νῦν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐ μόνον δεινῶν τε καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ἡ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων, ὡς νῦν αὖ ὁ σὸς λόγος, ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη. οὕτως αὖ μετατίθεσθαι ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Νικία;

ΝΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ σοῦν σοι, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἀπολείπειν ἄν τι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀρετῆς, εἴπερ εἰδείη τά τε ἀγαθὰ πάντα καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται καὶ γέγονε, καὶ τὰ κακὰ ὡσαύτως; καὶ τοῦτον οἴει ἂν σὺ ἐνδεᾶ εἶναι σωφροσύνης ἢ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὁσιότητος, ᾧ γε μόνῳ προσήκει καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους ἐξευλαβεῖσθαί τε τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τὰ μή, καὶ τἀγαθὰ πορίζεσθαι, ἐπισταμένῳ ὀρθῶς προσομιλεῖν;

ΝΙ. Λέγειν τι ὦ Σώκρατές μοι δοκεῖς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ Νικία, μόριον ἀρετῆς ἂν εἴη τὸ νῦν σοι λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ σύμπασα ἀρετή.

ΝΙ. Ἔοικεν.

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ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔφαμέν γε τὴν ἀνδρείαν μόριον εἶναι ἓν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς.

ΝΙ. Ἔφαμεν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε νῦν λεγόμενον οὐ φαίνεται.

ΝΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ηὑρήκαμεν, ὦ Νικία, ἀνδρεία ὅτι ἔστιν.

ΝΙ. Οὐ φαινόμεθα.

ΛΑ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε, ὦ φίλε Νικία, ᾤμην σε εὑρήσειν, ἐπειδὴ ἐμοῦ κατεφρόνησας Σωκράτει ἀποκριναμένου· πάνυ δὴ μεγάλην ἐλπίδα εἶχον, ὡς τῇ παρὰ τοῦ Δάμωνος σοφίᾳ αὐτὴν ἀνευρήσεις.

ΝΙ. Εὖ γε, ὦ Λάχης, ὅτι οὐδὲν οἴει σὺ ἔτι πρᾶγμα εἶναι ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἐφάνης ἀνδρείας πέρι οὐδὲν εἰδώς, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἐγὼ ἕτερος τοιοῦτος ἀναφανήσομαι, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπεις, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι διοίσει, ὡς ἔοικε, σοὶ μετ' ἐμοῦ μηδὲν εἰδέναι ὧν προσήκει ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἀνδρὶ οἰομένῳ τι εἶναι. σὺ μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνθρώπειον πρᾶγμα ἐργάζεσθαι οὐδὲ πρὸς σαυτὸν βλέπειν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους· ἐγὼ δ' οἶμαι ἐμοὶ περὶ ὧν ἐλέγομεν νῦν τε ἐπιεικῶς εἰρῆσθαι, καὶ εἴ τι αὐτῶν μὴ ἱκανῶς εἴρηται, ὕστερον ἐπανορθώσεσθαι καὶ μετὰ Δάμωνος—οὗ σύ που οἴει καταγελᾶν, καὶ ταῦτα οὐδ' ἰδὼν πώποτε τὸν Δάμωνα—καὶ μετ' ἄλλων· καὶ ἐπειδὰν βεβαιώσωμαι αὐτά, διδάξω καὶ σέ, καὶ οὐ φθονήσω· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι καὶ μάλα σφόδρα δεῖσθαι μαθεῖν.

ΛΑ. Σοφὸς γάρ τοι σὺ εἶ, ὦ Νικία. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐγὼ Λυσιμάχῳ τῷδε καὶ Μελησίᾳ συμβουλεύω σὲ μὲν καὶ ἐμὲ περὶ τῆς παιδείας τῶν νεανίσκων χαίρειν ἐᾶν, Σωκράτη δὲ τουτονί, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, μὴ ἀφιέναι· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ἦσαν οἱ παῖδες, ταὐτὰ ἂν ταῦτ' ἐποίουν.

ΝΙ. Ταῦτα μὲν κἀγὼ συγχωρῶ· ἐάνπερ ἐθέλῃ Σωκράτης τῶν μειρακίων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, μηδένα ἄλλον ζητεῖν. ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐγὼ τὸν Νικήρατον τούτῳ ἥδιστα ἐπιτρέποιμι, εἰ ἐθέλοι οὗτος· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἄλλους μοι ἑκάστοτε συνίστησιν, ὅταν τι αὐτῷ περὶ τούτου μνησθῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλει. ἀλλ' ὕρα, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, εἴ τι σοῦ ἂν μᾶλλον ὑπακούοι Σωκράτης.

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ΛΥ. Δίκαιόν γέ τοι, ὦ Νικία, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐγὼ τούτῳ πολλὰ ἂν ἐθελήσαιμι ποιεῖν, ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοις πάνυ πολλοῖς ἐθέλοιμι. πῶς οὖν φῄς, ὦ Σώκρατες; ὑπακούσῃ τι καὶ συμπροθυμήσῃ ὡς βελτίστοις γενέσθαι τοῖς μειρακίοις;

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὸν εἴη, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, τοῦτό γε, μὴ ἐθέλειν τῳ συμπροθυμεῖσθαι ὡς βελτίστῳ γενέσθαι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις τοῖς ἄρτι ἐγὼ μὲν ἐφάνην εἰδώς, τώδε δὲ μὴ εἰδότε, δίκαιον ἂν ἦν ἐμὲ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον παρακαλεῖν, νῦν δ' ὁμοίως γὰρ πάντες ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐγενόμεθα· τί οὖν ἄν τις ἡμῶν τίνα προαιροῖτο; ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δὴ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, σκέψασθε ἄν τι δόξω συμβουλεύειν ὑμῖν. ἐγὼ γάρ φημι χρῆναι, ὦ ἄνδρες —οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔκφορος λόγος—κοινῇ πάντας ἡμᾶς ζητεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς διδάσκαλον ὡς ἄριστον—δεόμεθα γάρ —ἔπειτα καὶ τοῖς μειρακίοις, μήτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε ἄλλου μηδενός· ἐὰν δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ὡς νῦν ἔχομεν οὐ συμβουλεύω. εἰ δέ τις ἡμῶν καταγελάσεται, ὅτι τηλικοίδε ὄντες εἰς διδασκάλων ἀξιοῦμεν φοιτᾶν, τὸν Ὅμηρον δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι προβάλλεσθαι, ὃς ἔφη οὐκ ἀγαθὴν εἶναι αἰδῶ κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι. καὶ ἡμεῖς οὖν ἐάσαντες χαίρειν εἴ τίς τι ἐρεῖ, κοινῇ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν μειρακίων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιησώμεθα.

ΛΥ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀρέσκει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ λέγεις· καὶ ἐθέλω, ὅσῳπερ γεραίτατός εἰμι, τοσούτῳ προθυμότατα μανθάνειν μετὰ τῶν νεανίσκων. ἀλλά μοι οὑτωσὶ ποίησον· αὔριον ἔωθεν ἀφίκου οἴκαδε καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσῃς, ἵνα βουλευσώμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων, τὸ δὲ νῦν εἶναι τὴν συνουσίαν διαλύσωμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, ταῦτα, καὶ ἥξω παρὰ σὲ αὔριον, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.

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Commentary

Section 1. Lysimachos' introduction, 178a1–180a5

At the conclusion of an exhibition of *hoplomachia* (the art of fighting in heavy armour), Lysimachos asks his friends Nikias and Laches to help him and Melesias choose a worthwhile educational accomplishment or exercise for their respective children, so that they may avoid the neglected upbringing which he and M. suffered at the hands of their distinguished parents. Would N. and L. regard *hoplomachia* as a suitable activity, or suggest some other?

The Title ΛΑΧΗΣ Η ΠΕΡΙ ΑΝΔΡΕΙΑΣ· ΜΑΙΕΥΤΙΚΟΣ, Laches or On Courage: obstetric.

The title, as with all Plato's dialogues, derives from Thrasyllus of Alexandria (d. 36 AD) who divided them into Tetralogies (groups of four; *Laches* is in Tetr. V after *Theages* (? spurious) and *Charmides* and before *Lysis*). Thrasyllus also added in each case the subject and type of dialogue according to his own classification, giving each work a title—usually the name of one of the chief speakers apart from Socrates—and a label *μαιευτικός*, a reference to Socrates' method of discussion, 'giving birth' to what is already in the minds of his interlocutors rather than introducing his own ideas (cf. Socrates the 'midwife', an image from *Theaetetus* 148e ff.).

Lysimachos, who speaks for himself and M. (M. only has a few lines, see n. on 184d8 ff.), has the dramatic function of the enquirer from experts. His periodic interventions (he does not contribute at all to the philosophical argument) serve to mark the transition between sections of the dialogue and give it impetus (he also concludes at 201b–c). The style and content of his speeches, esp. verbosity, suggest elements of humorous characterisation (see nn. on 78a3–4, b5, 79a1, e5, 80a2–5). Lys. features elsewhere in Plato as a passing example, (*Men.* 94a), of someone whose education had not enabled him to acquire *ἀρετή* (goodness, excellence). The main dramatic point in *Laches* is that unlike his father Aristeides (see n. on 179a4), Lys. is undistinguished, which generates the concern which initiates the discussion (for further details on this situation, see Intro. 4 (iii)).

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178a1 *τὸν ἄνδρα...ἐν ὅπλοις* : we discover shortly (183c8 ff.) that this refers to Stesilaus.

ὁπλομαχία was an exercise involving tactics and strategy taught, along with a wide range of athletic skills, by sophists (see Plato, *Euthd.* 271d and Xen. *Mem.* III.1.1–8). Spears may have been rendered harmless with a button on the point (Aristotle, *EN* 1111a12). For the venue, see Intro. 2 (i), and for *hoplomachia*, see Intro. 4 (iii).

a2 *Νικία...Λάχης* : is S. part of the group from the beginning? L.'s ref. at 180c1 clearly makes him so; the important point here is that Lys. is not really acquainted with S. (n. on 180c5) and, until L. introduces him, S. is not 'on the stage' as a significant participant (for his 'late' entry into the Dialogue, see n. at the end of Section 2).

a3–4 *τότε μὲν...νῦν δ'* : formal balance here indicates an over stressed contrast (see also above a1–2: *μὲν...δ'*). This may be appropriate for a formal opening, but also, perhaps, an indication of Lys.' somewhat rhetorical and repetitive style (see below in this section for other indications e.g. 179e5).

a4 *γὰρ...γε* : *γὰρ* explains *νῦν* ('the reason we're telling you now is ....'). *γε* (limitative) puts the emphasis on N. and L., 'you' (as opposed to others).

a4–5 *παρρησιάζεσθαι* : why introduce the issue of frankness here (re-emphasised at 179c1)? The obvious explanation is the one given by Lys. in the following sentence (*γάρ* a5): he feels it necessary to explain why he is exposing his own shortcomings to possible ridicule, a departure from the norm of social prestige, the maintenance of which might prevent frankness on the part of his interlocutors (*τότε μὲν κτλ.* a3, may indicate social embarrassment caused by the presence of others; we are specifically told (201a3) that the conversation has no audience). The seriousness of the issue at stake, the education of his children, will demand total sincerity and the putting aside of social anxieties (179b2 ff.). In addition, there may be a sub-textual reference to the sincerity demanded by S. in philosophical argument (*παρρησίαζεσθαι* and cognates are sometimes used by S. in this context, cf. *Grg.* 487a3 ff., 492d2, 521a6, see also *Prt.* 360e6 ff.; see also below, 193c7). The ostensible topic of the Dialogue may hint, through the language used, at the real one (see also below n. on b2).

a5 *τῶν τοιούτων* : either masc. 'such people' (as us, i.e. men like Lys. and M.), or neut. (i.e. our conduct in so exposing ourselves). It is less

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likely to be 'men like yourselves' (i.e. N. and L.) as Lane (Penguin) translates, since Lys. is here surely referring to himself (or his conduct in exposing his weakness) as the butt of ridicule.

a5–b2 *ἐάν...λέγουσι* : *ἐάν* clause is graphic construction for *εἰ* + opt., a future closed condition.

ἃ νοοῦσιν : 'what they think/(really) mean'.

b2 *στοχαζόμενοι* : the philosophical implications of *παρρησιάζεσθαι* in a philosophical context are perhaps continued here; the respondent who doesn't answer sincerely 'conjectures' or guesses at what his questioner wants to hear (cf. *Grg.* 464c6—an explicit distinction between knowledge and guesswork: *οὐ γνοῦσα ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη*). Cf. also *δόξαν* at b3 ('opinion' as opposed to 'knowledge'). For further subtextual echoes, see nn. on 179a5, a6, b2.

b3 *ἱκανοὺς γνῶναι* : testimonial for N. and L. as independent minded and trustworthy friends. *γνῶναι* 'form an opinion or judgement' (*γνώμη*). This assessment of N. and L. becomes significant later on; the Dialogue as a whole does not entirely fail to bear out Lys.' judgement of N. and L. But, of course, these qualities are not adequate for S.!

b4 *οὕτω* : emphasises the connection with b3–4 (cf. emphasis in b3 *ὑμᾶς δὲ*) '...it's *precisely* because (of all your qualities) that we invited you to consult...'

b5 *ἐπὶ τὴν συμβουλὴν...ἀνακοινοῦσθαι* : once again a possible continuation of sub-text; 'co-operation' is also a major element in Socratic dialectic, as well as in Lys.' search for a solution to his problem (see below 186a3 ff., 187b8 ff., 194c2 ff., 196c10 ff.). Also illustrates Lys.' stylistic tendency to overemphasis *συμβουλὴν...ἀνακοινοῦσθαι*.

179a1 *προοιμιάζομαι* : slightly apologetic consciousness of formality continues to characterise Lys. But in the context of the Dialogue as a whole, the theme is important enough to require a 'Proem'.

a2 *υἱεῖς οὑτοιί* : the sons of Lys. and M. are present, respectfully silent throughout, (except for Lys.' son at 181a3).

τοὐδε : i.e. M. Like Lys., M. is the undistinguished son of a famous father Thucydides (not the historian), son of Melesias. M.'s father had been the conservative leader of the political opposition to Pericles in the 440s. As was customary, both children have the name of their respective grandfathers.

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a4 *'Αριστείδην* : the grandfather was commander during the Persian wars (490–478) and played a major role in setting up the subsequent Delian League (477). Plato refers to him with qualified approval at *Grg.* 526b.

οὖν : 'well', resumptive, after the parenthesis (a2–4).

a5 *ἐπιμεληθῆναι* : a key Socratic term for the 'care' involved in moral education (see e.g. *Ap.* 24d2, *Euthyphr.* 2d2 ff.). Very important in the Dialogue as a whole (see e.g. 187a4 ff.), as well as being a preoccupation (obsession?) of Lys. in this speech (a8, b1, b4, b5, d3, d4, e6).

οἷόν : indicates capacity 'so far as possible of what cannot be done completely', *LSJ* s.v. *οἷος* III.3. *Trans.* 'as far as is within our power'.

a6 *ὅπερ οἱ πολλοί* : Lys. indicates his parental concern; but the phrase also recalls the Socratic separation of 'those that care', (about things that really matter) from 'the many' cf. *Ap.* 36b6–7, *ἀμελήσας ὥνπερ οἱ πολλοί.*

μειράκια : youths of *c.* 15–21 years. Lys. seems to imply that they are just entering this period of their lives.

a7 Word order: *ποιεῖν ὅτι* (rel. pron.) *βούλονται*

νῦν δή : *δή* is emphatic: 'forthwith' (implied opposition to *ἀνεῖναι*).

a4–8 Lys. repeats his first point at the end, in a characteristically Greek ABA construction (note repetition of *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι* a8...*ἐπιμεληθῆναι* a5; *καθ' ὅσον οἷοί τ'* a8...*ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα* a5, with increased emphasis in repetition *ἀλλα νῦν δὴ καὶ*, a7).

a8 *οὖν* : 'now' or 'so' (new stage in argument or 'march of thought', *GP* 425–6).

b1 *μεμεληκέναι* : understand *ὑμῖν*, with *τισὶν ἄλλοις* (b2) as parallel.

b2 *θεραπευθέντες* : a term used here by Lys. in a conventional sense of education, but with overtones of Socratic cultivation of the soul, gods, etc. (cf. *Euthyphr.* 12e7 ff.).

ἄριστοι : Lys. indicates here his goal, the highest objective of the Athenian value-system, conventionally understood (cf. *Men.* 71e, *Prt.* 318e), a tradition which goes back to Homer (cf. *Il.* 6.208). The questions which concern *Laches* are (i) in what does *ἀρετή* (or its parts) consist? (ii) how is it acquired? Lys. is entirely concerned here with (ii), and takes (i) for granted; it is (i) however which concerns most of the Dialogue, and (ii) is never reached (200e ff.).

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b2–6 The syntax of this sentence is peculiar since, strictly speaking, the *protasis* *εἰ δ' ἄρα...μὴ προσεσχήκατε* has no corresponding *apodosis*. *Either*, as some editors conjecture, words are missing either after b1 *ὄντας* or b6 *ἡμῶν or* the participles *ὑπομνήσοντες...παρακαλοῦντες* (b3–4) must be construed as parallel with *εἰδότες* (a8) and translated as the *apodosis*: i.e. 'knowing that you too have sons...we remind and exhort you...'

b2–3 *εἰ δ' ἄρα* : *δ' ἄρα* indicates a hypothesis, the possibility of which has only just been realised, 'But if after all...' (*GP* 37–8). *πολλάκις* reinforces the polite softening of the unfortunate implication (that maybe N. and L. haven't given any thought to their sons' education) 'but if, after all, by chance you haven't...'

b3 *τῷ τοιούτῳ* : i.e. *πῶς ἂν...γένοιντο ἄριστοι* (b2). Cf. also *αὐτοῦ* (b4).

b5 *ἐπιμέλειάν τινα* : *some kind* of care; Lys. is characteristically vague about what is required.

το...ποιήσασθαι substantival clause, 'the arranging of some kind of care...'

κοινῇ : further emphasis on co-operation, see above on 178b5.

b6 *ὅθεν...ἔδοξεν* : depends on *χρὴ ἀκοῦσαι*.

b7 *κἂν...μακρότερα* : Lys.' *second* apology for longwindedness (cf. 79a1 above)! With *χρὴ ἀκοῦσαι* (b6 above), it suggests a fussy and self-conscious anxiety about being properly understood, which contributes to the characterisation of Lys. in this speech (see also n. on b7–8 below).

b7 *συσσιτοῦμεν* : 'dine together' (not 'live together' (Jowett)).

b7–8 *γὰρ δὴ* : 'arresting attention at the opening of a narrative' (*GP* 243) 'you must understand that ... '

c1 *ὅπερ* : antecedent to *παρρησιασόμεθα* 'as I said' (*lit.* 'that which I said...'). Lys., in repeating the idea of frankness (see above on 178a4–5) is facing the difficult hurdle of unfavourable and potentially socially damaging, self-revelation; he and M. have not attained the *κλέος* (fame, reputation) of their fathers. We can by this stage understand Lys.' embarrassed beating about the bush (and the point of spelling out family relationships at a2–4 above) as an attempt to screw himself up to the difficult admission.

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c2 *γὰρ* : explanatory, of the need for frankness (*ἡμέτερα...ἔργα*, c5–6).

c4–5 *καὶ ὅσα...τῆς πόλεως* : the conventional range of activity covering the areas of war/peace and foreign/domestic affairs. Thucydides' opposition to Pericles would qualify as *τὰ τῆς πόλεως*, and the activity of Aristeides, as one of the founders of the Delian League, as *τὰ τῶν συμμάχων* (he fixed the initial tribute of each of the allies, Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 24) as well as his *τὰ ἐν πολέμῳ* (he commanded the Athenians at the battle of Plataia, *Hdt.* 9.28–9).

c6–7 *δὴ* : forceful connection 'of course' 'naturally' (shame would be self-evident in such an admission).

ὑπαισχυνόμεθα : only example of this word in extant Greek lit. *ὑπ–* indicates diffidence in admitting the feeling 'feel somewhat ashamed', 'cannot help feeling ashamed' (Loeb). Takes double acc.: reason for shame + those before whom shame is felt, i.e. their sons (*τούσδε* c7).

d1 *τρυφᾶν* : 'run riot', 'indulge oneself'. In *Men.* 94a–c, Plato's S. claims that both Lys. and M. were given an education involving a range of skills (M. became one of the best wrestlers in Athens). Possibly Plato here indicates a lack of personal involvement by parents in the teaching of the traditional prestigious activities of war and politics (see further Intro. 4 (iii)). If so, there may be unconscious irony here. Handing over education to professionals is what Lys. is actually proposing!

d4 *ἀκλεεῖς* : a strongly negative word. Absence of *κλέος* (see above n. on c1) is likely to result from failure to be *ἄριστοι*, to have achieved reputation in war and/or political life (see previous note).

d5 *τῶν ὀνομάτων ἄξιοι* : see above on a2 and a4.

d7 *τί ἂν...γένοιντο* : see above b2, but here emphasising the sons' active participation: what they have to learn or practice, i.e. 'discipline' or 'activity'.

e1 *τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα* : i.e. the one they have just witnessed (78a1).

καλὸν : a strong, if indefinite, value word (cf. b2 above). 'Excellence' often means 'military excellence'; Lys. surely intends a wider reference here, but fighting ability is important and central to his conception (see note at end of section).

e2 *ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι* : see above on 78a1.

τοῦτον : i.e. Stesilaus (see further 183c8 ff.).

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e3 *ἐπιδεικνύμενον* : a formal display of expertise either practical (as here) or a verbal exposition, a set speech (part of the traditional teaching method of the sophists, e.g. *Grg.* 447a6).

e5 *συμπαραλαβεῖν* : emphasis on co-operation (see n. on 78b5) continued in *συμβούλους...κοινωνούς* (e6); cf. *ἀνακοινώσασθαι* (180 a1).

ἅμα μὲν...ἅμα δὲ : see above on 178a1–4.

180a2–5 *καὶ περὶ...καὶ περὶ...καὶ περὶ* : Lys. over-formal style concludes the speech, but also gives us an insight into his somewhat naïve conception of how his problem might be solved—simply canvass a range of opinions from N. and L.!

Summary of section

A long uninterrupted introductory speech like this is unique among the Socratic Dialogues (and in the Platonic corpus as a whole). In 'direct speech' Dialogues, swift initial exchange between characters is usual (*Ion, Euthyphro, Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Euthydemus, Gorgias*); in 'reported speech' Dialogues the scene is economically and skilfully set (*Lysis, Charmides, Protagoras*).

The dramatic style of Lys.' speech seems, at first sight, to lack Plato's customary light touch, until we realise that he is characterising Lys. by his manner of speaking: long-winded, over-formal, repetitive, qualities (observed with not unsympathetic humour) which arise partly out of his innate character, partly out of embarrassment at what he feels he must confess on this specific occasion and partly from his conception of the seriousness of his problem (for wider discussion see Intro. 4 (iii)).

Lys. also makes assumptions which reveal the limitations of his conventional outlook: that *ἀρετή* can be taught through some specific study or activity and that co-operation between parents is the best way to discover how to do it (NB. it is striking that N. and L., initially at any rate, are canvassed for their expertise not as military generals, but as fellow-parents (179b1)).

Yet, for all their limitations, Lys.' views are important as the base from which the dialogue develops: his vague but strongly-held views on desirable ethical goals (see nn. on 179b2, d4, e1) anticipate the later problems S. N. and L. have in both defining *ἀνδρεία* (courage) and distinguishing it from *ἀρετή* as a whole. Furthermore, the repeated emphasis on the need for sincerity and co-operation in their joint undertaking reflects major thematic elements in Socratic teaching.

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Section 2. Reactions of interlocutors, 180a6–181d7

N. and L. are both willing to help. L. sympathises with the problem facing men in public life, and recommends S. as a fellow demesman of Lys. and as someone familiar with the educational questions which concern him. In response to Lys.' questions as to S.'s identity, L. reveals S.'s reputation as a brave soldier. Lys. addresses S. as a family friend and asks his opinion on the present question; S. says he is willing to help, but defers to N. and L. as older and more experienced, suggesting that N. should begin.

180a6 N. takes the lead here, signifying perhaps his assumption of intellectual superiority to L., a point which plays an important part in the dramatic development of the Dialogue.

b1 *γὰρ* : assent implied, with reason given (*GP* 89) 'Yes, for...'

οἴει : endorsement echoed from previous speech by repetition of word (*οἶμαι...οἴει*). This echoing and 'picking up' of specific words from one speech to another, a particular characteristic of Greek dialogue, is used competitively between N. and L. later in the Dialogue (see n. on 197a6).

ὡς : causal conjunction: 'for' , 'since'.

γε : limitative: 'what Lys. said (specifically) about his father...'

b4 *ὅτι* : introduces Indirect Statement after *εἰρῆσθαι*.

b5 *σχεδόν τι* : 'as a rule', 'more or less'.

b1–7 Despite its loose construction, L.'s second sentence is clear in sense; *ὅτι κτλ.* in b4 picks up *ὅ γε ἔλεγεν...εὖ εἰρῆσθαι* (b1–3), although note that *καὶ περὶ τἆλλα* in b6 is L.'s addition, and he appropriates the sentiment as his own. L. develops and broadens Lys.' theme of the tension between public and private life (see Intro. 4 (iii)). The juxtaposition of this theme with the first mention of S. (c1) may be significant; in *Ap.* 23b, S. admits to having neglected both *τὰ τῆς πόλεως* and *τὰ τῶν οἰκείων* but, in his case, for the service of the god (referring to his divinely-inspired mission to question his fellow Athenians concerning the conduct of their lives) which he regards as of overriding importance; at the end of *Apology* (41e) he asks the Athenians to rebuke his sons if, after his death, they do not live up to his high moral standards. Here in *Laches*, S. is shortly to be introduced as someone who knows about the education of the young, but certainly not as Lys. (or L.) envisages it.

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b7–9 *ὅτι...οὐ παρακαλεῖς* : depends on *θαυμάζω* (b9), 'I am surprised that...'

c1 *Σωκράτη δὲ τόνδε* : a very casual and (on the surface at least, see n. on b1–7 above) unprepared introduction to the main participant in the Dialogue. (On postponement of S.'s 'entry', see note at the end of this section.) As suggested above (on 178a2) it is not clear whether S. is present in the group from the start of the Dialogue, hovering on the edge or called over into the conversation at this point (the latter seems likely since Lys. doesn't really know him (181a2)).

c2 *δημότην* : a member of a 'deme' (township) a unit of the *polis* of Athens. Like S. (*Grg.* 495d), Aristeides and Thucydides, fathers of Lys. and M. respectively, came from the *deme* of Alopeke (Plutarch, *Pericles* 11).

τὰς διατριβὰς ποιούμενον : L. is portrayed in *Laches* as not knowing anything about S.'s teaching activity (as opposed to N., see 187e6 ff.) but is here referring to S.'s frequent presence at palaestras (wrestling-schools), e.g. Taureas' (*Chrm.* 153a3–4) and Mikkos' (*Ly.* 204a5) and the Lykeion (Lyceum) a large gymnasium just outside the city boundary in eastern Athens (*Euthyphr.* 2a1–2, *Euthd.* 271a, cf. Xen. *Mem.* I.1.10).

c5 *Πῶς λέγεις* : this incredulity neatly characterizes Lys. still further (see summary of Section 1 above). He is old and out of touch (see below on d5). The dramatic date of *Laches* (see Intro. 2 (i)) suggests the intriguing possibility that Lys.' ignorance has survived the recent presentation of Aristophanes' *Clouds* (423 BC)—though, of course, the historical details of Plato's dramatic contexts should not be explored too closely!

c8 *κἂν ἐγὼ...οὐ χεῖρον* : a hint of the intellectual rivalry between N. and L. which is to become more explicit as the Dialogue goes on. N. is very anxious here to demonstrate that he (*καὶ ἐγώ*) is much more familiar with intellectual developments than the vague statements of L. show *him* to be at 180c2–4) (but L. has got in first!). See *οὐ χεῖρον* (underemphasis, c8) and *καὶ γὰρ* (he is eager to show why, c9); *αὐτῷ μοι* (his acquaintance, unlike L.'s, is at first hand, c9).

d1 *μουσικῆς...Δάμωνα* : instruction in music (harmony, rhythm, playing of instruments) was a regular part of the education of Athenian citizens who could afford it. The little that is known about Damon suggests that he was an important figure in the intellectual life of the

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later fifth century BC. Plutarch (*Pericles* 4) makes him, along with the philosopher Anaxagoras, a teacher of Pericles (cf. Plato *Alc.* 118c and Isocrates, *Antidosis* 235) with expertise in music and perhaps political and social theory (Plutarch claims that Damon used music as a screen for more politically sensitive instruction). In *R.* 400a–c, Plato ascribes to Damon, and himself accepts, views about the ethical and political implications of various rhythms (ibid. 424c). All that is known about his teacher, Agathocles, is in Plato, *Prt.* 316e, where he is spoken of in much the same terms as Plutarch speaks of Damon—using music as a disguise for the activities of a sophist, though Plato is clearly joking in suggesting the need for sophists to disguise themselves. Damon's ostracism for (according to Plutarch) his *δεινότης* (cleverness) has been confirmed by the discovery of an *ostrakon* (voting sherd) bearing his name (*c.* 450–40 BC, Diels-Kranz I.382 n.).

d2 *καὶ τἆλλα* : supports the idea that Damon's interests stretched beyond music.

d5 ff. Lys.' remoteness, perhaps from his own children as well as others of the younger generation, may have some connection with his anxiety over their education (see above 179a8 ff.)

d5–6 *οἱ ἡλίκοι ἐγὼ* : abbreviated for *τηλικοῦτοι ἥλικος ἐγώ εἰμί* ('people at my time of life…').

d6 *καὶ σύ* : i.e. as well as N. and L.

d7 *τῷδε τῷ σαυτοῦ δημότῃ* : i.e. Lys. himself. For *δημότῃ* see above on c2.

e1 *δίκαιος εἶ* : *δίκαιος* expresses an obligation based on the relationship ('you are bound to…'). And the relationship is about to be explained, *καὶ γὰρ*.

e2 *τυγχάνεις ὤν* : *τυγχάνω* adds to the verb 'to be' an element of (happy) coincidence 'for it turns out that you are a family friend of ours'.

e3 This emphasises Lys.' age; S. was about 47 at the dramatic date of *Laches*.

e3–4 *καὶ πρότερον…πρίν* : *lit.* 'he died before ever having a difference of opinion with me', i.e. 'to the day he died we never etc.'

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e7 *οὐ...ἀνηρώτησα* : Lys.' detachment from his sons means that he's not sufficiently on their wave-length to ask them about S.'s identity, despite his general concern.

181a1 *λέγοιεν* : *λέγω* = 'mean' 'refer to', here.

ἀλλ' : as if combating indecision or reluctance on the part of interlocutors (*GP* 13–14) 'Come now...'

a2 *ὅδ' ἐστὶ Σωκράτης* : 'is *this* the Socrates...?'

a3 *Πάνυ μὲν οὖν* : emphatic assent. Lys. has asked both boys but it is his son, Aristeides, who answers. In *Tht.* 151a Plato's S. mentions Aristeides as someone who rendered his (S.'s) teaching ineffective by leaving his tutelage too soon. In *Laches*, the younger generation passively spectates, not always the situation with S. (see e.g. *Charmides* and S.'s account of his activity in *Ap.* 23c ff.).

a4 *Ἥραν* : commonly an oath used by women; the choice this of goddess here perhaps reflects the domestic character of the situation.

ὀρθοῖς : 'to keep (something) in the right way', i.e. to guard the reputation of his father. (See below on b1 and b3 for word-play).

a5 *ἄριστον* : used by Lys. in an emphatic, generalised sense; 'an excellent man' (see above on 179b2).

a6 *οἰκεῖα...ἡμέτερα* : '...we'll both be treating each other's family affairs as our own' (Lane).

a7 *Καὶ μήν* : feeling that the addition is important 'And what's more...'

ὡς : 'for' 'because' (see above on 180b1).

a8 *καὶ ἀλλοθί γε* : emphatic 'elsewhere, too'; 'in quite a different context' (Lane).

a8–b1 *πατέρα...πατρίδα* : the word-play affects the repeated *ὀρθοῦντα* (see above on a4, and *ὀρθὴ* at b3, below). S.'s activity (unlike Lys.'?) very effectively spans public and private, according to L.

b1–2 *τῇ ἀπὸ Δηλίου φυγῇ* : recent defeat of Athens by the Boeotians at Delium, north of Attica (424 BC: *Thuc.* 4.91–6). The retreat of S. and L. is mentioned by Plato's Alkibiades (in *Symposium* 221a) who notes humorously that S. was more cool and collected than L. See also Plato's S.'s mention of his own service at Delium (*Ap.* 28e2–3). On the

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significance of this *Laches* passage for the dramatic date of the Dialogue, see Intro. 2 (i).

b2 *συνανεχώρει* : note imperfect, 'he was retiring (with me)...' The imperfect (rather than aorist) indicates the duration of the manoeuvre, during which L.'s other observations take place.

b3 *ὀρθὴ* : Plato takes the pun still further, playing on the literal and metaphorical sense of the words; just as S. maintains the 'uprightness' of his family, so he would have enabled the 'righted' fatherland and city to hold its head high (*ὀρθὴ*) and not 'fall' into so terrible a state (*τοιοῦτον πτῶμα*).

b4 *τότε* : implies looking back from some distance (a few years?) (see Intro. 2 (i)).

b5 *μέντοι* : emphatic, 'bringing the truth home to another person' (*GP* 399) 'you know...'

b6 *ταῦτα* : i.e. *both* his skill at selecting teachers (N.) *and* bravery in battle (L.)—although the latter is obviously more recent in Lys.' mind. The redundant, repetitive language (*ἐπαινός...ἐπαινῇ...ἐπαινοῦσιν*) and over-formal style remind us of Lys.' character.

c1 *καὶ...γε...αὐτὸν* : emphatic, 'you really ought to have visited us of your own accord before now...'

c2 *τὸ δίκαιον* : see n. on 180e1 above.

c4 *σύνισθί κτλ* : *σύνισθί* from *σύνειμι* (imperative) 'associate with us'; a very similar phrase to *R.* 328d4–5, where S. is urged (with striking similarity of vocabulary) by the aged Kephalos to visit him and his sons more often. Like Kephalos, Lys. also begs to be excused from the argument (189c6 ff.), though his concern and interest are greater.

c7 Lys. comes, unusually abruptly, to the point. *φατε* (pl.) shows that the remark is addressed to all of them (N. and L. as well as S.).

d1 *Ἀλλὰ καὶ* : The speaker 'repudiates the idea that refusal of the request is possible' (*GP* 16–17). 'But of course...' S. is only too pleased to try to help.

τούτων πέρι : reversal of preposition and pronoun, a stylistic device known as *anastrophe*.

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d2 *ἃ προκαλῇ* : i.e. including Lys.' invitation to resume relations between the two families.

d3–5 *δικαιότατον...ἀπειρότερον...παρ' αὐτῶν* : S.'s customary disclaimer of expertise takes the form of a reference to the inexperience of youth in deference to the experience of age (*τῶνδε* (d4) = N. and L.; but in terms of Plato's dramatic date, S. cannot be very much younger than N. or L.—see n. on 180e3 above, and on N.'s proximity in age to S. see Davies (1), 404). The question of how far S.'s expressions of ignorance are intended ironically is complex (see Intro. 2 (iii)). Note that S. returns to this theme more emphatically later in the Dialogue: see 186b8 ff. and 200e2 ff. At this point it is dramatically plausible that S. should sincerely defer to the two generals on a matter (supposedly) within their expertise; however it also suits the structure of the Dialogue to let N. and L. have their say first and give S. their perceptions to work on (see e.g. *Euthyphr.* 4e ff.). The subsequent course of the Dialogue, in which S. takes an increasingly large part, renders this innocent statement (d3–7) somewhat ironic (see also nn. on d6 and d7 below).

d5 *ἔχω* : subjunctive, after *ἐάν*.

d6 *τότ' ἤδη* : 'then (and only then)'. S.'s emphasis here is modest: only *if* the point comes where he has anything to add, will he contribute (see *LSJ* s.v. *ἤδη* I.4d).

d7 *ἀλλ'...πότερος* : S., while giving N. and L. a choice of precedence, clearly motivates N. to begin and thereby immediately begins to exercise control over the structure of the discussion.

S.'s entry into the Dialogue

S.'s actual entry at 181d1 is unusually late in comparison with other Socratic Dialogues, following a correspondingly late mention of S. at 180c1. This unusual procedure can be assumed to have some dramatic and even thematic significance:

(1) S.'s initial reticence (or even physical absence, see above nn. on 178a2 and 180c1) is connected with the unusually large and active role played by his interlocutors in *Laches*; the discussion gets going and the subject which gives impetus to the Dialogue is broached before S. is invited to contribute. N. and L. continue throughout the Dialogue to show an unusual degree (but, of course, ultimately only a degree) of independence.

(2) S. is given a major 'build-up' in advance of his entry: Lys.'

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ignorance as to S.'s identity enables Plato to 'create' S. so that when he appears we already know a great deal about him: N. and L. vie in their desire to 'acquire' S. as experienced in their respective fields (180c8 ff., 181a3 ff.—and contrast with S.'s claim to be *ἀπειρότερον τούτων* (181 d4)). L.'s word-play at 181a7–b4 effectively portrays S. as bridging the public/private divide, which is seriously at issue in the social background to the Dialogue (see Intro. 4 (iii)). All this is not unrelated to Plato's desire to rehabilitate S.'s memory in the face of the charge on which he was found guilty and executed (see Intro. 2 (ii)). In *Laches* he has already appeared as seemingly well-connected and respectable (Lys. and family connections) brave and public-spirited (L.) and well-versed in intellectual matters (N.). Something for everybody in these testimonials!

Section 3. Nikias' speech in defence of *hoplomachia*, 181d8–182d5

N.'s defence of the exercise of *hoplomachia* (the first of a pair, balanced by L.'s speech against in Section 4 below) takes the form of a short formal speech not unlike a sophistic exposition or *epideixis* (see above n. on 179e3). N. makes in order a number of points in favour of the argument that the exercise in question is advantageous and useful in the education of the young: (1) it is good exercise, (2) along with horsemanship an exercise which befits a free man (i.e. citizen); (3) it is practical, in providing an advantage in actual combat with the enemy, (4) leads to knowledge of other aspects of military science, (5) leads to increased confidence in battle, and (6) promotes a smart appearance, which boosts morale and demoralises the enemy.

d8 N. confidently takes up S.'s offer and embarks with the practised formality of the experienced speaker (the formally structured argument makes it reasonable to describe the speech as a mini-*epideixis*, although not explicitly characterised as such).

Ἀλλ' : acquiescence in the attitude or declared intentions of the previous speaker (*GP* 19), 'Well' or 'Very good'.

e1 *ὠφέλιμον ἐπίστασθαι* : N. wishes to argue that *hoplomachia* is a *μάθημα and* that is useful (has practical application).

e2–4 *τὸ μὴ ἄλλοθι...ἐν τούτῳ* : all subject of *εὖ ἔχει* (e4). *τούτῳ* refers to *hoplomachia*.

e2 *δή* : dismissive: 'you know' (Tatham).

e4 *ὅθεν* : antecedent is *ἐν τούτῳ*.

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e5 *ἀνάγκη* : 'necessarily', implies logical inevitability (getting fit is an unavoidable part of the exercise).

γὰρ : gives reason for *ἀνάγκη*. In English, the comparison is oddly expressed (*lit.* it is easier and requires less effort than none); *transl.* 'it is as hard and strenuous as any...'

182a1 *καὶ ἅμα* : introduces point (2) (*καὶ γὰρ* in 181e2 introduced (1)).

ἐλευθέρῳ : the exercise is only appropriate for a free man, because it is free citizens (principally foot soldiers, or *hoplites*) who defend the state in war.

a2–4 *ἀγῶνος ἀθληταί...γυμνάζονται* : this metaphor, which is found also in *R.* 543b8–9, of the Guardians of the state as its military defenders, relates the exercise to the principal civic activity of battle and military defence of the *polis* (city-state). Whatever the social reality, N. has reason here to emphasise the exclusiveness (*μόνοι* a3) of the hoplite class (*καὶ ἡ ἱππική* (a2) is added as an afterthought, in order to boost his recommendation of *hoplomachia).*

a3 *ἐν οἷς...πρόκειται* : refers to the actual 'contest' (i.e. fighting) for which the exercise of *hoplomachia* prepares (and is not a reference to an actual event, as Schmid, 5 suggests).

a5 *ἔπειτα* : *either* introducing point (3) *or* possibly 'later on', i.e. when potential soldiers have had their practice and have to go into real battle.

a8 *μόνον πρὸς μόνον* : 'hand to hand combat'.

b2 *ἄν* : anticipatory of *ἄν* in b3.

ὑπό γε ἑνὸς : emphasis (*γε*) of limitation, *lit.* 'would not suffer under *one*, nor perhaps...'

b2–3 *ἐπιστάμενος* : cf. *ἐπιστάσθαι* above, 181e1. N. relates directly the intellectual grasp of the discipline with ability to cope with an emergency (see end of section).

b4 *ταύτῃ* : adverbial.

πλεονεκτοῖ : emphasis on practical advantage, cf. *ὠφέλιμον* (181e1).

ἔτι δὲ καὶ : point (4).

b5–c4 N. describes an ascending hierarchy of sciences where study of the simpler and practical leads step by step (*ἑξῆς* (b6)) to the more

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complex and theoretical through desire for knowledge (cf. *Chrm.* 172b). N. demonstrates his familiarity with educational methods here. Socrates' references to the usefulness of *hoplomachia*, in Plato and Xenophon, have the appearance of humorous exaggeration (see esp. Xen. *Mem.* III.1.6–7).

c2–4 *ἤδη δῆλον...μάθημα* : the predicate begins with *καὶ καλὰ* (c3), supply *ἔστι* ; *transl.* 'And it is immediately obvious that matters related to those (i.e. previously mentioned)—all studies and activities—are both fine and worthy of a man's application and practice.' In this sentence the sting is in the tail: *τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα* (final words) is the starting point for all these worthwhile activities. This is the point of the recommendation. N.'s sentence tends to be somewhat redundant and verbose, more reminiscent, perhaps of a stylistic trick picked up from the professional sophists than a clear expression of original thought: see e.g. a parody of Hippias in Plato, *Hippias Major* 286a, (Diels-Kranz 86A9).

c3 *καλὰ καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξια* : generalised (albeit emphatic) term of high commendation (see n. on 179b2).

c5–7 *προσθήσομεν...ἐπιστήμη* : point (5). Plato makes N. speak here with perhaps a parody of sophistic formality, see e.g. Gorgias, Diels-Kranz 82B11 (5). Note reversal of syntax of sentence (as in the previous one) with subject last.

c6 *θαρραλεώτερον καὶ ἀνδρειότερον* : N. is associating these adjectives here, in contrast to L. at 184b4–7. But note that Plato indicates that N. is clearly aware of the difference in separating *τὸ ἄφοβον* (fearlessness) and *τὸ ἀνδρεῖον* (bravery) at 197a6 ff.

c7 *αὑτὸν αὑτοῦ* : 'than he was before' or' than he would be otherwise'.

c7–8 *μὴ ἀτιμάσωμεν* : point (6).
εἰ καὶ : 'even though...'

c9 *εὐσχημονέστερον* : 'smarter' (because of *hoplomachia*) object of *ποίησειεν ἄν* (understood from previous sentence). The comparative adjectives imply a sense of competition: smarter and so more formidable than others (esp. but not exclusively?, the enemy). N. is making two separate points: (1) smartness is important where (*ἐνταῦθα οὗ*) one needs to gain respect from one's fellow soldiers; (2) and also where (*οὗ ἄμα*) smartness will impress the enemy.

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d2–5 N. ends formally (*μὲν οὖν* (d2) ...*δ'* (d4)) with a somewhat patronising ref. to L. (*εἰ τι παρὰ ταῦτα...*).

Nikias' speech

Almost all of N.'s points in favour of *hoplomachia* emphasise the advantages of acquiring a technical skill (cf. emphasis on *ἐπιστήμη* at 181e1 and 182b2 and c7). His case for fighting as a theoretical teachable skill is, on the one hand, 'indicative of the growing professionalism which entered Greek warfare in the latter part of the fifth century' (Lane, 87 but see also Intro. 4 (iii)). But it also sets part of the agenda for the Dialogue as a whole; the connection between the skill taught and personal qualities necessary for battle is expressed in terms of acquisition of a technique; reference to feelings and emotions is well down the list (point (5)) and the connection with *hoplomachia* expressed in strongly instrumental terms. This implicitly raises the question of the relative emphasis to be placed on intellect and emotion, which plays a major part in the definitions of bravery which occupy the latter part of the Dialogue. The speech also characterises N.; his skill in formal exposition (sometimes almost to the point of parody) was doubtless acquired from acquaintance with the style of professional teachers (see nn. on 182c2–4, c5–7).

Section 4. Laches' speech attacking *hoplomachia*, 182d6–184c8

L. supplies a balancing speech attacking the value of *hoplomachia*. He maintains that it is not a *μάθημα* (or only an unimportant one) and so not worthy of study. His supporting arguments are: (1) the Spartans, the most skilled militarily of the Greek city-states, don't study it and the instructors in *hoplomachia* significantly avoid Sparta; (2) the experts in *hoplomachia* are no good when it comes to practice, e.g. the current expert, Stesilaus; (3) the skill acquired encourages false courage in cowards and provokes undue criticism of the brave.

d6 *Ἀλλ'...μὲν* : 'Well...' L. opens by conceding a conditional point to N.

d7–8 *πάντα...εἶναι* : ironic echo of N. in *ἐπίστασθαι* (181e1, 182e7) and in the sentiment as a whole?

d8 *τὸ ὁπλιτικὸν τοῦτο* : *τοῦτο* gives a sarcastic emphasis, 'this arms training business'.

e1–2 *εἰ μὲν...εἰ δ'* : L. is not a 'skilled' speaker like N., but the contrasted clauses show an unforced clarity of style which matches L.'s untutored, but original, thought.

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e4 *σπουδαῖον*: i.e. a *μάθημα* which leads to genuine results, as N. claims.

καὶ : adds emphasis (*GP* 315), 'what need *could* there be...?'

e5 *ἀποβλέψας*: 'paying (particular) attention to...'

e6 *τοῦτο* : i.e. *τὸ ὁπλιτικόν.*

εἴ τι ἦν : 'if it were anything', i.e. 'if it had any value'.

Λακεδαιμονίους : the Spartans had a reputation for excellence in military matters based on a concentrated regime of training for all male citizens from an early age. Thucydides' Pericles contrasts Sparta's military training unfavourably with that of Athens at Thuc. 2.39 ff.

183a1 *ὅτι ἄν* : 'whatever'.

πλεονεκτοῖεν : cf. 182b4 above.

The force of Laches' point here has been underestimated (e.g. Lane, 88). L. is not suggesting that the Spartans reject military training (which would be manifestly false) but that they are not interested in *hoplomachia* as a technical exercise (presumably because it is considered ineffective). They prefer to put their emphasis elsewhere (where, by implication, L. thinks it should go). Rejection by the most successful land army in Greece is no high recommendation for a military training method! The argument has considerable rhetorical force (for its logic, see below on b6).

a2 *εἰ δ' ἐκείνους* : unexpressed subject is *hoplomachia* referring back to *τοῦτο* (182e6) and, ultimately, *τὸ ὁπλιτικὸν* at d8.

a2–3 *ἀλλ'...γε* : 'at all events...' (*GP* 12).

a3 *αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅτι κτλ.* : 'this very fact, that...', parallel with *ὅτι* (a5).

ἐκεῖνοι : i.e. the Spartans.

a5 *ἄν* : anticipatory, see a6.

a6 *γε* : strengthens *ὥσπερ*, 'precisely as...' (*GP* 124).

a7 *τοιγάρτοι* : strong logical force (*GP* 567), 'And that is the reason why...' (Tatham).

a8–9 *ἔξωθεν...πόλεις* : means 'cities outside (bordering on) Attica' and not (Loeb) 'outlying Attic towns'.

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b1–2 *εὐθὺς δεῦρο*: emphasises abruptness and speed of approach, 'makes a bee-line for...'

b3 *τούτους*: refers to *τοὺς...μαχομένους*.

b4 *ἄβατον ἱερὸν*: *ἄβατον*, commonly used of religious sanctuaries (cf. Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*. 167, 675); here is ironic, 'Holy of holies' (Lane).

ἄκρῳ ποδὶ: 'with the tip of the toe'.

b5 *πᾶσι μᾶλλον*: 'everybody rather...' (than the Spartans).

b6 *τούτοις*: depends on *ἐπιδεικνυμένους*, parallel with *πᾶσι μᾶλλον*. L.'s argument (1), including his analogy with Athenian tragedy has strong rhetorical force (see n. on 183a1), but it is less effective when analysed logically; his contention that teachers of *hoplitikon* don't dare to match themselves against the Spartans *because* they don't have a *μάθημα* which is *σπουδαῖον* is unconvincing; they might have other reasons for staying away, e.g. Spartan unwelcoming attitude towards foreigners, or unreceptivity to new ideas. Put schematically L.'s argument is: (i) all experts with a worthwhile *μάθημα* gravitate towards the acknowledged centre; (ii) Sparta is the acknowledged military centre; (iii) Athenian military teachers don't go there; (iv) therefore they don't have a worthwhile *μάθημα*. The fault of this argument lies in the initial premiss (i), which is supported by the false analogy of Athenian tragedy, while (ii) also is itself disputable (see Thuc. 2.39.1).

c1 *ἔπειτα*: point (2).

c2 *ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔργῳ*: a clue to L.'s character—averse to theory and impressed by reactions of people 'under fire'. Cf. his high estimate of S. which is based not (as N.'s is) on his intellectual ability, but on his proven courage 'under fire' (see 181a7–b4 above). His mockery of professionals comes from practical experience (*παραγέγονα* above c1–2).

c3 *καὶ αὐτόθεν*: i.e. from *αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα*.

ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες: 'as if on purpose', 'it looks almost deliberate!' (Lane). L.'s speech is peppered with ironical, even sarcastic nuances (a2–3, b4, c3, c7–8 below) to indicate that he believes he has detected the pretensions of the so-called experts.

c6 *ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευσάντων*: i.e. in all other subjects the men with reputations come from the ranks of the (properly) trained.

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οὗτοι : i.e. **experts in *hoplitikon*.**

c7–8 *ὡς ἔοικε...οὕτω σφόδρα...δεδυστυχήκασιν* : **withering sarcasm.**

τοῦτο : **refers to** *καίτοι...ἕκαστα* **above c5–6.**

ἐπεὶ καὶ : **'for example, take...' (for the force of** *καὶ* **here, see *GP* 296–7).**

τοῦτον τὸν Στησίλεων : **the man whose performance they were viewing just before the Dialogue began (178a1** *τὸν ἄνδρα*). **Stesilaus is not known elsewhere. He is presented as an all-round teacher of the military art, theoretical and practical, rather like Euthydemos and Dionysodoros (*Euthd.* 271d and 273e; cf. Xen, *Mem.* III.1.1 ff.), and drawing a large audience (***ἐν τοσούτῳ ὄχλῳ*** d1).**

d1 *ἐθεάσασθε* : **cf.** *τεθέασθε* **(178a1).**

d1–2 *τὰ μεγάλα...ἔλεγεν* : **strong self-advertisement appears to have been a stock-in-trade of teachers of this kind (cf. *Euthd.* 273d8–9, *Grg.* 448a1–3). We don't need to take Plato's word for it; Diodorus Siculus, 12.53, tells us that the famous sophist Gorgias gave a display of his talents in the Athenian Assembly, speaking as an ambassador for his home town of Leontini in Sicily in 427 BC.**

d2–3 *κάλλιον...ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιδεικνύμενον* : **strong irony, with a word-play which also exists in English, '...I had a better spectacle of him really and truly making an exhibition of himself' (*ὡς* intensifies the adverb** *ἀληθως*).

d3 *ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ* : **omitted by Schanz (Vat. MS).**

d4 *ἐπεβάτευεν* : **an** *ἐπιβάτης* **= marine (soldier on board ship). Thuc. 6.43 states that at the beginning of the Sicilian Expedition these were *thetes* (the lowest property-class of the Athenian State), but that they could also be *hoplites*, is clear from Arist. *Politics* 1327b9.**

δορυδρέπανον : **a combination of scythe and spear—a kind of halberd, designed to cut rigging on the enemy ship (cf. Strabo 4.41, Polybius 21.27.4), not entirely useless, though looked down on by the conventional L.**

δὴ : **sarcastic, 'of course'.**

d6 *ἅτε καὶ αὐτὸς* : **'just as he himself...' (*αὐτὸς* has as its antecedent the subject of** *ἐμάχετο* **(d5) i.e. Stesilaus).**

d7 *σόφισμα* : **here in a negative sense, 'contrivance', 'artifice', 'clever stunt' (Lane).**

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e1 *οἷον ἀπέβη* : understand *ἄξιον* (*ἐστι*) *λέγειν* (from d7).

e2 *ἐνέσχετο* : passive of *ἐνέχω*, 'became somehow (*που*) caught...'
ἀντελάβετο : passive of *ἀντιλαμβάνω*, 'was held fast'.

e 4–5 *μὲν σὺν...δὲ δὴ* : strong contrast in vivid story-telling style.

e4–184a1 *παρέθει...παρημείβετο...ἐφίει* : imperfects, descriptive of the *duration* of Stesilaus' plight.

a1–2 *ἀντελάβετο* : here *middle*, 'he was grasping' (contrast passive at e2 above).

a3 *σχήματι* : cf. N.'s favourable emphasis on *εὐσχημοσύνη* (above 182c9 ff.) on which L. may be here implicitly commenting. '(laughing at) what a figure he cut'.

a5 *τότ' ἤδη καὶ* : then, by this time, even those...' L. emphasises the fact that, ultimately, even Stesilaus' own comrades couldn't restrain themselves.

a7 *ἐκεῖνο* : mocking emphasis, 'that scythe-spear'.

a7–8 *μὲν οὖν...δ' οὖν* : contrast; in the first clause, L. goes as if to set aside his reservations and concede that N. may have a point, but, in the second, withdraws the concession in favour of his own experience.
ταῦτα : i.e. Stesilaus' training.

a8 *ἐντετύχηκα* : L. consistently rates his own experience higher than theory (cf. *παραγέγονα*, 183c1–2).

b1 *ἐξ ἀρχῆς* : i.e. 182e1–4.

b1–3 *εἴτε οὕτω...αὐτὸ εἶναι μάθημα* : this whole phrase is subject of *οὐκ...μανθάνειν* ; *transl.* 'And so, as I said at first, whether it is a *μάθημα* but of so very little use, or, when it's not, they say and pretend it is—all this it is not worth trying to learn.'

b3–4 *καὶ γὰρ οὖν* : indicates a further general argument which reinforces what has been already said, 'And indeed I think it would be true to say...'

b4–7 In direct contrast to N. (182c6) L. here distinguishes *θρασύς*

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(bold, rash) from *ἀνδρεῖος* (brave). L.'s point, which contradicts N., is that assumption of knowledge (*ἐπίστασθαι* b4) may give a coward unjustified confidence (*θρασύτερος...γενόμενος* b5) (a commentary on Stesilaus' actions at 183e1–184a7) and make a brave man the object of criticism (*μεγάλας...διαβολάς* b7). For L. then, mastery of *hoplitikon* does not, even partly, determine whether a man turns out a coward or a brave man; indeed he goes further: in either case it can be a positive disadvantage, i.e. make matters worse. Although L. here is focusing his attention specifically on the object of his attack, *hoplitikon*, his clear separation of bravery from knowledge of a technique anticipates discussion later in the Dialogue (see Intro. 3 (i)).

b7 *ἴσχειν* : infinitive after *δοκεῖ* (b4), 'withstand', 'put up with'.

c1 *ἐπίφθονος* : 'subject to envy'. Dislike of the success of others was a major aspect of ancient Greek morality and psychology (see P. Walcot, *Envy and the Greeks: A Study of Human Behaviour*, Warminster, 1978).

c2 *ἀρετῇ* : L. uses the word here in its restricted sense of 'bravery in battle', cf. e.g. Thuc. 5.9.9. On the significance of use of value terms in this section of the Dialogue, see further Intro. 3 (i).

c6 *ἐξ ἀρχῆς* : i.e. at 181a7. The theme of 'not letting (people) go', introduced initially by L. to indicate the anticipated value of S.'s contribution, reappears at intervals throughout the Dialogue in various guises, in particular as an indication of perseverance and dedication (or otherwise) to the philosophical quest (cf. 186d6, 7, 188a2). Cf. *Euthyphr.* 15d2.

c8 *τοῦ προκειμένου* : 'the issue before us'.

Laches' speech

There is a strong contrast with N.'s speech throughout in a number of ways; it is less formally and neatly organised and shows none of N.'s acquaintance with professional practice. L.'s argumentative points, while logically flawed (see esp. n. on 183b6), have strong rhetorical force, which derives from a strong vein of ironic even sarcastic humour (182d7–8, 183b4, c3, d2–3, d5) and conviction of the importance of his own personal experience (183c1–2, 184a8) which overrides theoretical arguments. (The story of Stesilaus' antics has a strong flavour of reality; maybe Plato is recalling an incident in Laches' own experience as a general in Sicily, e.g. Thuc. 3,103?). L.'s obvious respect for Spartan military training also reflects a contrast with N.'s more Athenian emphasis on intellectual qualities (cf. Thuc. 2.40). As with N.'s speech, L.'s

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also sets part of the agenda for the Dialogue (see esp, n. on 184b4–7); for L., acquisition of a technique is incidental (or even disadvantageous) for attainment of *ἀρετή*. The essence of courage, it is implied, lies in what a man proves to be (184b5 ff.), not what his acquired technique makes him *appear* to be. The question of the competing claims of intellect and character or temperament assumes major importance in the subsequent attempts to define bravery (see below Section 10 ff.).

The two speeches of N. and L, and especially their formally opposed style and arrangement also reflect a commonly observed aspect of Greek style, found in e.g. forensic oratory and prominent in drama (the *agon*) and the paired opposed speeches in the *History* of Thucydides. It is significant that Plato immediately moves beyond them, dismissing the idea of opposition, as it were, in favour of *co-operation* as an effective way of getting at the truth.

Section 5. S.'s initial questioning, 184c9–186a2

Lys. is at a loss as to how to arbitrate between the contradictory views of N. and L., and suggests a vote, a procedure sharply questioned by S. who introduces the idea that instead they should defer to an expert (on analogy with other skills, e.g. physical training). But first, they need to regress the argument logically a step and consider for what goal expertise is to be sought, namely the *ψυχή* (soul) of the young men. And experts in this need to offer proof of their expertise.

c9 *Ἀλλὰ...ἔγωγε*: repetition of word from the end of L.'s speech (*δεῖσθαι...δέομαι*), 'Well, I *am* asking you...' (see n. on 180b1).

καὶ γὰρ: gives reason for emphasis (previous note), 'for, indeed...'

ὥσπερ: 'as it were', indicates that a metaphorical expression is to follow, and probably refers to the whole phrase *τοῦ...βουλή*. There is a joking reference here to Athenian political procedure: the *βουλή* was a council of 500 members which prepared business for the Assembly. But the joke has a deeper significance; although Lys. does not yet (does he ever?) realise it, issues such as these cannot ever be decided on the arbitrary vote of an *assessor* (*ἐπιδιακρινοῦντος* is probably the correct text). The political implications of voting for one side or the other (*σύμψηφος*, d4 below) are reflected ironically in S.'s subsequent emphasis on the contrast between the authority of the expert and the weight of numbers (see below e8–9 and in a political context e.g. *Grg.* 445a7 ff.). Cf also Xen. *Apology*, 20–1.

d2–3 *νῦν δὲ...γὰρ...δή*: 'But now that (because) L. has voted contrary to N....'

δή gives emphasis to the result. The political metaphor is maintained

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with *τὴν ἐναντίαν...ἔθετο* (d3) and *σύμψηφος* (d4). There is heavy underlying irony in Lys.' apparent naive assumption that S.'s only task would be to arbitrate between N. and L. He seems to think that if they had agreed, S.'s function would have been barely necessary!

d4 *καὶ σοῦ* : '(hear) from you, too...'

d5–6 S.'s first contribution is, characteristically, not a speech (like N. and L.) but an abrupt question; he is replying to an invitation which he cannot accept because he considers it ill-conceived. His reply and the following dialogue immediately emphasise the gap between a *competitive* debate based upon simple weight of support (in the form of votes) and a *collaborative* search (ironically, what Lys. was asking for in his initial speech, 178a1 ff.) based on mutually supportive arguments, and having as deciding factor not the arithmetic of majority voting, but the authority of expertise. Note how S.'s intervention immediately shifts the terms of the discussion (contrast with his modest entry at 181d1–8); N.'s and L.'s speeches are not judged by S. and, in the immediate philosophical context at least, are simply passed over for new arguments (for their significance in the context of the Dialogue as a whole, however, see Intro. 3 (i)).

d7 *τί γὰρ*; : the question is a rhetorical one and 'virtually constitutes a statement which gives grounds for an implied assent' (*GP* 76), 'Well yes, what else should one do?'

d8 ff. d8–185b8 is M.'s only appearance in *Laches*. M. is mentioned along with Lys. at *Men.* 94c as having been educated by his father, becoming one of the best wrestlers in Athens (see above, Intro. Section 1, on Lys.) An oligarchic politician, M. was sent by the Athenian Council of 400 in 411 BC to Sparta on an embassy (Thuc. 8.86.9). As Lys.' 'sleeping partner', he appears to lack even Lys.' general concern and soon fades out when the going gets slightly tough (185b ff.). The choice of M. as S.'s interlocutor here is motivated probably by the need for variation and dramatic interest (it would have been clumsy and excessively confrontational to have reintroduced N. or L. so soon after their own set speeches).

κἄν : *ἄν* is anticipatory (see below e2).

e1–3 A key Socratic doctrine, the importance of expertise, as opposed to weight of opinion; here, following familiar Socratic practice, introduced by means of analogies with professional expertise; cf. *Cri.* 47b for this precise analogy and in general, *Ap.* 24d ff. See further Intro. 3 (ii).

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e2–3 *τυγχάνει...πεπαιδευμένος καὶ ἠσχηκώς*: *τυγχάνω* + perf. part., 'who happens to have trained and exercised...'

e3 *παιδοτρίβῃ*: the *paidotribes* was a teacher of gymnastics and general physical exercise, one of the three basic elements of Athenian primary education, along with *mousike* and *grammatike* (the study of the rudiments of Greek language and literature).

e7 *ἴσως*: M.'s less than enthusiastic reply (less positive than e4 above) is probably motivated more by reluctance to offend his more articulate friends (two of the four S. mentions in e5) than because he is not convinced by the argument.

e8–9 *Ἐπιστήμη*: expertise implies knowledge of a skill or technique from which authority derives.

γὰρ: gives implied assent, and reason for it, 'yes, for...'

e10 *Πῶς γὰρ οὔ*: M. agrees emphatically to a proposition which on the face of it would have been in many respects against the political instinct of fifth-century Athenian politicians, whose political system worked by the opinion of the majority, expressed in voting. Plato does not allow this tension to surface in *Laches* or in the Socratic dialogues in general, though its political implications are brought out in *Ap.* 24d ff. See further Intro. 3 (ii).

e11 *καὶ νῦν*: introduces the next logical point.

185a1 *τεχνικός*: in Plato *τέχνη* denotes an art or craft which has a rational system or method which is the object of *ἐπιστήμη*, and which has as its aim to make the object of its activity as good as possible (see esp. *Grg.* 464b–66a). For Plato's audience, there is a tension between S.'s expectations of a *τεχνικός* and the everyday use of the word, as understood by N. and L., e.g. in N.'s set-speech, which clearly identifies a skill in which there are experts; and note his somewhat bemused reply to S. below at 185c2–4, in which he clearly assumes that he has already supplied the answer to S.'s question at b9 ff.

a2 *ἑνὶ...ἐᾶν*: this follows from 184d8–e3 above. *ἐᾶν* 'let (the others) be'.

a3–7 S.'s moral earnestness shows his estimate of the importance of the group's quest not just for the children but for the whole family (in this he is in agreement with Lys.).

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a4 *ἀλλ' οὐ* : better rendered '...and not...' (*GP* 2). This clause contains S.'s main point.

a5 *κτήματος* : their sons (and their welfare) are their most important 'possession'.

a5 *υἱέων...γενομένων* : genitive absolute.

a5–7 In this sentence *οὕτως* refers backward to the genitive absolute, and the final clause echoes the first in an 'ABA construction' (see n. on 179a4–8). *Lit.* 'For, I suppose, according to whether the sons became good or the reverse, so will the whole house of their father be organised, (depending on) what sort of people the children turn out to be.'

b1 *ἄρτι* : i.e. at 184d8–e3.

b6 ff. This represents the second of S.'s major changes of direction—'shifts' in basis of the the argument (see above 184d5 for the first). The question he implies in b1–4 has already been answered, in a conventional sense: N., L. and Lys. all assume there are experts; the only problem is to judge the merits of *hoplitikon*. If it is held on this level, the argument will run forever in circles; it needs S. to deepen and extend it. In what follows it takes N. (the most intellectually sophisticated of S.'s interlocutors) some time to catch up (c2–e3; incidentally is this, strictly speaking, a dramatically consistent portrayal of N., in view of his apparent acquaintance with S.'s methods, cf. 187 e6–88c3, and his sophisticated handling of the 'S. role' later at 194c7–197c1? Why did Plato not let M. continue in his dramatically appropriate 'passive' role until e3?).

b6 *τίνος ὄντος τούτου* : 'what that thing actually is (for which) we are seeking teachers?'

b8 M.'s incomprehension is dramatically very appropriate, and at this point he fades out, never to return (though clearly present throughout, e.g. 186b8). Plato uses this incomprehension dramatically, and as a teaching device: first he arrests the reader's attention with an abbreviated expression of a new idea (b6–7) and then, in response to his listeners' incomprehension, goes on to explain it (b9–c1). But, as N.'s intervention at c2–4 shows, it needs still further elucidation. (For this device, see also below at 189e7–8, 191e11 and 195c3 ff.)

b10 *ἐξ ἀρχῆς...τί ποτ' ἐστιν* : on the need to clarify and agree basic positions before proceeding further, see e.g. *Grg.* 457c–e.

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c2–4 The 'common-sense' answer. This is what the Dialogue has been about, up to 184d4.

c5 ff. S. accepts N.'s answer, in the sense that discussion of *hoplitikon* is valid, but only as an instrumental means to a more basic end (S. uses means/ends analogies frequently in different contexts, cf. e.g. *Ly.* 219e–220a; *Grg.* 467c–d).

c7 *τὴν βουλὴν* : 'consultation', which is concerned with *ends*, e.g. what effect the ointment will have on the eyes; not what effect the eyes will have on the ointment. The same pattern is repeated in the examples at d1–3.

d5 *ἑνὶ λόγῳ* : S. sums up the principle which the previous examples illustrate, 'in a nutshell' (Lane).

d6 *ἐκείνου* : antecedent is *του* (d5), i.e. the object for the sake of which (*οὗ ἕνεκα*) the *βουλή* took place, and *not vice-versa.*

d7 *ὃ ἐζήτει* : *ὅ* is object of *ἐζήτει*, with *τοῦ* as antecedent, the subject being *τις* (understood from d5). *Transl.* 'but not about that thing which he was seeking for the sake of another (i.e. end result).'

d8 *Ἀνάγκη* : 'it follows (logically)', see on 181e5.

d9 *ἄρα* : drawing inference (almost synonymous with *οὖν* or *δή* but less strong or formal, *GP* 41). 'So…' To be distinguished from *ἆρα* in the same line, which introduces the indirect question, 'whether…'

τὸν σύμβουλον : object of *σκοπεῖν*,'so we must consider our adviser too (*καὶ*)…'

d10 *ἐκείνου…οὗ ἕνεκα* : phraseology echoes d5–7 above (see nn.).

σκοπούμενοι σκοποῦμεν : read *σκοποῦμεν ὅ σκοποῦμεν* (Cron.) adopted by e.g. Vicaire. The sense is, in any case, clear whichever reading is adopted.

e1–2 *τῆς ψυχῆς* : S. makes this basic move very casually, and receives immediate and unquestioning assent from N., which suggests that Plato does not believe that S. is introducing a controversial or difficult idea (contrast b6 ff., above, which needed much explanation). For a similar, equally unheralded and immediately accepted introduction of *ψυχή* into the discussion, see e.g. *Grg.* 477a7 (in this case, an important component of S.'s argument). The idea of *ψυχή* had a long history in Greek thought

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from Homer onwards (see, in general, *Oxford Classical Dictionary* 'psyche' and 'soul'). For us it may seem a big move to assert that the object of teaching is the *ψυχή*, but this represents a fundamental, and, as we see here, unchallenged Socratic tenet. For S., the *ψυχή* is the essence of the person and its cultivation the object of all moral aspiration (cf. *Ap.* 29e). Later Platonic Dialogues go on to emphasise the *ψυχή* in a metaphysical context as a separable part of the person which survives the death of the body and is reborn (see esp. *Phd.* 82d ff.). In *Laches* *ψυχή* is restricted to an ethical context but its separability from the body is clearly envisaged in e.g. the myth of the fate of the soul in the afterlife at the end of *Gorgias* (523a ff.). The translation of *ψυχή* as 'soul' is therefore much less misleading than e.g. the reductionist 'character' (Lane), which excludes the idea of separability, either in theory or in practice.

e4 *εἰ...σκεπτέον*: whole sentence to *γεγόνασιν* is the antecedent of *τοῦτο*, subject of *σκεπτέον*.

τεχνικός: S. assumes, without opposition, that the analogy between *θεραπεία* of the *ψυχή* and other crafts holds, i.e. such activity is a *τεχνή*, (on which see above n. on 185a1) in the sense that other crafts are also. For us a questionable assumption, but not it seems for S. or his audience.

e7–8 Characterisation of L. here: he is not sophisticated in philosophical argument, but shrewd and independent-minded. His objection could have been potentially damaging, but S. effectively stops him before he gets going (see following n.).

e9–186a1 S. cleverly silences L. by appealing to his prejudice, his excessive admiration for concrete facts/objects which he can vouch for with his own eyes. Not unpredictably, L. emphatically agrees at 186a2.

e9 *οἷς*: the antecedent is *τεχνικωτέρους* (e8), L.'s 'people more skilled (without teachers)'.

186a2 *τοῦτο*: adverbial, 'in that regard'.

μὲν: emphatic or, perhaps, indicating unexpressed reservation (*δέ* clause unexpressed), '(to that extent) you're right.' It may be that S. is to be thought of as interrupting before L. can get on to the *δέ*.

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Summary of the main points of interest in S.'s initial contribution to the discussion

(1) After a modest start (81d1–7) (really a dramatic ploy to have the advantage of reacting to the speeches of N. and L.) S. takes the initiative and, without being explicit about the change in method (contrast S. in e.g. *Grg.* 449b), substitutes his own characteristic style of dialectic (see Intro, 3 (ii)). Plato skilfully illustrates the change dramatically and philosophically. The initial method of set speeches has produced a dead end; the way out is to aim the argument in a totally different and ultimately, more satisfactory direction. S., with the co-operation of his interlocutors, redefines expertise more sharply in terms of *τέχνη*, (though an actual definition of *τέχνη* is not found in *Laches* (see *Grg* 464b ff.)), and forces them to be more explicit about the aims of the activity in question.

(2) In contrast to N.'s theoretical approach and L.'s pithy but essentially negative contribution, S. re-introduces the moral seriousness with which Lys. started (178a ff.), but takes this to a new level by redefining Lys.' concern in terms of the *ψυχή*. In this, and especially in the following section of the Dialogue, Plato may have had in mind the rehabilitation of S.'s reputation in the aftermath of S.'s execution, with particular regard to the charge of corrupting the youth of Athens (see Intro. 2 (ii)).

(3) This initial dialogue exemplifies well S.'s technique of proceeding by means of securing agreement (and, if necessary, expanding explanation until understanding and agreement are forthcoming, (see n. on 185b8)). Note that the two main positions for which S. secures unhesitating agreement (and which are fundamental to the subsequent argument) are (i) the primacy of the authority of the expert and (ii) the excellence of the *ψυχή* of Lys.' sons as the ultimate goal of *θεραπεία*. Both of these (esp. (ii)) are treated as almost self-evident (see further Intro, 3 (ii)).

Section 6. Socrates' speech on the quest for teachers, 186a3–87d5

While disclaiming any expertise in the subject in question, S. urges N. and L. either to demonstrate proven excellence as a teacher of the *ψυχαί* of the young or to reveal the identities of their teachers. Lys. (whom S. has been addressing), passes on this request to N. and L., re-emphasising S.'s point that the matter is of the greatest importance.

186a3–b8 S.'s first sentence is long, but with a clearly articulated structure: *ἡμᾶς...δεῖ* (a3) governs (i) *ἐπιδεῖξαι* (a6), (ii) *εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐπιδεῖξαι* (b3), and (iii) *κελεύειν ζητεῖν καὶ μὴ...κινδυνεύειν* (b6). These all provide S.'s necessary alternatives for L. and N. (i) *εἰ μὲν* (a6), (ii) *ἢ εἴ τις* (b1), (iii) *εἰ δὲ μηδὲν κτλ.* (b5).

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a3 *καὶ ἡμᾶς ἄρα* : 'and so (*ἄρα*) we too (*καὶ*), (i.e. as well as the hypothetical cases they have been discussing at 185e1–186a1).

a6 *εἰ μέν* : resumes after parenthesis *ἐπειδὴ...ψυχάς* (a3–6).
ἔχειν : 'if we say we can' (sc. *ἐπιδεῖξαι*). *ἔχω* + inf = 'to be able'. Not 'if we say we have any...' (Loeb).

a7 [*ἡμῶν γεγόνασιν*]. Burnet omits. Bekker (followed by e.g. Vicaire) retains with addition of *οἵ*.

b1 A basic assumption of S., unargued here, is that having had a good teacher automatically guarantees that the pupil will possess qualities which he/she has been taught (cf. *Grg.* 460a–d for the argued case).

b2 *οὔ φησι* : Greek idiom, *transl.* with negative belonging to *γεγονέναι*, 'says he hasn't had...'

b4 *δοῦλοι* : Plato is recognising the natural abilities of all, including slaves (cf. the boy interrogated in *Meno.* 82a) or is this perhaps simply a polar expression parallel with *'Αθηναίων...ξένων* (e.g. gods/men, etc.)?

b6 *κελεύειν* : still after *ἡμᾶς* (a3); object is Lys. and M. (understood) and *ἄλλους* is object of *ζητεῖν*.

b7 *διαφθείροντας...αἰτίαν* : the language here recalls part (and the more serious part) of the charge against S., of corrupting the youth (*τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων*), cf. *Ap.* 24b9, Xen. *Mem.* I.1.1. Understand 'them' (the sons) as object of *διαφθείροντας*.

b8 *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν* : emphatic. Beginning of a personal statement by S.

c1 *διδάσκαλός...οὐ γέγονε* : In *Apology*, Plato's S. details his vain attempt to find someone wiser than himself through questioning of so-called experts.

c2 *ἐκ νέου* : there is some evidence in Plato that, in his youth, S. was also interested in theories of cosmology and natural science (*Phd.* 96a–b), contradicted, however, by *Ap.* 19d.

c3 *τοῖς σοφισταῖς* : sophists were itinerant intellectuals. The most famous known to us were not Athenians, though they spent much time at Athens. They taught, for a fee, on a variety of subjects, including natural science, politics and ethics. Their range, as we have seen in *Laches*,

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extended to questions connected with e.g. military matters. For S.'s attitude to them, and his estimate of their capacity as teachers, see *Ap.* 20b–c., *Prt.* 311d ff.

οὐκ ἔχω τελεῖν μισθούς: S. emphasises his poverty in *Ap.* 23c1, as the result of his devotion to the god (Apollo, of the Delphic Oracle) whom he conceives as having given him a mission to question Athenians without asking for a fee (cf. *Euthyphr.* 3d8, *Ap.* 33a–b. See also *Cra.* 384b, on not being able to afford sophistic instruction).

c4 S.'s language here carefully (and possibly also ironically) distances him from endorsement of these claims. *ἐπηγγέλλοντό* and *καλόν τε κἀγαθόν* (the conventional aristocratic ideal) may have ironic nuance—Lane aptly renders '...who professed to be able to make a good and honest man of me.' In *Ap.* 19d–e, Plato's S. refers to sophists with careful politeness (again with lurking irony), but in *Protagoras* and especially *Gorgias*, he clearly shows what he regards as their intellectual limitations.

c6 *οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι*: surely ironical after their mutually contradictory speeches.

c7–8 On the criterion of wealth, see n. on c3 above. On N. and L.'s age, see n. on 181d3–5. The absence of mention of N. and L.'s *military* experience is striking (they are, after all, Athenian generals)! On the idea of 'age bringing wisdom' (with a strong ironical overtone) Lys. would seem a fairly potent counter-example (e.g. 189c6–d1)! At 189a8 ff. L. expresses willingness to learn from suitable teachers, young or old.

c8–d1 *δοκοῦσι δή*: *δή* emphasises the gap between appearance and reality, 'Of course, (certainly) they *seem* to be able...'

d1–3 *οὐ γὰρ ἂν...εἰδέναι*: S. once again ironically makes the assumption that confidence = expertise, cf. *Euthyphr.* 15d4–8, a close parallel to *Laches*: 'you (Euthyphro), would never have dared to prosecute your father...if you did not know precisely what is the holy and unholy...' (in this case, at the end of the Dialogue, after four failed attempts at defining the concepts!).

d3 *αὐτοῖς ἐπίστευον*: S. continues to emphasise what N. and L. *think* or *suppose* or what seems (cf. *δοκοῦσι*, c8) implicitly opposed to what is really the case.

d4–5 This gives polite but devastating point to S.'s irony. L. and N.

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disagree. S.'s discourse from c5–d5 operates on two levels, (1) polite deference to the qualities of N. and L., (2) doubt about their abilities, conveyed by language which emphasises the gap between appearance and reality.

d5 *ἀντιδέομαι* : echoing Lys. at 184c9. The word is found only here in extant Greek literature (s.v. *LSJ* ad loc.).
τοῦτο : i.e. *μὴ ἀφίεσθαι κτλ.* (d7 ff.).
ἄρτι : i.e. at 181a7.

d8 *λέγοντα ὅτι* : S. puts the words into Lys.' mouth—a common Socratic technique, to pose questions or statements in the mouth of interlocutors, or third persons (cf. e.g. *Cri.* 50a ff., *Ap.* 20c4 ff.).

d8–e1 *οὔ φησιν* : see above n. on b2.

e3 *σὺ δ'* : *δ'* corresponds to *μὲν* (d8).

e4 *δεινοτάτῳ* : 'most skilful'. The word has a favourable (or at least neutral) connotation here (contrast frequent negative connotation, e.g. *Ap.* 17b1, *Euthyphr.* 3c8).

e5 *συγγεγόνατον* : 2nd pers. dual perfect indicative.

e5–6 *πότερα...αὐτῷ ἐξευρόντε* : corresponds to the alternatives above at a6–b5 (the third alternative, b5–6, is not raised here).

187a2 *ἄν* : = *ἐάν*.
ὑπὸ : = 'under (the burden of)'.

a4 *τῶν ἡμετέρων* : S. is speaking as Lys., and so he here refers to Lys.' (and M.'s) children, as well as those of N. and L. (*τῶν ὑμετέρων*).

a5 *καταισχύνωσι* : S. introduces the theme with which Lys. started (179d4)—the need to avoid shame based on an absence of *κλέος* ('renown'). Speaking, appropriately enough, in Lys.' *persona*, S. subtly links his development of the need for expertise with conventional values (cf. also *καλούς τε κἀγαθοὺς* below, a8).

b1 *ἐν τῷ Καρὶ* : Caria was a source of slaves and mercenary soldiers, regarded as expendable, hence suitable for beginners' experiments. 'Guinea-pig' (Lane). Cf. *Euthd.* 285c; Euripides, *Cyclops* 654.

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b3 *ἀτεχνῶς* : 'precisely'.

b4 *ἐν πίθῳ...γιγνομένη* : a proverb (a *πίθος* being a large and difficult piece to make, and one in which a mistake would be costly), 'run before you can walk' (Lane). The metaphor is expanded at *Grg.* 514e.

b5 *ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ προσήκειν* : '...you have the capacity and the right (to claim)...'

b6 For the last sentence, S. reverts to his own person, talking to Lys.

c2 *αὐτοὺς δὴ...γιγνώσκειν* : '(you must) form you own (*αὐτοὺς δή*) judgment', i.e. *εἰ δὲ βουλομένοις ὑμῖν κτλ.*

c5 ff. Lys. repeats himself yet again (cf. 179a8 ff.).

c7–8 *καὶ ἄλλως καὶ* : 'especially'.

d2–3 *διδόντες...ἀλλήλων* : one doubts whether Lys. has really grasped the implications of S.'s previous speech, or of 'exchanging views' (and Plato clearly intends us to doubt this—see N.'s speech below). Vicaire (n. on c1–2) considerably overinterprets *ἐρωτᾶσθαί τε καὶ διδόναι λόγον* in suggesting that in this speech 'Lys. is accepting and recommending the Socratic method.' The 'Socratic method' consists of much more than questioning and replying; there is no evidence here that Lys. has moved much from the positions and attitudes he adopted in his first speech; in particular there is no clue here that he has at all assimilated any of S.'s moves relating to expertise and the role of *ψυχή*—contrast the much more sophisticated N. in the following section.

Summary of the main points of this section

(1) S.'s speech, while formally straightforward, contains within it underlying elements of personal justification, which can perhaps be related to the (comparatively recent) trial and death of the historical S. (see Intro, 2 (ii)). He combines moral earnestness with a personal disclaimer of expertise, the latter allowing Plato scope for touches of characteristic Socratic irony—here at the expense of N. and L. (see nn. on 186c6, 7, 8–d1, d3, 4–5). The whole passage (186c2–d5) can be understood on two levels, (i) apparently sincere respect, (ii) ironic distancing from the sophists' claims (and by implication those of N. and L.).

(2) Lys.' reply strongly suggests that *his* intellectual position is static; while seeming to reply to S., he simply re-covers much of the ground of his Section 1 speech (his suggestion of questioning and exchanging

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views sounds like very little more than the 'co-operation' of 179e5 ff.). His final contributions in the Dialogue (see below 200d5 ff. and 201b6 ff.) confirm the suspicion that he is not understanding much that goes on, nor do they give the lie to his own disarmingly low estimate of his own intellectual ability at 189c6 ff. His blithe invitation to give a full account to Socrates (187c4) is taken up ironically by N. below.

Section 7. Nikias' and Laches' reaction to Socrates' proposals, 187d6–189d3

N. and L. both react in characteristic ways to Lys.' request (characteristic, in the sense that their earlier speeches have prepared us for their attitudes here). N., speaking as someone familiar with S.'s procedure, points out that enquiries with S. tend to turn into self-examination which, since it is not unpleasant, he is quite willing to undergo. L. is likewise willing because S. is a man whose deeds, which he has experienced, bode well for what L. respects—a harmony of words and deeds. Lys., giving age as a pretext, concedes his part in the discussion (also on behalf of the silent M.) to N. and L.

d6–e4 N.'s first speech humorously maintains the impression that Lys. is 'out of touch' (see 180d4–181a2). Actually, N.'s observation at e3–4 has already been strongly suggested by Lys. himself at 180c5 ff., but N. wishes to reinforce the point, already amply demonstrated in the previous speech, that Lys. is ignorant of S.'s procedure.

d7–e2 *ἀλλ' ἢ...ἢ* : 'except either when...or...'. For this use of *ἀλλά*, see *GP* 25.

e3–4 *δῆλος...εἶ* : *trans.* as impersonal, 'it is clear that...'
ἔτι : with *οὐκ* (*ἐτι*).

e5 *Τί μάλιστα;* : *lit.* 'why, especially?', i.e. 'What makes you say that?'

e7 [*λόγῳ ὥσπερ γένει*]: omitted by Cron., plausibly as a marginal explanation of the text.

e8 *αὐτῷ* : *ὅς* (e6) is antecedent (S.'s hypothetical interlocutor).
ἐὰν ἄρα : 'if by chance'.
ἄλλου του : 'something else'.
e9 *μὴ παύεσθαι* : dependent on *ἀνάγκη* (*ἐστι*) *αὐτῷ περιαγόμενον τῷ λόγῳ*, 'led round and round in the argument by him', i.e. S. (*ὑπὸ τούτου*). This characteristic of Plato's S., as seen by his interlocutors, is much recorded, cf. e.g. *Euthyphr.* 11b7 ff.

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e10–188a2 N. combines here the two key aspects of S.'s dialectic: his professed ignorance of the subject under discussion (see esp. 200e2 ff) and, at the same time, his strong conviction of the personal moral implications of the discussion for the individual involved, cf. *Ap.* 29e, 38a, *Grg.* 500c, where there is (c3–4, *ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν*) a close parallel in language with *Laches* 187e10–188a1, *ὅντινα τρόπον νῦν τε ζῇ*...

a2 *ὅτι* : picks up *ὅτι* (187e6) after *δοκεῖς εἰδέναι*.

ἀφήσει : cf. other instances of 'letting go' in *Laches*: 181a7, 184c6, 186d6, 7, 187b6, 200c5. Here, in contrast to L. at 181a7, it is S. who won't 'let people go', signifying dramatically the 'compulsion' of the dialectical argument.

a3 *βασανίσῃ* : basic meaning 'to test quality of a metal on a touch-stone', i.e. 'to examine closely' (with the implication of 'testing'). N. emphasises the element of compulsion exerted (*ἐμπέσῃ* = 'fall into (a trap)' a2, and see previous note).

a4 *ἐγὼ δὲ συνήθης* : as earlier (180c8 ff.) N. reveals himself as a man acquainted with contemporary intellectuals including S.

a5 *καὶ ἔτι γε αὐτὸς* : 'and still more with regard to myself...'

a6 *χαίρω* : not always the reaction of S.'s interlocutors (on N.'s attitude see further note at the end of the section).

τῷ ἀνδρί : affectionate familiarity.

b1 *προμηθέστερον* : agrees with *τὸν...φεύγοντα κτλ.* (b2) after *ἀνάγκη εἶναι* (inf. dependent on *οἶμαι*, a7). S. introduces the idea of *προμηθία* as a desirable quality in the Socratic search at 185a9.

b2 *ταῦτα* : i.e. S.'s cross-examination.

b3 *τὸ τοῦ Σόλωνος* : The line referred to is *γηράσκω δ' αἰεί πολλὰ διδασκόμενος* ('but as I grow old I continue to learn many things' J.M. Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus* I.18). Solon was an Athenian statesman and poet of the early sixth century BC who composed poems with moral, social and political import. One of the traditional 'wise men' of Greece, he is frequently quoted by Plato.

b4 *προσιέναι* : 'approach' (of old age).

νοῦν ἔχον : 'bringing sense with it' (Tatham).

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b5 *ἄηθες...ἀηδὲς* : words associated by sound. The process is so described (*οὐκ ἀηδὲς*) at *Ap.* 33c4 and 41b5 but there the pleasure is felt by onlookers (33c2 *χαίρουσιν*, see above a6) and questioner respectively but not by the victim.

b6–c1 It is frequently explained that Plato's S. questions not just the youth (this is the nub of the charge against him) but anybody, including parents (cf. *Ap.* 33a). N., as someone experienced in S.'s method, has already divined S.'s plan (*πάλαι...ἠπιστάμην*).

c1 *οὐδὲν κωλύει* : cf. N. at 181d8. Note N.'s casual, somewhat 'uninvolved' attitude in this speech.

c1–2 *τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν...Λάχητα δὲ* : the antithesis indicates a 'put-down' for the 'uninitiated' L. N. is quite happy about the prospect, but he can't speak for L.

c4 f. *Ἁπλοῦν...διπλοῦν*: a pun on *ἁπλοῦν* = 'single' or 'simple', 'straightforward'.

τὸ γ' ἐμόν: an echo of N.'s expression at c1 above, somewhat assertive (on the picking up of words in verbal competition between N. and L. see above n. on 180b1 and below n. on 197a6).

c6 *φιλόλογος...μισόλογος* : L. seems to be indulging here in an awkward parody of antithetical style (see also n. on c4 f.—an unlettered man trying hard to be *à la mode*?). *μισόλογος* often has negative connotations in Plato (e.g. *R.* 411d = 'philistine') but for a close parallel to *Laches*, see *Phd.* 89d1 ff.

c7 *ἀρετῆς* : a ref. to the general virtue; contrast L. at 184c2 (see n. ad loc.). Here, L. does not define closely what sort of quality he is referring to in c8, but there must be a strong implication that the conduct (with which L. wants speech to harmonise) is primarily thought of as military excellence.

d1 *χαίρω* : cf. N. at 188a6, but note the different circumstances and expectations of L.

d3–4 *μουσικὸς...ἁρμονίαν καλλίστην* : the return of the theme of music, briefly introduced in the context of a ref. to Damon at 180d1 ff. (see n. ad loc.) Here L. introduces the idea of *ἁρμονία* as an indication of a moral quality. It is not our 'harmony' but a word indicating a musical scale—with a strong basic idea of appropriate connection between parts.

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In L.'s case, it is given a particular relevance: he wishes to fit (basic meaning of *ἁρμονία*) words appropriately (*πρέποντα* d2) to the real worth of the person (shown through his deeds).

d3 *τοιοῦτος* : *ἀνδρός*, c8.

d6–7 *δωριστὶ...ἰαστί...φρυγιστὶ...λυδιστί* : L. maintains the musical metaphor. Plato (*R.* 398 ff.) approves only of the Dorian mode, associated with bravery, and the Phrygian, its peacetime counterpart; he rejects the Ionian and Lydian as weak and effeminate. The musical modes were scales which differed from each other in the sequence of intervals composing them, and in tonality. They were also thought to have distinctive ethical effects, e.g., as here, Ionian = 'effeminate', Dorian = 'warlike', 'manly'.

d7–8 *ἥπερ...ἁρμονία* : antecedent is *δωριστί*. As the names imply, traditionally the Dorian was the only mode of (mainland) Greek origin. Its choice by L. clearly underlies the military connections here.

d2–8 All that follows *τοιοῦτος εἶναι* is in apposition to it. *ἡρμοσμένος* (dependent on *τοιοῦτος*) governs *τὸν βίον κτλ.*

e1 *φιλόλογον* : see c6 above. L. has explained why he seems so, at c6–d8.

e2 *ὁ δὲ* : the other alternative (which makes L. *μισόλογος* ; see distinction at c6 above).

e3–4 *ὅσῳ...τοσούτῳ* : literally 'by how much better he seems to speak, by that much I am more grieved...', i.e. for the man whose deeds don't match his words, L.'s grief is in proportion to his interlocutor's eloquence. It is clear that, for L., deeds are the yardstick: he judges words from deeds, as in his example of S. at e5–7; he assumes that S.'s bravery (181b1 ff.) is likely to entail good speech.

e6 *ἐπειράθην* : see above 181a7 ff.

189a1 *παρρησίας* : cf. Lys. at 178a4–5. L. uses the word in a general sense, but it also has implications for the conduct of S.'s dialectic (see n. on 178a4–5).

a2 *καὶ τοῦτο* : 'this too' (*λόγων...παρρησίας*) (i.e. as well as physical bravery). There is something rather beguiling in the spectacle of L. hoping that S.'s words live up to his deeds!

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συμβούλομαι : *lit.* 'wish with him', i.e. 'am of one mind with him' (Jowett), 'his wish is mine' (Lane).

a4–5 *καὶ ἐγὼ* : L. is not to be outdone by N. in quoting from Solon.

a5 *ὑπὸ χρηστῶν μόνον* : L.'s addition to N.'s quotation is significantly in character with its emphasis on the moral fitness of the teacher.

a6 *συγχωρείτω* : subject is Solon, imagined to be in dispute with L.
καὶ αὐτὸν : 'in himself', i.e. quite apart from his teaching.

a7 *ἀηδῶς* : compare N. at 188b5.

a8–b1 *εἰ δὲ...ἔχων* : indirect question after *οὐδέν μοι μέλει*. Here, L. implicitly rejects S.'s (ironic) insistence on the precedence of age at e.g. 181d3 and 186c8.

b2 *ἐλέγχειν* : L. has in mind a cross-examination, but not of the rigour that S. has in mind (which L. is about to undergo). For Socratic *ἔλεγχος*, see Intro, 3 (iii).

b3 *καὶ μάνθανειν* : on the face of it this looks like dramatic irony on Plato's part, in view of L.'s inexperience. But note S.'s insistence on the *co-operative* nature of the investigation (see e.g. 194c2 ff.) and the possibility that L.'s basic position on the definition of *ἀνδρεία* contributes something to the purpose of the Dialogue as a whole (on this larger question see Intro, 4 (i)). Also *καὶ...γε* perhaps lessens any possible irony by making L.'s claim sound less confident: 'even, perhaps, learn what I know...'

b4 *σὺ παρ' ἐμοὶ διάκεισαι* : '...the opinion I have of you'.

b5 Yet another ref. back to 181b1 ff.
ἀρετῆς : here distinctly 'military excellence' (cf. above 184c2 and n. ad loc.).

b7 *τὴν ἡμετέραν ἡλικίαν* : see n. on 181d3–5.
c1 *τὰ ὑμέτερα* : clearly both N. and L. are included here. There is, possibly, an ironic echo of *το...ἐμὸν* (N. 188c1; L. c4), with *ὡς ἔοικεν* here.

c3 *ἡμέτερον δὴ* : 'the initiative is with us...'

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c5–6 *τῶνδε...τούτοις* : i.e. N. and L.

γὰρ : Lys. gives the reason for his request: 'You see...' (Lane).

c7 *τὰ πολλὰ* : adverbial, 'most of the time'.

ὧν : attracted into case of (unexpressed) antecedent (genitive, after *ἐπιλανθάνομαι*).

d3 Lys. is still unaware of the complexity of the problem, is *passive* (he'll do whatever is decided) when S. demands *active* participation, and so is totally unfitted to join in. Plato's portrait comes close to satire here.

Summary of section

(1) In the two speeches of N. and L., contrasts in character and attitudes, visible in their earlier contributions, are developed. N.'s willingness to engage with S. in discussion is based on his knowledge of what is in store, though N. appears to take the prospect of giving an account of his way of life lightly (his lack of emotional involvement is indicated at 188b5, c1). L. presents an even starker contrast to N. than in his earlier speech; ignorant of S.'s intellectual reputation and methods (Plato injects much subtle humour here) he regards seriousness of commitment, as witnessed by actions, to be paramount.

(2) These speeches complement each other so closely that it seems reasonable to suppose that Plato intends a moral testimonial to his S. here, extolling, in the persons of N. and L., the contrasted sides of his character. Emphasis is also given to a major Socratic paradox—S.'s insistence on his own ignorance and inability as a teacher, alongside his overwhelming conviction that he knows the most effective way of tackling the problems of the group.

(3) The conclusion of this section also brings us to the end of the first half of the Dialogue (and almost to the actual half-way point), and the major break between preliminary discussion and the philosophical argument proper. For the relationship between the two halves of the Dialogue, see Intro, 2 (iii) and 4 (i). The significance of the first half will be clearer in retrospect, when the main philosophical arguments of the second half have been worked through. However the first half also stands in its own right as a contribution to Socratic method and procedure, as well as a subtle and often humorous portrayal of tensions between vividly drawn personalities, with their various assumptions and concerns.

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Section 8. The argument between Laches and Socrates, preliminaries, 189d4–190d6

S. suggests that, before they search for suitable teacher(s), there is a more fundamental question for them all to ask: what is it which, by addition, will make them better? In other words, what is *ἀρετή* ? It is necessary to know what it is, or at least that part of it relevant to the present discussion, i.e. *ἀνδρεία*, in order to give people the best advice on how to acquire it.

d4–5 *καὶ Μελησίᾳ* : sheer politeness, surely, since M. has not shown much sign of contributing. M. is, in a sense, 'represented' by Lys.

d5 *νυνδή* : i.e. 185b1–187b7.

d6 *τοιαύτης παιδείας* : i.e. cultivation of the *ψυχή*.

d6–7 S. maintains the alternatives, (i) who have been our teachers?, or (ii) (assuming we claim expertise) whom have we made better? (See above 186a3–b8.)

d5–e1 *ἃ...ἡμᾶς αὐτούς* : the whole phrase *ἃ...πεποιήκαμεν* is object of *οὐ κακῶς εἶχεν ἐξετάζειν*, with *ἡμᾶς αὐτούς* as subject. *τοιαῦτα* is the antecedent of *ἃ* (*οἷα*), but in reverse order.

e1–3 *ἡ τοιάδε σκέψις...ἐξ ἀρχῆς* . This represents the *third* of the major shifts in the terms of argument, engineered by S. (see above 184d5 and 185b6 and nn. ad loc. for the others). This move to a more fundamental question (*μᾶλλον ἐξ ἀρχῆς*) introduces what is *the* characteristic question of the Socratic Dialogues of Plato, the 'what is X' question, the search for a definition, which occupies the speakers for the rest of the Dialogue.

e3 *τοιάδε* : refers forward to what follows, *εἰ γὰρ τυγχάνομεν κτλ.*

εἰς ταὐτὸν φέρει : 'leads to the same thing', 'has a bearing on the same problem' (Lane).

σχεδὸν...τι : 'if anything...'

μᾶλλον ἐξ ἀρχῆς : 'more fundamental', 'nearer to first principles' (Jowett).

e3–7 The idea here is complex, but Plato's syntax is not; *lit. transl.* 'For if we know concerning anything (*ὁτουοῦν πέρι*) that (this thing) put beside something (*τῳ*) makes that thing (*ἐκεῖνο*, ref. back to *τῳ*) which it was put beside better, and furthermore, we are able to put the one (*αὐτὸ*,

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ref. back to *ὁτουοῦν*) beside the other (*ἐκείνῳ*, ref. back to *ἐκεῖνο* at e4), then it is clear that we know that thing itself (*αὐτὸ...τοῦτο*, ref. back to *αὐτὸ* at e5), concerning which we are consulting as to how anyone might most easily and best acquire it (*αὐτὸ* refs to *αὐτό* in e5, 6)'; i.e. 'If we know that we can make something better by adding another thing to it, and we are able, in addition, to add the one to the other, clearly we know what that thing we are talking about is, and how it may be most easily and best obtained.' By this S. means that (i) knowledge of the good effect of an added thing, and (ii) the ability to add it, entail knowledge of the thing added.

e7–8 Plato indicates awareness that this is a difficult idea by filling out the somewhat abstract pattern of e3–7 with examples (cf. also 185b8–9, 191e11 and 198b2 for dramatic signalling of a difficult idea).

e8 *ὧδε* : i.e. with the following examples.

190a1–5 The example clarifies the pattern of e3–7 above: (i) knowledge of the good effect of adding *ὄψις* to eyes and (ii) the ability successfully to add *ὄψις*, entails (*δῆλον ὅτι*) that we know what *ὄψις* is (and so could advise people how best to acquire it).

a6–b1 Ignorance of the 'what is...?' question renders it highly unlikely (*σχολῇ*, ironical understatement) that one could advise people as an *expert* (here a doctor).

a8 *ὅντινα τρόπον* : introduces indirect question.

b2 There is no particular dramatic reason why L. (rather then N.) answers here. But, in the larger context of the arguments of the second part of the Dialogue (see Intro. Section 3) it is clear why S.'s conversation with L. takes precedence.

b3 *καὶ νῦν* : in *this* case (what the examples by analogy were leading up to).

τῶδε : i.e. Lys. and M.

b4 *τίν' ἂν τρόπον...παραγενομένη...ἀμείνους ποιήσειε* : S. underlines the parallelism between the analogies of sight and his present concern by repeating words: *τίν' τρόπον* (*ὅντινα τρόπον* a8), *παραγενομένη* (*παραγίγνεσθαι* 189e5); *ἀμείνους ποιήσειε* (*βέλτιον ποιεῖ* e4, a2).

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b7 *Ἆρ' οὖν*: introduces a new stage of the argument (following L.'s agreement at b2 and b6). 'So then ...?'

τοῦτο refers to *τὸ εἰδέναι...ἀρετή*: The immediacy of L's agreement at c3 (the move from sight to *ἀρετή* is not at all obvious to us) is perhaps aided by S's keeping the analogy of sight very close to the key concept by means of repetition of vocabulary and syntax (see also on b4). So, *ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή* b8 – *ὄψιν...ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν* a4; *εἰ γὰρ που μήδ'...εἰδεῖμεν* b8 – *εἰ γὰρ μηδ'...εἰδεῖμεν* a6; *σύμβουλοι γενοίμεθ'* c1 – *σύμβουλοί...γενοίμεθα* a7; *κάλλιστα κτήσαιτο* c1–2 – *κάλλιστ' ἂν κτήσαιτό τις* b1. The identity of vocabulary bridges over the conceptual gap which may be perceived between physical and ethical 'expertise'. Whether this bridge (known as the 'Craft Analogy') would have even been perceived by S's audience as a problem (there is no serious protest in *Laches*, or any other Socratic Dialogues) is doubtful (see further, Intro. 3 (ii)). The close attention paid to repetition of language (mentioned above) suggests that perhaps S. was aware that this particular move needed care and his interlocutors required 'leading' (see also *που*, (b8), which tends to 'force' the analogy). In any case, it is *the* central plank in S.'s ethical edifice. For a similar demonstration of the 'Craft Analogy', see *Grg.* 460a–c.

b8 *ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή*: S. casually introduces the key Socratic question, and a traditional expression of it (cf. eg. *Euthyphr.* 6e3–4). It is not yet clear (and the medical analogy has not helped the unclarity) what S. means by 'what is *ἀρετή*?' Does he want a synonym, examples or a definition? The bigger question, whether *ἀρετή* has a single definition, is put on one side at c8 ff., to be suggested later (199e2 ff.).

c5 *μέντοι*: 'assent by echoing a word, or words of the previous speaker' (*GP* 401), 'Well yes, we do.'

c6 *δήπου*: i.e. this follows uncontroversially from c3. To be able to put into words what one knows is an unquestioned assumption of Socratic enquiry.

d3–5 The question of whether S.'s language commits him to the 'parts of virtue' position which he appears to support here is a tricky one, on which see Intro. 3 (iii) in connection with the final argument of Section 14 below (see n. on 198a4).

d3 *οὖν*: 'so' (resuming, after L's agreement). The question is rhetorical; S. wishes to 'get on'.

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d4–5 *ἡ...μάθησις* : S. thus connects the developing line of argument to the initial discussion, the enquiry initiated by Lys. about *hoplitikon* (179e1ff).

d5 *τοῖς πολλοῖς* : in basing his choice on the popular view, does S. here wish to side-step personal endorsement of it? (see n. above on d3–5).

d6 *καὶ...δοκεῖ* : L's strong assertion is to be expected.

Summary of section
By means of the 'Craft Analogy' subtly developed and 'pushed' by means of careful choice of language and syntax (see above for details), S. secures agreement on what basic question needs to be asked *before* one's suitability as a teacher can begin to be judged. The choice of a part of *ἀρετή* for analysis gives precision to what have been hitherto vague and inconsistent references by Lys. and L. to *ἀρετή* as an undifferentiated virtue (albeit with strong implication of one of its core meanings = valour in battle). The decision to choose a part of *ἀρετή* (whether S. owns to it or not) is also very significant for the final argument of the dialogue (see below, Section 14).

Section 9. Laches first attempt to define *ἀνδρεία*, 190d7–192b4
L. defines courage as being willing to stand in the ranks, resist the enemy, and not flee. S. agrees that this action is courageous but argues against it as a definition in two ways: (i) it admits of exceptions—flight can be consistent with courage, citing examples from Homer and history; (ii) courage has a wider scope than L's definition allows. What is the common factor (taking by analogy, the example of *τάχος* = capacity to do a lot in a short time)?

d8 *ἀνδρεία τί ποτ' ἐστιν* : For the form of the question, see above n. on 190b8. This is the topic of the remainder of the Dialogue, in apposition to *τοῦτο* (d7).

d8–e2 *ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο...παραγενέσθαι* : they never get on to this stage in *Laches*. *παραγένοιτο* (cf. 189e4 etc.).

e3 *ἀλλὰ* : with imperative (*πειρῶ* = 2nd sing. pres. imp. mid.), 'But (just for now) try...'

e4 L. reacts with the confidence characteristic of S's interlocutors in the initial stages of questioning (cf. *Euthyphr.* 4e9, 5d8 ff., *Grg.* 448a ff.; and S's comment on this confidence at *Ap.* 21c5–7). It is also a good

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dramatic touch here. As with the interlocutors in the account S. gives in *Apology*, L. is a professional in the field, a general, who should know, if anybody does, what courage is (i.e. know what it is and be able to add it to individuals—above 189e3, 190b1), and is, doubtless, conscious of the fact.

e5–6 Characteristically, (cf. *Euthyphr.* 5d8 ff., *R.* 1.331e1 ff.) L's definition is not wide enough (see further Intro. 3 (iii) on the exact outcome of L's mistake here). His definition derives from popular sentiment—e.g. the seventh century BC Spartan poet Tyrtaios, 'Young men, fight them shoulder to shoulder; don't begin disgraceful flight, nor be afraid' (Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus* I.10.15 ff.), cf. *Ap.* 28e–29a.

e7–9 S. gives L. qualified praise, since L. has correctly used the predicate *ἀνδρεῖος* (e6). S. politely assumes responsibility for the 'misunderstanding' (*οὐ σαφῶς εἰπών*). It is possible to interpret this as 'mock humility' (e.g. Tatham); but S's reaction here is also characteristic of his conception of the questioning as a co-operative exercise; he is as much responsible for success or failure as L. (see below 193e1).

e8 *τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι* : dependent on *αἴτιος*, 'guilty of your not answering...'

διανοούμενος : 'meant (when I asked)'.

e10 *πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις* : 'what do you mean by that?'

191a5–6 S. agrees with L., in the sense that they have correctly used *ἀνδρεῖος* (see above e6). But S. then introduces an example which (L. will eventually admit, c6 below) qualifies its subject as *ἀνδρεῖος*, but which doesn't fit L's definition.

a7 Has L. forgotten his exploits with S. (181b1–4)?

a8 ff. In taking his examples from 'real life' (Greek history and poetic tradition), S. is adapting his method of argument to the down-to-earth L.

Σκύθαι : a nomadic people who lived north of the Black sea, who traded with the Greeks and were among the earliest fighters with the bow from horseback. S. refers to a practice of tactical retreat discussed in detail by Hdt., 4.120 ff.

a9 ff. *Ὁμηρός* : The references are to *Iliad* 5.222–3 (a10–b1) and 8.106–8 (b3). Plato's S. is not entirely serious here: the reference in *Il.* 5.222–3 is to Aeneas' Trojan horses, who understand pursuit and flight

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(not 'tactical withdrawal') and 8.106–8 describes Aeneas as a 'deviser of rout' *not* an expert in tactical retreat. Semi-humorous and not entirely apposite references to poetry are common in Plato (he may be ridiculing current fanciful interpretation, cf. *Prt.* 339a ff.).

b2 *τοῦτ'* : sc. *τὴν τοῦ φόβου ἐπιστήμην*. Plato plays on the ambiguity in the implications of the phrase 'knowledge of fear'.

b4 L. doesn't see the humour, but takes the point literally, making what *he* thinks is a telling reply, which is actually beside the point. S.'s argument is not about tactical methods! A good pointer to his character; L. is not quick-witted!

b6–7 [*τὸ ἐκείνων*]...[*τὸ γε τῶν Ἑλλήνων*] : omitted by the third century BC Arsinoe papyrus (Flinders Petrie II, no. 50).

b8–c5 Instead of pointing out the irrelevance of L's objection (b4–7), S. refutes L. on his own terms by citing another historical event—the battle of Plataia against the Persians under Mardonios in 479 BC, the last and decisive battle of the Persian wars. S. could of course, have simply referred back to his own retreat with L. (181b1 ff.) (referred to so often in *Laches*), but this might seen immodest in the circumstances.

b8 *τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων* : the height of military prowess for L. (see 182e6).

c1 *φασιν* : popular tradition (see above n. on b8–c5). S's account does not correspond with Herodotus 9.59 ff., in which the Spartan retreat does not feature as a purely tactical move (*contra* Vicaire n. ad loc.). Plato may possibly have been drawing on sources unknown to us, in which the Spartan tactics in the battle were placed in a more favourable light.

c2 *γερροφόροις* : the Persian wicker shield armament (Hdt. 7.61).

c7 *τοῦτο* : understand *ἐστί* before *ὃ*, on which *ὅτι κτλ.* is dependent. It picks up S.'s statement at 190e7–9 (*ἄρτι*).

ἔλεγεν : 'I meant'

d1 ff. S. broadens his examples of the appropriate use of *ἀνδρεῖος* well beyond what has so far been agreed or implied in the discussion. Aristotle, *EN* 3.1115a, contrasts the *ἀνδρεῖος* proper, who demonstrates courage in war, with other instances, *κατὰ μεταφοράν* (see further Intro. 4 (ii)). For similar extension of *ἀνδρεῖος*, see Demokritos (Diels-Kranz

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68B214): 'The brave man is he who masters not only the enemy, but also his pleasures' (but precedence between Demokritos and Plato here is doubtful, see Guthrie II, 490).

d3 *εἴδει* : 'class', 'kind'. Not to be interpreted here in Plato's semi-technical sense to refer to a 'defining characteristic' of e.g. 'bravery' or 'holiness' (see *Euthyphr.* 6d11).

d4–e1 S.'s examples cover an unusually wide range; the examples of d4–6 are analagous to the central idea, the facing of unpleasant or painful circumstances, and they reflect non-philosophical usage (cf. e.g. Thuc. 2.51.5, on those showing *ἀρετή* by sacrificing themselves to help others during the Athenian plague; see in general, Dover, 164 ff.). At d7, however, the idea of resistance to *ἐπιθυμία* and *ἡδονή* is surely different again, despite the accentuation of the analogy by repeated phraseology (e1 *ἀναστρέφοντες* – c4 *ἀναστρεφομένους*). These examples blur into what we, and S., would call 'temperance' (*σωφροσύνη*—the subject of *Charmides*). S. does not pursue this line of argument in *Laches*, but the implications of the crossing of 'boundary-lines' between parts of *ἀρετή* point forward to the last argument section of the Dialogue (Section 14). See also *Grg.* 507b.

e3 *καὶ σφόδρα* : L's emphatic agreement to this wide extension of the usage of *ἀνδρεῖος* is remarkable in view of his general position and assumptions. Why not a protest or, at least, a less than ringing endorsement? (L. is not above trying to stop the Socrates juggernaut, e.g. 185e7). Of course, L.'s agreement is necessary so that the argument can proceed, but in terms of L's conventional character, it is less than convincing to find him agreeing so readily to S.'s extension of usage.

e6 *κέκτηνται* : perf. with pres. sense, 'possess' (i.e. 'have acquired').

e9 *τί ποτε ὄν* : a repeat of the *τί ποτ' ἔστιν* question (see above on 190b8). A characteristically Socratic question: 'what is the common thing (neuter) which makes people in all these diverse cases *ἀνδρεῖοι* (or *δειλοί*) ?'

ἐπυνθανόμην : force of imperfect, 'That is what I *was* asking' (just now at 190d7–8).

e10 *πειρῶ εἰπεῖν* : repeated from 190e3.

πρῶτον : cf. *ἑκάτερον* e9. The implication is that they will subsequently go on to discuss *δειλία*—which they don't in *Laches*.

τι ὄν...ταὐτόν ἐστιν : for this way of expressing the question, see

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Euthyphr. 5d1 ff. The use of neuter signifies the 'thing', the 'defining characteristic'.

e11 *ἢ οὔπω καταμανθάνεις* : For dramatic signalling of a difficult idea, see nn. on 185b8, 189e7–8 and 198b2.

192a1 *ὧδε...ὥσπερ* : introduction of an analogy, 'Well I mean it in this way...just as if...'

τάχος : this example is not really analagous; quickness is an example of behaviour whereas bravery is behaviour accompanied by a particular mental state and, arguably, a morally worthy intention (see Irwin, 46; Walton, 3). But the example does serve its very limited purpose here of demonstrating in purely formal terms what S. means by a defining characteristic.

a4 *αὐτὸ* : i.e. *τάχος*

a6 *καὶ σὺ* : 'wouldn't you too express it like that?'

a9–10 For S.'s habit of representing the words of others, see n. on 186d8. Note the didactic force of S. answering his own question.

b1 *τὴν...δύναμιν* : in apposition to *ταχυτῆτα* = 'capacity', 'ability'. S. uses the word to express both purely behavioural tendencies and also 'states', i.e. the condition which causes a certain type of behaviour (Irwin's 'A' and 'B' powers, 45). The use of the same word to cover this distinction (see below b6) makes the weakness in the analogy less apparent.

Summary of section

The failure of this first stage in the attempt at definition follows a familiar pattern (cf. *Euthyphr.* 5d8–6d9; *R.* 335e; *Hp. Ma.* 287e). Distinctive here is the use of examples from history and poetry—no doubt reflecting the personal interests and assumptions of S.'s interlocutor in this case, i.e. L. The particular philosophical interest in this stage (strictly speaking L. is doomed to failure from 190e5 onwards) lies in the unexpectedly wide range of examples S. collects to illustrate his aim of isolating a defining characteristic of *ἀνδρεία* which, while S. does not pursue it here, raises questions about the separateness and unity of the parts of *ἀρετή* which exercise S. and N. later on (Section 14).

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Section 10. Laches' second attempt to define *ἀνδρεία*, 192b5–193e5
Courage is a kind of 'endurance of the soul' (*καρτερία τῆς ψυχῆς*). S. then secures L.'s agreement that to qualify as *ἀνδρεία* this endurance must be accompanied by wisdom; foolish endurance is not courage. But perhaps knowledge is not only not a sufficient condition for courage but not even a necessary one. In certain cases, knowledgeable endurance is less courageous than foolish endurance. So the definition fails, and there is no 'Doric' match.

For this and subsequent Sections (10–14) the line-by-line Commentary should be supplemented by the detailed analysis of the argument in Intro. 3 (iii) to which frequent reference will be made.

b5–6 *πειρῶ...εἰπεῖν*: repeated from 191e10, there forestalled by S. divining that L. couldn't understand (see also 190e3).

δὴ καὶ σύ: 'so now it's *your* turn...' (since you indicated you now agree with my explanation).

οὕτως: i.e. following the model set out by definition of *τάχος*.

b6 *τίς οὖσα δύναμις κτλ.*: indirect question. For meaning and significance of *δύναμις*, see above n. on b1.

ἔπειτα: inferential sense, 'therefore'.

b9 *καρτερία τῆς ψυχῆς*: L. has now put the definition in the form S. wants it. Note that L., as we might by now expect (e.g. from his rejection of ***hoplitikon*** as a *τέχνη* way back at 182d–84b), defines *ἀνδρεία* not in intellectual but in dispositional terms.

τις: 'some sort'. This qualification gives S. his opening for further modification at c8 ff. below.

c1 *πεφυκὸς*: 'naturally present'.

c2 *Ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ*: substantiating a previous condition (*GP* 344) with repeated words, 'Well, of course you must, if...' S. overcomes L.'s slight reluctance to embark on the questioning (L. knows by this stage that his definition won't just be allowed to stand).

c3 *τοῦτο τοίνυν*: S. immediately starts on the ***elenchos*** (see Intro. 3 (iii) (b)).

c4 *σοι*: S. wishes it to be clearly Laches (as well as himself) who 'owns' the reasoned argument.

τεκμαίρομαι: S. begins the argument.

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c5–6 *Stage 1* (for Stages, see Intro. 3 (iii) (b)): S. can be sure of L.'s (and presumably every Athenian's) enthusiastic support for this!

c8–9 *Stage 2*: At this stage, the modern reader might wish to make distinctions or ask questions, but L.'s assent is essential; it is possibly the strong implication of 'practical calculation' inherent in *φρόνησις* which makes this acceptable to L. (despite his opposition earlier on to *hoplitikon* as a *μάθημα* 182e2 ff.).

d1–2 *Stage 3:* S. makes use here of Greek susceptibility to polarised modes of thought; having strongly endorsed *φρόνησις*, L. would naturally wish to show an opposite reaction to its opposite, *ἀφροσύνη*. And, in qualifying *καρτερία* with *ἀφροσύνη* as *βλαβερά* and *κακοῦργος* (harmful and detrimental) S. can rely on the strong inclination of L. (as, here at least, an average Athenian) to react negatively to a definition which implies *failure*.

d4–5 *Stage 4*: *καλὸν...κακοῦργον κτλ.* In juxtaposing the strongest term of commendation with negative words, S. ensures agreement (see previous note).

d7–8 *Stage 5*: This follows from combining Stages 1 and 3.

d10–11 *Stage 6*: This follows (S. assumes) from combining 1 and 2. This, the final stage of the argument is, significantly, given to L. (*κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον*) when, for all serious intents and purposes, the argument is S's. But—and this is characteristically Socratic (see e.g. *Euthyphr.* 7e9)—S. regards it as very important that agreement, to which L. has given thought (c7–d12) binds *him* (L.) to ownership of the positions reached; hence it is 'L.'s argument'. But is it also S.'s? (see below on e6).

d12 *ἔοικεν* : has L. slight qualms about where S. has taken him? (as we shall see, he has every reason to be apprehensive). For 'qualified answers', see above n. on 184e7.

e1 S. now proceeds to question the conclusion; having made it L.'s conclusion, the further investigation involves L. The emphasis on L. as owner at d10 helps to modify the impression that S. is now criticising conclusions which he himself has established. This is very significant in the light of what follows.

φρόνιμος : understand *καρτερία*.

εἰς τί : 'in what respect?', i.e. with regard to which situations?

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e1–2 *τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ σμίκρα*: S. never actually says what *τὰ μεγάλα* might be. *τὰ σμίκρα* are clearly implied in e2–193a1.

e4 *τοῦτον*: refers back to *τις* at e2.

e5 L.'s agreement with S. here is emphatic. But could a more perceptive interlocutor have gone further and entirely refused to recognise e2–4 as an instance of *καρτερία*? S. is here possibly relying on L.'s awareness of the popular idea that love of money saps ability to be brave or ambitious (cf. *R.* 8.555a: Aquinas, *Summa* 2.2.118.7).

e6 *περιπλευμονίᾳ*: 'inflammation of the lungs', 'pleurisy'. L.'s emphatic agreement here (we might well have reservations, see Intro. 3 (iii)), confirms that this example too is considered in the category of *τὰ σμίκρα*. So, there *are* exceptions to the definition of *ἀνδρεία* as *φρόνιμος καρτερία* (Stage 6). The definition therefore fails. In retrospect, the exact wording of d10–11 is significant: it is L.*'s* argument which fails and it is possible that S.'s statement there is actually intended as a question (double indemnity by S. against accusations of ownership, one might say).

a3 ff. Having established that *φρόνιμος καρτερία* is not a sufficient condition for *ἀνδρεία*, S. goes on to question whether it is even a necessary condition, i.e. whether there are acknowledged instances of *ἀνδρεία* which do not display *φρόνιμος καρτερία*.

193a 3–9 A long, but not convoluted sentence: *καρτεροῦντα ἄνδρα* a3...*εἰδότα*...*ὅτι κτλ.* a4 is all object of *ἂν φαίης* a8; *τοῦτον* a7 refers back to the *καρτεροῦντα ἄνδρα* a3.

b1 Why does L. make this choice? He may not yet see how fatal it is for his recent argument, but surely his instinct would be to support success? One answer is that in massively elaborating the purely intellectual and tactical advantages of the 'superior' man at a3–6, S. has loaded the dice against him in L.'s eyes, provoking the latter's instinctive support for a 'heroic failure'. S. is exploiting the tensions and contradictions in L.'s own assumptions (see further Intro. 3 (iii)).

b2 *Ἀλλὰ μήν*: 'But surely...'
τούτου...*ἑτέρου*: the latter (the weaker)...the former (the superior).

b4 On the possible reasons behind L's (fatal) agreement here, see n. on b1 above. His unconscious assumptions make it impossible for him to

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describe the 'heroic failure' as *φρόνιμος*.

b5 *ἐπιστήμης*: S. shifts vocabulary here. In using *ἐπιστήμη* as a synonym for *φρόνησις*, (cf. also *τέχνης* at b10), S. identifies the 'superior' man with the 'technically qualified' (NB. see also *δεινοί*, below at c3). This shift serves to accentuate L's dilemma, inevitable since his agreement at b1.

c2–3 This example also occurs in a parallel passage of argumentation at *Prt.* 350a (see Intro. 4 (ii)). S. secures agreement to this and other examples because the terms of the argument have been tacitly confined to presence (or absence) of *technical skill*. Much wider issues could be raised by an opponent more skillful than L. (see further Intro. 3 (iii) (b)).

c6 *γὰρ*: 'Yes, for...' (*GP* 77). See also d5 below.

c7 *εἴπερ...οὕτως*: S. emphasises the need to say what one believes (see n. on 178a4–5 and refs.).

c8 *Ἀλλὰ μὴν...γε*: strong assent to the conditional of c7, 'well I certainly do'. L. would strongly resent any remote suggestion that he was lacking in sincerity.

c9 *καὶ μήν*: 'and yet...' S. reintroduces the earlier premisses of the argument. As previously agreed, such people are more foolish (b2–4).

ἀφρονεστέρως...μετὰ τέχνης: given S.'s association of *φρόνησις* and *τέχνη*, this is almost true by definition.

c10 *αὐτὸ*: i.e. the kind of deed previously mentioned at b5–c5.

c12 *φαίνονται*: has L. finally perceived the inevitable refutation which S. is about to spring on him?

d1 *αἰσχρὰ*: this was not the term S. used *ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν* (192d2), but rather, *κακοῦργος*. S. appears here to be reinforcing the original Stage 3 with the strongest possible negative term of value (the opposite of *καλόν*) which goes to the heart of L's problem: how can something which is *αἰσχρόν* have any claim at all to be *ἀνδρεία*?

τόλμα: this term also does not occur in the original Stage 3 at 192d1–2. S.'s final example at c2–3, of the inexperienced diver, is the best candidate for a 'rash' or 'bold' action. Like *αἰσχρόν*, *τόλμα* is a term which is likely to have strong negative connotations for L., in view of his separation of *θρασύς* (bold) from *ἀνδρεῖος* at 184b4–7 above (see n. ad

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loc.). Despite L.'s inevitable agreement, S. seems keen on making absolutely sure he doesn't attempt to change his mind.

d4 *Ὡμολογεῖτο* : i.e. Stage 1 (at 191c5–6).

d6 *Νῦν δ' αὖ πάλιν* : 'but now again, on the contrary...', i.e. at b1–c5. This contradicts Stage 5.

ἐκεῖνο : ironic or contemptuous nuance, 'that disgraceful thing, senseless endurance'. For *αἰσχρόν*, see above on d1.

d8 *Ἐοίκαμεν* : L. has to admit it, but the implication is that this is inexplicably how things have turned out. This is the *aporia*, the psychological moment of confusion (cf. *Meno* 80a ff. Meno is *μεστὸν ἀπορίας*, 'full of perplexity', a state which S. describes in *Ap.* 22 ff.).

d9–10 The recognition of the failure of the *elenchos* turns on the incompatibility of two premisses, suggested by S. and accepted at different points by L.: (i) wise endurance is courage (192d10–12), (ii) foolish endurance is braver than wise endurance (193a3 ff.).

d11–e4 *Οὐκ...δωριστὶ ἠρμόσμεθα* : S. echoes L's words at 188d, but turns L's meaning around. L. judged words by actions, whereas S. is saying that, on the contrary, their actions are to be judged in the light of their (inadequate) words (*τὰ γὰρ ἔργα οὐ συμφωνεῖ ἡμῖν τοῖς λόγοις*). Taken this way round, the statement implies a central Socratic position—that knowledge of what X (bravery, holiness etc.) is entails being brave, holy etc. Since S. and L. don't (yet) know, does this throw any doubt on their exploits, as recounted by L. at 181b1–4?

d11 *κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον* : *either* 'to use your words' (i.e. a ref. back to 188d6 ff.) or 'according to your argument' (i.e. what L. has agreed to). The latter is to be preferred, on balance, as a clear echo of 192d10. S. is anxious both to make L. *own* the argument he has agreed to and at the same time to associate himself (*ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ* e1) with the *aporia* (see further Intro. 2 (iii)).

Section 11. Interlude, 193e6–194c6

A short pause in the argument, following their failure to define *ἀνδρεία*. L. is confused but S. encourages him to show *καρτερία* (endurance) and suggests that N. should be asked to help.

e6 *οὖν* : next stage, '(what) then?'

διακεῖσθαι : to be in (such a) condition (as revealed by the contradic-

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tions of the previous argument (cf. 189b4)).

e8 *ᾧ* : understand *τούτῳ* as antecedent, object of *πειθώμεθα*.

e9 *τοῦτο...τούτῳ* : referring to *ᾧ λέγομεν* and *τό τοσοῦτον* respectively, i.e. 'to what point?' and 'what statement?'

194a1–4 *καρτερεῖν...καρτερήσωμεν...καρτέρησίς* : S. plays on these words as a joke. They need to show 'endurance' in the face of all their difficulties!

a1 *τῷ λόγῳ* : ref. back to *τούτῳ* in previous line.

a1–2 *καὶ ἡμεῖς* : 'we too...' So the previous sentence should be translated as impersonal, 'The statement that commands endurance' (*contra* e.g. Lane). Neither of them actually made such a statement, but S. is probably referring loosely to L.'s attempted definition at 192b9 ff. For the idea of courage in pursuing a debate (with strong implication of intellectual tenacity) see *R.* 2.357a (Glaukon, also in an Interlude).

a4–5 *εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις κτλ.* : 'If, perhaps, endurance actually is bravery.' Much has been made to hinge on whether this remark is a casual part of the joke, or a vital clue that Plato wishes us to retain 'endurance' as part of L.'s definition which has not been refuted. For discussion of this point in the larger context of the Dialogue as a whole, see Intro. 4 (i).

a6 The quality of *καρτερία* is embodied by L. (see also *φιλονικία* a8).

a7 *ἀήθης* : unlike his fellow disputant, N.; cf. 188b5 (*οὐδὲν ἄηθες*).
καὶ : intensive (*GP* 320), 'a *real* eagerness for the competition'.

a8 *φιλονικία* : In general, the word has strong negative connotations (cf. MSS variant *φιλονεικία*) but favourable connotation is clearly intended here. (L. is no Thrasymachos (*Republic*) or Kallikles (*Gorgias*) in temperament.) It is notable that, in the Interlude, L. uses a competitive image, whereas S. emphasises that the hunt (b8) requires not only resolve (a4), but also co-operation between them (b8) in the face of their threatened shipwreck (c2–4).

b1 *ὡς ἀληθῶς...εἰ* : 'so angry that...' L. is portrayed as impatient with *himself* (Vicaire).
οὑτωσὶ : i.e. in the argument just undertaken (*εἰρημένα* a8).

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b3 *ἄρτι* : 'just now'.

b5 *κυνηγέτην* : S. makes explicit the implied metaphor begun by L. in *διέφυγεν* and *συλλαβεῖν*, and continued in *μεταθεῖν...μὴ ἀνίεναι*. For the metaphor as image of philosophical search, see *Ly.* 218c, *R.* 432b.

c2 *χειμαζομένοις* : S. introduces another image—of helpless passivity (cf. *Philebus.* 29a–b); 'floundering in a sea of words' (Lane).

c3–5 *ἀποροῦσιν...ἀπορία...ἀπορίας* : the characteristic state of participants in the Socratic *elenchos*, in which S, emphasises that he is implicated (*ἡμέτερα* c4; *ἡμᾶς* c5). The literal sense of *ἀπορία*, 'difficulty of passage', continues the image of c2, and shades into the metaphorical at c5 (*ἔκλυσαι*).

c6 *τῷ λόγῳ βεβαίωσαι* : S. develops the idea of the gulf between thoughts and words, and the need to bridge it, introduced by L. at b1 ff. Spoken expression should 'confirm' (or 'secure') (*βεβαιώσαι*) one's thoughts.

Summary of section

The interlude is a typical stage in the structure of Plato's Dialogues, and expressions of bafflement are characteristic at about the half-way stage (cf. *Euth*yphr. 11b6–e4; *Men.* 80a). The effect is, as here, dramatic: there is a pause in the technical argument, which gives the participants a chance to get their breath and for S. to encourage them (a 'half-time orange' plus 'pep talk'). However, within this generic pattern, the particular characteristics of the *Laches* Interlude are significant: S. strongly emphasises *his* implication in the dilemma (contrast *Euthyphro* where S., with transparent irony, expresses his disappointment at 'not being taught', and *Meno* where for Meno, S. is responsible for the dilemma, as the 'numbing wizard'). The unusual emphasis on co-operation, and the active participation of the interlocutors in *Laches* is underlined by the use of the Interlude to bring in at S.'s request the other main (and the more skilled) interlocutor, N. One might contrast here the more hostile (and uninvited) interventions of Kallikles (*Grg.* 481b ff.) and Thrasymachos (*R.* 1.336b).

The interlude is also a place where Plato traditionally develops the imagery of the activity being undertaken. In *Laches* this again reflects the co-operative character of the Dialogue as a whole: S. is in danger of shipwreck along with the other participants, and they are all in *ἀπορία*; they need to show resolution in the hunt. Contrast strikingly the tone of *Euthyphro* where the image is of the fatal mobility of *λόγοι* (of S.'s

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interlocutor) and *Meno*, in which S. is in Meno's eyes the 'sting-ray fish' who benumbs any who touch it.

Section 12. N's attempt to define *ἀνδρεία*, 194c7–196c9

N. initially chooses what he claims is a tenet of S.—that someone is good in so far as he is wise: therefore, if a brave man is good, he is also wise. In the face of questioning from S. and L., N. refines his definition to, 'courage is knowledge of what is fearful and encouraging in war and other situations.' L. does not accept this, and S. takes up the questioning of N. on behalf of both of them.

c7 *Δοκεῖτε* : speaking to S., referring to both of them (their attempts at definition in Section 10).

τοίνυν : 'Well...', weak connective.

πάλαι : i.e. while the argument of Section 10 was going on.

c8 *ἤδη* : 'before now', 'already, in the past'. N. is familiar with S.'s conversations (see his admissions at 188e6 ff.).

d1–2 This is a form of the Socratic tenet that 'virtue is knowledge'.

d4–9 *σοφός...σοφίαν* : this term passes (without comment) at e8 to *ἐπιστήμη*. See below n. on e4.

d4–5 This does not follow, in strict logic, since goodness has a wider extension (on a strict interpretation of d1–2) than wisdom. S. agrees emphatically with d1–2 at d3 but withholds comment on the deduction about courage at d4–5, preferring to pass the ball to L. The question of the coincidence, or otherwise of goodness and courage resurfaces, in another form, at the end of the Dialogue (Section 14).

d7 L.'s perplexity here and below is well motivated; he thinks that the definition of *ἀνδρεία* in terms of wisdom has already been run into the ground at 193d9.

e4 ff. S.'s introduction of a kind of 'negative Craft Analogy' cements the bond (which is never questioned) between *σοφία* and *τέχνη*. *ἀνδρεία*, if they discover what it is (which they do not in *Laches*) will be a *τέχνη* (see further *Grg.* 460a–c).

e9 There is humour here in L.'s urging of S. L. is very suspicious at what he supposes is an attempt to resurrect a defunct line of questioning (see above n. on d7).

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e11–195a1 N.'s definition (unlike L.'s, already in a sophisticated form).

ταύτην : picks up *αὐτήν* from previous line; *τὴν...ἅπασιν* is the predicate: *transl.* 'This is what I say it is, namely...'

a2 ff. L.'s suppressed irritation with N. surfaces again here; see liveliness of exchanges a2–b1. (On the hostility between the two of them, see nn. on 180c8, 188c1–2). L.'s incredulity also seems to signal dramatically a difficult idea, which requires further elucidation (see nn. on 185b8, 189e7–8, 191e11).

a4 *Πρὸς ὅτι;* : L. rhetorically repeats S.'s *πρὸς τί* as a question. His surprise is based on his feeling of the obviousness of his objection. The vehemence of his objection may be based on his recent bad experience with handling wisdom in the context of *ἀνδρεία* (Section 10) but also derives from his basic conviction of the primacy of character over intellect (his speech at 182d6 ff.).

a5 *Οὔκουν...γε* : emphasis on N. 'That's not what N. says.'

a6 *μέντοι...μὰ Δία* : L. sarcastically agrees. N. is not saying anything coherent!

τοι : function to 'bring home to the comprehension of the person addressed a truth of which he is ignorant' (*GP* 537). *Trans.* 'I'm telling you...'

καὶ : intensive 'That's rubbish he talks' (*GP* 308). The build-up of particles in a6 indicates L.'s exasperation.

a7 *Οὐκοῦν* : 'In that case, let's...'

a8 N. gets his knife in by perceptively uncovering the emotional, (as well as intellectual) reasons for L.'s vehemence.

a9 *μηδὲν λέγοντα* : Greek expression, 'talk nonsense'.

ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς : 'Just because *he*...', parallel with *κἀμὲ*.

ἄρτι : i.e. in the *elenchos* of Section 10.

b2 ff. L. takes up the 'Socratic role' for a period (S. has assumed a subordinate role for the moment—absence of domination in the discussion is a characteristic of *Laches*, see Intro. 2 (iii)). L. finally gives up at 196c6.

b3 ff. L's questioning is initially quite expert; he has picked up the technique quickly (and learned from his mistakes?). Like S. (e.g. *Ion*

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538a1 ff.) L. is aiming to exclude any area of expertise to which N.'s definition might apply, by defining all knowledge in craft terms (unfortunately N. proves too expert for him).

b3 *αὐτίκα* : 'to begin with', ' for example'.

c3 *μέντοι* : emphasis, 'there *seems* to be something in what he says, you know' (*GP* 400).

c5 N. makes a word-play out of the two senses of *λέγειν τι* (which he echoes ironically from S. at c4) = 'to have a point' and 'to say something'. The whole passage (a6–c5) plays with the ideas of speaking nonsense/saying nothing.

καὶ γὰρ : 'yes, he is saying *something*...' (i.e. producing words; *γε* gives *τι* an ironic emphasis).

c7–d2 For the argument here, see Intro. 3 (iii). N. is concerned to distinguish between expertise (knowledge of facts) and ability to estimate the value of the outcome, e.g. whether it is better for an individual that the doctor's skill should cure him/her.

c7 *ὅτι* : constr. continues from *ἀληθές* (c5), '(what he says isn't true) because...'

c8 *εἰπεῖν οἷόν* : omitted by Badham. Stephanus conjectures *οἷόν τι* : *transl.* '...know more about the sick than to say what health, and disease are.'

c9 *τοσοῦτον* : refers back to previous sentence, 'But they surely know *only* that much' (i.e. *τὸ...νοσώδες* c8).

c9–10 *εἰ δε...κάμνειν* : dependent, as indirect question on *ἐπίστασθαι* and in apposition to *τουτί*. This is N.'s key move against L., which marks the introduction of a new idea in the Dialogue—the idea of estimation of *value* (*ἄμεινον*, c12). N. also cleverly gets L.'s assent by concluding (d1–2) with a question which calls on L.'s common-sense and fighting experience (for the overriding persuasive power of personal experience in L.'s character, see n. on 184a8).

d3 *τοῦτο γε* : limitative *γε*, 'That much I'll agree' (Lane).

d4–5 *Οἷς...οἷς* : understand antecedent *τουτοῖς*, indirect object of *λυσιτελεῖ* ; *ταὐτὰ* is object of *οἶει*. *Transl.* 'Do you think that the same

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things are to be feared by those for whom it is profitable to live and for those who are better off dead'?

d7–9 N. here comes to the point: he has delimited the territory of expertise for his 'brave man', despite L.'s attempt to crowd him out at b3 ff.

d7 *τοῦτο* : i.e. knowledge about whether it is better to live or be dead. *δὴ* is emphatic.

d8 *δημιουργῷ* : doctors were classed with skilled artisans in Classical Athens.

e1–4 L.'s suggestion that N. is equating the brave with *μάντεις* (seers, prophets) is traditionally seen as a covert sneer at the historical N.'s excessive respect for prophets which fatally impeded his military judgement when commanding the Sicilian expedition in 413 BC (Thuc. 7.50). See further n. on 198e4 ff. below. *Manteis* claimed to foretell the future, either through direct divine inspiration (of gods, e.g. Apollo) or through signs (birds, animal entrails, astronomical phenomena).

e2 *γὰρ δὴ* : emphasis, 'For whoever else...?'

e3–4 L.'s alternatives here assume that N. takes his point (which N. doesn't).

e5 *αὖ* : exasperated, '*Now* you think again that... (after all your other suggestions).'

e8 *Ὧι* : understand antecedent *τουτῷ* (after *προσήκει*, d5).

e9 *γε* : emphasizes the limited function of the *mantis*. He only *reads* the future, he cannot estimate its *value* (cf. *ἄμεινον* 196a2). See also Xen. *Mem.* I.1.8. for this distinction, attributed to Socrates.

196a2 *ὅτι...παθεῖν* : in apposition to *τί*, the true object of *κρῖναι*.

a4–c9 This section functions as a 'mini-Interlude' in which L. gives vent to his rising tide of frustration with N. At the same time it represents the transition from L.'s questioning to the return of this role to S., who maintains it until the end of the argument.

a4–5 *ὅ τι βούλεται λέγειν* : 'What he means', 'What he's driving at' (Lane).

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b1 *γενναίως* : 'honestly', ' like a gentleman' (Lane).
οὐδὲν λέγει : see n. on 195c5 for idiom.
στρέφεται : with negative sense, cf. *R.* 405c1 and (close to the present context) *Ion* 541e.

b2 *ἐπικρυπτόμενος* : the force of the present participle indicates intention or effort, 'trying to hide...' (Vicaire).

b3 *ἄρτι* : i.e. in the *elenchos* of 192b9–93d10.

b5 *ἐν δικαστηρίῳ* : L. makes the Socratic point that they are not concerned with winning but with seeking the truth (*dialectic*, as opposed to *eristic*) cf. *Ap.* 17b2, *Grg.* 495a5–b3.

b6 *ταῦτα ποιεῖν* : subject of *εἶχεν*.
νῦν δὲ : 'but in the present circumstances...'
συνουσίᾳ : 'friendly gathering'. This picks up the emphasis on non-competitive co-operation made in Lys.' opening speech (Section 1) and repeated frequently, e.g. 194c2. It is somewhat ironic that L. is making the point as a competitive move in his dispute with N.!

b7 *κοσμοῖ* : used of persuasive and decorative, but empty rhetoric e.g. at *Ap.* 17c. The emphatic overload mirrors L.'s rising irritation: *μάτην κενοῖς λόγοις...κοσμοῖ*. He adds to the insult with *αὐτὸς αὑτόν*, playing on another meaning of *κοσμέω*, 'adorn oneself' (like a woman).

c1 *Οὐδὲν οὐδ'* : double negative gives emphasis. S. answers as if L. had said something like *οὐδὲν ἐστι δι' ὅ τις* at b6–7.
ὁρῶμεν μὴ : verb takes on idea of apprehension, hence *μή*.

c2 *λόγου ἕνεκα* : 'for the sake of argument'.

c5–6 L. retires (until 197a1, where he cannot restrain himself).
ἱκανῶς πέπυσμαι : the tension between L. and N. under the surface in the first half of the Dialogue, is displayed more and more openly.

c7–8 S. speaks for L. just as he was asked to speak for Lys. at cf. 189c4. L. wishes simply to drop out here, but S. involves him in the conversation.

Summary of section
N.'s definition (explained to L. but not modified) moves the Dialogue on by meeting implicitly some of the problems raised by the earlier

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conversation between S. and L. (Section 10). Giving L. the 'S-role' in questioning N. is an effective dramatic touch (cf. esp. 195b2 ff., where L. attempts to corner N. with 'negative Craft-Analogies'). Unlike S., though, L. cannot refute N. and consequently becomes increasingly exasperated, until he breaks down at 196a4 ff. The questioning by L. also has the effective dramatic purpose of requiring N. to elucidate fully his initially somewhat cryptic definition (a technique we have already met, but here it is on a large scale). The 'mini Interlude' (196a4–c9), like the Interlude proper (Section 11 above) highlights images relating to the nature and conduct of the argument, and the feelings of the participants—here more aggressive and personally abusive. It is S. who restores the prevailing 'co-operative ethos' at c7–8.

Section 13. Socrates' first examination of N's definition, 196c10–197e10

S. draws out particular implications of N.'s definition of bravery. If bravery is a kind of knowledge, then on conventional estimates of the bravery of animals *either* their possession of the necessary knowledge has to be denied, *or* it has to be conceded that they know more than most humans. This dilemma leads to N.'s distinction between bravery and fearlessness (because of ignorance or lack of foresight); animals share the latter quality with children and most other people. L. is irritated at the personal implications of N.'s distinctions, which S. teasingly suggested N. has acquired from Damon. S. prepares to take another look at N.'s definition.

c10 *ἡμῖν· κοινούμεθα* : S. emphasises the co-operation (even with the 'sulking' L.)—see Lys.' first speech, esp. 179e6–180a2.

d1–2 N.'s definition of *ἀνδρεία* from 194e11–195a1 (Stage 1 of his argument—see Intro. 3 (iii) (c)).

d4 *τοῦτο* : i.e. knowledge of what is fearful and what is encouraging (at d1–2). Genitive of quality with prolative infinitive (*παντὸς...γνῶναι*) '(it) is not, surely, the part of every man to know...'

d4–5 *ὁπότε γε* : 'since' *γε* is limitative, '(at least) a doctor etc. won't know it...'

d6 *προσλάβῃ* : 'take in addition', i.e. 'supplement (his own knowledge) with this particular knowledge' (i.e. that of d1–2).

d9 *τὴν παροιμίαν* : according to the Scholiast, the proverb was *κἂν*

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κύων κἄν ὗς γνοίη, 'any dog or pig would know (that)'. S. quotes the proverb with serious intent (*οὐ παίζων* e2–3). Creatures without knowledge cannot be brave (as N. defines it).

e1 *Κρομμυωνίαν ὗν*: the Crommyonian sow, a fabled beast of great ferocity, killed by Theseus, a legendary king of Athens (Plutarch, *Theseus*, 9).

e2 *σύ γε*: 'you, at least' (because of N.'s definition).

e3 *ἀναγκαῖον*: denotes inevitable logical consequence (cf. 181e5). S. goes on to outline the inevitable and unacceptable alternatives which follow from N.'s definition: either (i) no animals are brave, or (ii) some animals are wiser than most humans. Both alternatives are strongly counter-intuitive for the audience, esp. L. (see below 197a1 ff.)

e4 *ἀποδέχεσθαι*: 'to admit that no beast possesses bravery' (alternative (i) above).

συγχωρεῖν: 'concede' (grant in argument); this is alternative (ii) above.

e5–6 *ἃ...ταῦτα*: '*What* few men know...*those things* he (i.e. the man advocating (ii)) says a lion, etc. knows.'

e7 *ἀλλ'*: 'further', 'again', a further objection (*GP* 21–2); all animals with a reputation for bravery will be in this position.

ἀνάγκη: see above on e3.

e8–9 *τὸν...τίθεσαι*: subject of *φάναι*. *Trans.* 'But it is inevitable that anyone who defines courage as you define it (i.e. as that which you propose) must say that a lion, a deer, etc. are by nature equally endowed in respect of courage.'

197a1 ff. Thinking N. has been caught, L. eagerly jumps in.

εὖ γε: intensive, 'You've got a good point there...!

a2–5 L. restates S.'s expression of the dilemma in the belief that N. will be forced to reply with one of the counter-intuitive (*πᾶσιν ἐναντιούμενος* a4) alternatives (see n. on 196e3 above).

a6 *Οὐ γὰρ*: *trans.* 'Yes, for I do not call 'brave' either animals or anything else which doesn't fear danger because of want of understanding.' N. smoothly counters what L. undoubtedly intended as a rhetorical

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reductio ad absurdum. L. is intellectually no match for N.

καλῶ : ironic repetition of L.'s word at a5. On echoed words as part of the 'one-upmanship' practised by N. and L. in *Laches*, see 182d4/6 *λέγει...λέγειν*; 188c1/c4 *τὸ ἐμὸν...τὸ ἐμόν*; 195b1/2 *ἐφάνη... ἀποφῆναι*; 195d9/e1 *καλῶ...καλεῖ*.

b1 *ἀλλ'* : 'no, rather, I think'.

b3 *προμηθίας* : taken as opposite of *ἀνοίας* (a7), and the addition duly fits in with the 'knowledge of the future' element in N.'s definition of *ἀνδρεία*, though as we've seen (e.g. 195e1 ff.) it is not the whole of it. An unusually close parallel to the distinction made by N. is found in Thuc. 3.82.4; the stasis (civil strife) at Corcyra caused words to change their conventional meanings and, among others, *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος* (thoughtless daring) was judged to be *ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος* (bravery of a comrade), though, of course, for Thuc. the distinctions were being ignored. N.'s speech seems deliberately calculated to insult L., whose argumentative forays have already resulted in failure, by implying that he, L., is one of *οἱ πολλοί* (b5).

c2 *ὅδε...δή* : expresses lively contempt, 'this fellow supposedly...'

κοσμεῖ : cf. 196b7 and n. ad loc.

c4 *τούτους* : antecedent of *οὕς*, and object of *ἀποστερεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ*.

ἀποστερεῖν : 'defraud', 'rob'.

c5 *ἀλλ'* : with imperative (*GP* 14), 'Come now, ...'

c6 *εἴπερ* : 'since (in fact)...' Schmid (145) translates as 'if in fact...' making the insult improbably deadly even for this level of controversy!

Λαμαχόν : a well-known Athenian general, colleague of Nikias in the Sicilian expedition, killed in a battle in front of Syracuse in 414 BC (Thuc. 6.101).

c8 L. does not react well to N's patronising tone.

c9 *Αἰξωνέα* : L.'s *deme* (township) of Aexone on the coast south of Athens. The point of L.'s comment lies in the proverbial abusive wit of the citizens of this deme (scholiast).

d1 *καὶ γάρ μοι* : 'for you see...' S. is about to pull N.'s leg (trying to defuse the situation?).

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d2–4 For Damon, see n. on 180d1. Prodikos, a sophist, specialised among other things in the precise meaning of words and distinctions between them (see esp. *Prt.* 341a ff.), and was known as a teacher of Damon, hence the point of S.'s humour. Plato clearly satirises Prodikos in *Protagoras*, but N.'s distinction at a6–c1 is an important one philosophically (cf. e.g. Walton, 108 ff.).

d6–8 L. reveals a traditional view of the seriousness of sophistic discussion; for a very similar attitude, cf. Kleon's speech in the Mytilene debate, Thuc. 3.38.7.

κομψεύεσθαι : 'to be ingenious', 'over subtle'.

d8 *προεστάναι* : 'to preside over', a ref. to N.'s elevated position in Athens as a frequently re-elected general, largely responsible for the peace between Athens and Sparta, concluded in 423 (Thuc. 4.119) at about the dramatic date of *Laches*; he also gave his name to the peace of 421 (Thuc. 5.16 ff.).

e2 *μεγίστης φρονήσεως* : S. leaves it nicely balanced whether he is here being ironical or not (cf. *σοφία* d2 above).

e3 *ὅποι βλέπων* : *lit.* 'looking towards which point, he defines...', i.e. 'what he has in mind when he...'

e5 L. 'retires' once again, cf. 196c6.

e7 Once again (cf. 196c7) S. emphasises that he is still including L. in the search, but the latter seems less willing (e9).

κοινωνίας : cf. 196c10 and n. ad loc.

e10 *Ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ* : S. repeats L.'s word, substituting affirmation for the conditional: L. '...if it seems necessary'; S. 'Indeed it does'.

For general discussion of issues raised in this section, see Intro. 3 (iii).

Section 14. Socrates' second examination of N's definition, 197e10–199e12

S. returns to questioning N.'s definition of bravery, this time discreetly. Having re-established the idea of *ἀνδρεία* as a part of *ἀρετή* (cf. 190c9–10), S. secures agreement by stages (see Intro. p. 13) arguing that knowledge of future good and evil is the same as knowledge of all good and evil; from there he shows that it follows that *ἀνδρεία* is therefore not a part of *ἀρετή* but the whole of it. Since this contradicts the original premiss, they still have not discovered what *ἀνδρεία* is.

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For the stages of the argument and discussion of them see Intro. 3 (iii) (d)

198a1 *κατ' ἀρχὰς τοῦ λόγου*: i.e. at the beginning of the argument with L. (190c8–d1).

a4 *καὶ σὺ...ἀπεκρίνω*: N. did not actually say anything at the earlier point S. is alluding to, i.e. 190c ff.; it was L. who agreed with S.'s suggestion that they should choose a part of *ἀρετή*, at 190d2. Moreover the position which S. *now* says N. agreed with, i.e. that courage was a part of *ἀρετή was* not even argued for at 190c8 ff., but taken for granted, as a popular view (190d5); furthermore, Lane prejudges the issue of S.'s implication in the answer by mistranslating a4 '...you did agree with *our* (italics mine) answer that it's a part.' But S. is careful at a4 *not* to implicate himself in the original assumption at 190c8 ff. N.'s agreement (198a6) to S.'s reformulation of what was actually said at 190c8 ff. is, nevertheless, vital as a basis for the argument of this section, as the essential Stage 2 (see further Intro 3 (iii) (d)). Plato is perhaps papering over the cracks in the sequence of his argument here.

a5 *ὄντων δὴ*: *δή* may serve to distance S. further from the earlier alleged formulation (see previous note).

a7 *Ἆρ' οὖν ἅπερ κτλ.*: 'Do you name the same parts as I do?', i.e. 'Do you agree with me?'

a8 *καλῶ*: 'name'. This 'naming' does not really commit S. to the 'courage a part of virtue' position, but indicates that he is stating the traditional position. The parts of *ἀρετή* named by S. are two of the other 'cardinal' virtues: justice, temperance (also piety, as well as courage). These are often found in non-philosophical literature (see Dover, 66 ff.). For 'cardinal virtues' in *Plato*, see *R.* 427e ff., *Prt.* 329b–c, *Men.* 88a. The list varies (hence S.'s *καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα τοιαῦτα* at a9).

b2 *Ἔχε δή*: 'Wait a moment.' S. wishes to proceed slowly here; he has to get N.'s agreement to every stage of the argument (and he emphasises N.'s right to disagree at b5).

b7 *δέος*: object of *παρέχει* with *τὰ...προσδοκώμενα* as subject. b5–10 represents Stages 3 and 4 of the argument.

b9–10 The appeal to L. is surely for form's sake (cf. also c2). But it is also possible that S. wishes to keep his 'representation' of L. in sight for this culminating argument of the Dialogue (see also d1 below and 199 a2–3).

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c4 *ταύτη...λέγεις*: 'would you describe them (i.e. *δεινά* and *θαρραλέα* c2–3) in this way or in another? S. continues elaborately to give N. a chance to disagree. c2–4 is Stage 5 of the Argument (see Intro. p. 13).

c6–7 This associates *ἀνδρεία* with S.'s 'unpacking' of the definition (Stage 6). For particular objections to the argument at this stage, see Intro. 3 (iii) p. 14.

d2 *ἄλλη*: sc. *ἐπιστήμη*, parallel to *ἡ αὐτή* at d5.

d2–3 *γεγόνοτος*: 'a past event'.

d5 *τὸ μήπω γεγονός*: subject of *γένοιτο καὶ γενήσεται*.
οἷον: 'for example'.

d6 *οὐκ ἄλλη*: sc. *ἐπιστήμη*, 'none other but medicine, a single science, oversees...' S. elaborates familiar analogies at d5 –199a1.

e2 *δήπου*: 'of course'. This is S.'s only acknowledgement of L. and N.'s expertise as being relevant to their understanding of the questions at issue.

e4 ff. This has frequently been taken as an ironic ref. to the historical Nikias (see n. on 195e1–4 above). While obviously a historical anachronism, the allusion here doesn't seem apposite, because N.'s position is like S.'s, that *manteis* only foretell the future; they cannot estimate *value*, so he does not show any more respect for prophets than other people. Of course, we might see irony in a contrast between N.'s attitude here and the historical N.'s real actions—a contrast between words and deeds indeed! But Plato leaves no clue in the text.

199a10–b1 S. reiterates Stage 1.

b3–4 S. reiterates Stage 5.

b6–7 S. introduces Stage 7.
καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων: 'in all circumstances', 'universally'.

b9–10 Stage 8. This follows from combining Stages 6 and 7. For the progression from Stages 6–8, S. relies on the assumption that an *ἐπιστήμη* (which *ἀνδρεία* is agreed to be) cannot simply refer to future time, but must be universal (for objections to this position see Intro. p. 14).

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c4 *τι τρίτον*: 'a third part', because N. defined *ἀνδρεία* (Stage 1) as knowledge only of future evil/good (leaving out present and past).

c5–d1 *κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον...ὡς νῦν αὖ ὁ σὸς λόγος*: N. has agreed to all the stages, and so it becomes his argument (see the verbal repetition at the 'denouement' of L.'s *elenchos* at 193d11, *κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον*). Here S. is making sure N. realises 'his' argument also entails Stages 9 and 10, below.

d1 *μετατίθεσθαι* : inf. after *λέγεις* (understood). 'Do you then admit that you have changed in this way, or how would you put it?'

d4–e1 S.'s last major contribution to the argument is in two parts:

(i) *Δοκεῖ...ὡσαύτως* d4–7. Would such a man, *ὁ τοιοῦτος* d4–5, i.e. a man possessing *ἀνδρεία* (sc. *τοῦτον* d7), lack *ἀρετή* in any way if he knew all good and evil? (*ὡς...γέγονε* d6, i.e. all 'good things', past, present and future).

(ii) *και...προσομιλεῖν* d7–e1. Here S., in his question, associates the traditional virtues with *ἀρετή* and suggests that the man who has one of them necessarily possesses all.

e1 *ἐπισταμένῳ κτλ.* : to be taken in parenthesis, governed by *ᾧ...μόνῳ* . 'for whom alone (sc. *τοῦτον* d7) knowing the right way to associate (with them), it is fitting with regard to the gods and men, to take due precaution over what is and is not to be feared and to provide what is good?' i.e. the man who has knowledge of what is and is not to be feared will automatically possess the whole of virtue. d4–e1 is Stage 9 of the argument, which S.'s speech elaborates and conforms.

e3–4 *τὸ νῦν σοι λεγόμενον*: i.e. N.'s original definition of *ἀνδρεία* (stage 1) but with, of course, all S.'s (agreed) deductions from it. This is Stage 10, which contradicts (e6–7) Stage 2.

e6 *ἔφαμεν*: i.e. at 190d3–5. It would have been more accurate for S. to have said that they had *assumed* that *ἀνδρεία* was a part of *ἀρετή*, with L. (and, one supposes N. tacitly) agreeing. But here, i.e. e6, S. fully associates himself with N. in the refutation and failure to find out what *ἀνδρεία* is.

There are two complex questions of interpretation associated with this argument: (i) How far is S. actually implicated in the failure to define *ἀνδρεία* ? and (ii) Is S., at Stage 9, implying the 'Unity of Virtue' thesis?

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Section 15. Conclusion of the Dialogue, 199e13–201c5
The antagonism between L. and N. reaches its climax. They each accuse the other of covering up failure, but both also agree that S. should be chosen as a teacher of sons (their own potentially, as well as those of Lys. and M.). S. concludes from the fact that none of them turned out to have knowledge that none of them is to be preferred as teacher; they should co-operate in trying to find a suitable teacher to get them out of the unsatisfactory situation they are in (a teacher for *themselves* primarily, and then for their boys). Lys. concurs, and suggests a further meeting between him and S. the following morning. S. agrees.

199e13 *καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε* : strongly adversative, 'And there was I, thinking...' (Lane). The sarcasm of L. is continued with *ὦ φίλε Νικία* and *πάνυ δή* (200a2), as well as the reference to Damon (see 197d2).

200a1 *κατεφρόνησας* : a ref. to 194c7. Actually N. only says there that S. has not defined *ἀνδρεία* well, but it is a characteristic of L. that he is oversensitive to possible slights (and N. did ignore *him* at that point). Despite his emphasis on deeds, L. really cares about his own intellectual standing!

a2 *τῇ παρὰ τοῦ Δάμωνος σοφίᾳ* : L. borrows S.'s irony from 197d3–4.

a4 ff. N., who has maintained a smooth (somewhat patronising?) façade to L.'s provocation throughout, finally breaks down in the face of this direct attack.

a4 *εὖ γε* : sarcasm in return, 'That's fine, I must say, Laches!'
οἴει : a possible verbal echo here of L.'s *ᾤμην* (199e13)? (on this aspect, see n. on 197a6).
πρᾶγμα εἶναι : 'of any consequence'.

a5 *ἄρτι ἐφάνης...εἰδώς* : i.e. at 193d10. Here N.'s actual view of L.'s performance (hidden at the time) comes out.

a6 *καὶ ἐγω...ἀναφήσομαι* : *lit.* 'but if I also turn out to be clearly shown up as another such...'
τοῦτο : refers to the previous phrase.

b1 *ἀληθῶς ἀνθρώπειον πρᾶγμα ἐργάζεσθαι* : 'behaving in a typically human way' (Lane).

b3 *ἐπιεικῶς* : N. seems strangely unmoved by his failure (parallel to that of L.) at 199e3 ff.

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b5 N. takes his relationship with Damon seriously (and seems oblivious to S.'s humour at 197d1–5). His anxiety to demonstrate the importance of this relationship goes back to 180c8 ff. and n. ad loc.

b5–6 *οὐδ' ἰδὼν πώποτε* : L. does not move in these exalted intellectual circles!

b6 *καὶ μετ' ἄλλων* : who are these? Is N. simply posing?

b7–c1 N. finishes the speech in an openly patronising tone. L. will have to wait his turn (*καὶ σε*) and is very badly in need of instruction. This is a rather revealing speech for the character of N. Throughout a smooth and comparatively experienced foil for S., the pressure of L.'s banter forces his real feelings out into the open; crushingly patronising to L., he also reveals a degree of humourless vanity (refs. to Damon and hints of mysterious alternative intellectual contacts (b4–7)), which has been glimpsed as early as 180c8 ff. And how, after 199 e3 ff., can he describe his recent performance as *ἐπιεικῶς εἰρῆσθαι* (b3)?

c2 *Σοφὸς* : heavily ironic, with the common negative connotation of *σοφός*.

γάρ τοι σὺ : strong agreement, but here of course, heavily ironic. 'Yes, of course, you've a clever fellow...'

ἀλλ' ὅμως : significant that it is L. who ends the fight?

c3 *συμβουλεύω* : cf. 178 b2, 5 etc. L. returns to the style and language of the opening of the Dialogue, and Lys. and M. are brought back into the discussion.

c4 *χαίρειν ἐᾶν* : 'say good-bye to', either figuratively or literally. The latter is more likely; at 201b8–c4 Lys. asks only S. and S. replies only for himself (contrast his general inclusion of L. and N. elsewhere).

c5 *ἐξ ἀρχῆς* : at 181a7. The last appearance of a common motif in *Laches*.

εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐμοὶ κτλ. : the implication of 179b1 is that L.'s sons *are* of a suitable age.

c7 N. reacts to L.'s conciliatory tone.

c8 *ἐπεὶ κἄν* : *ἐπεὶ καὶ* = 'for that matter...'

d1 *τὸν Νικήρατον* : son of N., was executed by the 30 Tyrants (the

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oligarchic regime which briefly ruled Athens after the defeat of the city at the end of the Pelopnnesian War in 404/3) (Xen. *Hellenica* II. 3.39). He was said by the orator Lysias to have been a 'good democrat' (Lysias 18.6). He is named by Plato as present in the *Republic* (I.327c) but takes no part. He was distinguished also as a Homeric rhapsode, made by his father to learn all of Homer by heart (Arist. *Rhetoric* 1413a8, Xen. *Symposium* 3.5, 4.6).

d2 *ἀλλὰ γὰρ* : 'but, you see...' (Lane).

ἑκάστοτε...ὅταν : emphasises that the response is invariable, '*each time* he recommends others to me, *whenever* I mention...' An example of this was mentioned by N. at 180c9 ff., the introduction, by S., of Damon.

d5 *τούτῳ* : i.e. S.

d7–8 *συμπροθυμήσῃ...βελτίστοις* : *βελτίστοις* dat. by attraction agreeing with *μειρακίοις* (after *συμπροθυμήσῃ*). Lys. resumes his wish for co-operation (cf. 179b6 ff.) with generalised use of a term of excellence similar to his initial speech (179b2).

e1 *καὶ γὰρ* : implies willingness, despite subsequent refusal. 'Yes, it would be strange...not to...but as it is; (*νῦν δ'* e5).'

τοῦτό γε : governs *δεινόν*, and refers to the remainder of the sentence, *μὴ...γενέσθαι*. *γε* implies reservation, 'this much, at least...'

e2 S. repeats Lys.' words at d7–8, admitting the justness of his request (cf. *δίκαιον* e4).

e3 *τοῖς ἄρτι* : i.e. the arguments with L. and N. We now see the point of S.'s association of himself with these arguments; he, likewise, is ignorant.

e5 *ὁμοίως γὰρ*: *γάρ* is here inferential, following a hypothesis of something contrary to fact (*GP* 7). 'But now, as it is, ...'

ἀπορίᾳ : i.e. at 193d11 ff. and 199e12. See on 194 c3–5 for discussion of *ἀπορίᾳ*. Here S. states that they are all *equally* confused.

e6 *ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δὴ αὐτῷ* : the strong emphasis on the fact that this is his own personal opinion perhaps indicates S.'s embarrassment at the somewhat demeaning conclusion of e5.

201a2 *συμβουλεύειν* : (cf. Lys. at e.g. 180a2 etc.). But the irony here is

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that S. is willing to consult *only* on whom to consult!

a3 *οὐδεὶς ἔκφορος λόγος* : *corr. λόγου* by some editors. The phrase, perhaps proverbial in origin, is possibly here a quotation from Aristophanes, *Thesmophoriazusai* 472 (cf. also Euripides, *Hippolytos* 295). Means 'no word must get out'.

a4 *ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς* : this is the reason why it must be kept secret: the tuition is not primarily for their sons, but for themselves!

a5 *μήτε χρημάτων φειδομένους* : cf. 187a3 (also 186c7). It is, of course, an underlying irony that S. himself taught free of charge (*Ap.* 33a–b).

a7 *καταγελάσεται* : cf. Kallikles' ridicule of adults studying philosophy at *Grg.* 484c ff.

εἰς διδασκάλων : 'to (the house of) teachers'.

b2 *προβάλλεσθαι* : 'put before ourselves (as a defence)', i.e. plead the authority of.

b2–3 Homer, *Odyssey* 17.347. Here in reported speech (the original form is quoted at *Chrm.* 161a).

b5 *ἐπιμέλειαν* : cf. 179a5 etc.

b7 *προθυμότατα* : there is underlying humour in Lys.' rather endearing enthusiasm, especially after his self-confessed reasons for 'dropping out' at 189c2–d3!

b8 Lys. comes abruptly to the point (as at 181c7).

c2 *τὸ δὲ νῦν εἶναι* : 'But for the present' (as opposed to *αὖριον*).

Summary of Conclusion

(1) The abrupt and inconclusive ending is typical of Socratic Dialogues, especially those where, like *Laches*, *aporia* is emphasised, e.g. *Euthyphr.* 15e ff., *Ion* 542b, *Hipp. Min* 376c, *Prt.* 362. The degree to which a 'positive' solution may be implied is a complex one (see Intro. 4 (i); however it is important, in the immediate context of the Conclusion, to note S.'s emphatic statement of his own failure (200e2–201a1), in close association with his interlocutors (see also (3) below).

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(2) The richness of character-drawing in *Laches* is continued; there is a lively exchange of insults between L. and N. (199e13–200c2) which finally brings to the surface (esp. with N.) a number of tensions more or less suppressed throughout the Dialogue. S.'s silence at this point is notable. When he does speak, at the invitation of Lys. (urged by both N. and L.) his confession of inadequacy is in marked contrast to their (esp. N.'s) competitive posing. There is a strong re-emphasis in this final speech of S. (200e1–201b5) of the paradox, presented explicitly in earlier speeches (Sections 6 and 7) and implicitly in the main argument-sections, of S.'s profession of ignorance and, at the same time, his moral certainty (a combination most notably present at his trial speech, *Apology*). Indeed, his moral authority at the end of the Dialogue seems almost to derive from his *unwillingness* to pose as a suitable teacher for his friends and their sons, coupled with his strong certainty that to continue the search is the most important thing that they can do.

(3) The Conclusion also brings back the themes with which the Dialogue started: the need for co-operation, the importance of finding a suitable teacher (at the outset they merely discussed the possibility of a *discipline*, *μάθημα*; *then* for them on behalf of their sons, *now* for *themselves*). Yet the repetition of familiar themes rings somewhat ironically after the intellectual distance they have travelled. Despite S.'s introduction of important new ideas, what has actually changed for these people? S. is still the man to teach, the subject is still, it is implied, a matter of consulting the right authorities; N. will consult Damon, or others, and get it all sorted out; Lys. still talks vaguely about excellence (200d8). S.'s advice at 201a6–7, that they should not stay as they are, falls on deaf ears, one suspects. And what on earth are S. and Lys. going to talk about in their tête à tête on the morrow?

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Vocabulary

ABBREVIATIONS

acc.	accusative	*num.*	numeral
adj.	adjective	*opt.*	optative
adv.	adverb	*part.*	participle
aor.	aorist	*partic.*	particle
comp.	comparative	*pass.*	passive voice
conj.	conjunction	*perf.*	perfect
dat.	dative	*pers.*	person
dem.	demonstrative	*pl.*	plural
fut.	future	*plup.*	pluperfect
gen.	genitive	*possess.*	possessive
imperat.	imperative	*prep.*	preposition
impers.	impersonal	*pres.*	present
indef.	indefinite	*pron.*	pronoun
inf.	infinitive	*reflex.*	reflexive
interrog.	interrogative	*rel.*	relative
mid.	middle voice	*sing.*	singular
n.f.	noun, feminine	*subj.*	subjunctive
n.m.	noun, masculine	*superl.*	superlative
n.n.	noun, neuter	*v.*	verb

A

ἄβατος : *adj.*, not to be trodden
ἀγαθός : *adj.*, good
ἀγανακτέω : *v.*, be angry, displeased
ἄγω : *v.*, carry, lead, take
ἀγών : *n.m.*, contest, game
ἀγωνία : *n.f.*, struggle, contest for victory
ἀδεῶς : *adv.*, without fear, confidently
ἀδυνατέω : *v.*, be unable
ἀεί : *adv.*, always, ever
ἀηδής : *adj.*, unpleasant
ἀήθης : *adj.*, unfamiliar, strange
ἀθλητής : *n.m.*, combatant, champion
αἰδώς : *n.f.*, shame, respect
αἰσθάνομαι : *v.*, perceive, feel, understand
αἰσχρός : *adj.*, shameful, base
αἰτία : *n.f.*, blame, responsibility, charge
αἰτιάομαι : *v.*, accuse, blame
αἰωροῦμαι : *v.* (*pass.*) swing, hang (in air)
ἀκλεής : *adj.*, without fame, inglorious

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ἀκοή : *n.f.*, hearing
ἀκολουθέω : *v.*, follow
ἀκούω : *v.*, hear, listen to
ἄκρος : *adj.*, tip, extreme point
ἀληθεία : *n.f.*, truth
ἀληθής : *adj.*, true
ἀληθῶς : *adv.* truly, actually
ἀλλά : *conj.*, but
ἀλλήλους (ἀλλήλων, ἀλλήλοις) : *pron.*, each other
ἄλλοθι : *adv.*, elsewhere
ἄλλος : *pron.*, other
ἄλλως : *adv.*, otherwise
ἅμα : *adv.*, at the same time
ἀμαθής : *adj.*, ignorant
ἀμεινόν : *adv.*, (ἀμείνων: *comp.*, ἀγαθός), better
ἀμελέω : *v.*, neglect, have no care for
ἀμύνομαι : *v.*, defend oneself
ἀμφότερος : *adj.*, both
ἀνάγκη : *n.f.*, necessity
ἀναγνωρίζω : *v.*, recognise
ἀνακοινοῦμαι : *v.*, consult
ἀναλίσκω : *v.*, spend
ἀναστρέφω : *v.*, rally
ἀναφαίνομαι : *v.*, (*pass.*) appear plainly, be clearly shown to be
ἀνδρεία : *n.f.*, courage
ἀνδρεῖος : *adj.*, brave
ἀνερωτάω : *v.*, ask, question
ἄνευ : *prep.*, without (+ *gen*)
ἀνευρίσκω : v., find out, discover
ἀνήρ : *n.m.*, man
ἀνθρωπείος : *adj.*, human
ἄνθρωπος : *n.m.*, man, human being
ἀνίημι : *v.* allow
ἀνίστημι : *v.*, rise up, recover (from an illness)
ἄνοια : *n.f.*, ignorance
ἀντιδέομαι : *v.*, entreat in return
ἀντιλαμβάνω : *v.*, grasp, hold fast
ἄνω : *adv.*, up
ἄξιος : *adj.*, worthy
ἅπας : *adj.*, all, every one
ἄπειρος : *adj.*, inexperienced, unused to
ἁπλοῦς : *adj.*, single, simple, straightforward
ἁπλῶς : *adv.*, simply, plainly
ἀποβαίνω : *v.*, result, turn out, become
ἀποβλέπω : *v.*, pay attention to, gaze at
ἀποβολή : *n.f.*, loss
ἀποδέχομαι : *v.*, accept
ἀποκρίνομαι : *v.*, answer, reply
ἀπολείπω : *v.*, be wanting in, lack (+ *gen.*)
ἀπολύω : *v.*, loose, set free
ἀπορία : *n.f.*, difficulty, perplexity, puzzle
ἄπορος : *adj.*, difficult
ἀπορέω : *v.*, be at a loss
ἀποστερέω : *v.*, defraud, despoil, deprive
ἀποφαίνομαι : *v.*, prove, demonstrate
ἀπρομηθία : *n.f.*, absence of forethought
ἄρα : *partic.*, so, then, accordingly
ἆρα : *partic.*, *used to introduce a question*
ἀργύριον : *n.n.*, money
ἀρέσκω : *v.*, please
ἀρετή : *n.f.*, goodness, excellence
ἄριστος : *adj.*, (*superl.* ἀγαθός), best
ἅρμα : *n.n.*, chariot
ἁρμόζω : *v.*, tune, fit, adjust
ἁρμονία : *n.f.*, arrangement, harmony, scale, mode
ἁρμόττω : *v.*, *see* ἁρμόζω
ἄρτι : *adv.*, just now, recently
ἄρχομαι : *v.*, begin
ἀρχή : *n.f.*, beginning
ἀσκέω : *v.*, practise, exercise
ἅτε : *conj.*, in as much as, seeing that
ἀτεχνῶς : *adv.*, simply, absolutely
ἀτιμάζω : *v.*, think unworthy, treat without respect
ἄτοπος : *adj.*, extraordinary, strange
ἅττα = ἅτινα : (*see* ὅστις)

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αὖ : *adv.*, again
αὐλητικός : *adj.* of the flute; *αὐλητική (τέχνη)* = art of flute playing
αὔριον : *adv.*, tomorrow
αὐτίκα : *adv.*, for example, to begin with
αὐτόθεν : *adv.*, immediately on the spot
αὐτός : *pron.*, self, himself (*αὐτόν, αὐτοῦ* etc.: him, of him etc.) (*ὁ αὐτός* etc.: the same)
αὐτόν, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ etc. : *see ἑαυτόν, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ*
ἀφίημι : *v.*, let go, give up
ἀφικνέομαι : *v.*, arrive at, reach, come to
ἄφοβος : *adj.*, fearless
ἀφροσύνη : *n.f.*, folly
ἄφρων : *adj.*, foolish
ἄχθομαι : *v.*, be grieved at, object to

B

βάλλω : *v.*, throw
βασανίζω : *v.*, test, examine
βεβαιόω : *v.*, establish, secure (in argument)
βέλτιστος : *adj.* (*superl. ἀγαθός*), best
βελτίων : *adj.* (*comp. ἀγαθός*), better
βιός : *n.m.*, life
βιόω : *v.*, live
βλαβερός : *adj.*, harmful
βλέπω : *v.*, look
βοηθέω : *v.*, help, assist
βουλεύω : *v.*, consult, take counsel
βουλή : *n.f.*, council
βούλομαι : *v.*, wish, want

Γ

γάρ : *partic.*, for (*for particular usages, see Commentary*)
γε : *partic., indicates emphasis. For particular usages, see Commentary*
γέλως : *n.m.*, laughter
γενναίως : *adv.*, nobly
γεραιός : *adj.*, old
γερροφόροι : *n.m.*, troops carrying wicker shields
γεωργία : *n.f.*, farming, agriculture
γεωργός : *n.m.*, farmer
γῆρας : *n.n.* old age
γηράσκω : *v.*, grow old
γίγνομαι : *v.*, become
γιγνώσκω : *v.*, think, form a judgement
γνωρίζω : *v.*, become acquainted with
γυμνάζω : *v.*, train, exercise, practice
γυμνάσιον : *n.n.*, bodily exercise
γυνή : *n.f.*, woman

Δ

δαιμόνιος : *adj.*, miraculous, marvellous; used in vocative: *ὦ δαιμόνιε* my good sir
δείδω : *v.*, fear; *δεδοίκα perf. used in pres. sense*
δειλός : *adj.*, cowardly
δέομαι : *v.*, beg, ask
δεινός : *adj.*, clever, skilful
δέος : *n.n.*, fear
δεῦρο : *adv*, hither
δέχομαι : *v.*, accept, receive
δέω : *v.*, want, lack, (*impers.*, *δεῖ* it is necessary)
δῆλος : *adj.*, clear obvious
δηλόω : *v.*, show, disclose
δημιουργός : *n.m.*, skilled workman
δημότης : *n.m.*, (fellow) member of a deme
δήπου : *partic.*, doubtless, I presume
δῆτα : *partic.*, certainly (emphatic form of *δή*)
διαβολή : *n.f.*, slander, abuse, censure
διαιρέω : *v.*, distinguish, divide
διάκειμαι : *v.*, be disposed, settled
διακελεύομαι : *v.* order, request
διακρίνω : *v.*, determine, decide

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διαλέγομαι : *v.*, converse, discuss
διάλογος : *n.m.*, conversation, dialogue
διαλύω : *v.*, dissolve, break off
διανοέομαι : *v.*, (*mid.*) have in mind, intend
διάνοια : *n.f.*, intention, purpose, thought
διαπράττω : *v.*, accomplish, bring about
διασώζω : *v.*, maintain, preserve
διατίθημι : *v*, manage, (*mid.*, arrange, dispose of)
διατριβή : *n.f.*, place of resort, pastime
διατρίβω : *v.*, spend time
διαφέρω : *v.*, differ from, (*mid. and pass.*) be at variance, quarrel
διαφθείρω : *v.*, corrupt, destroy, ruin
διαφεύγω : *v.*, get away from, escape
διδάσκαλος : *n.m.*, teacher
διδάσκω : *v.*, teach
δίδωμι : *v.*, give
διέξειμι : *v.*, go through in detail, expound
δίκαιος : *adj.*, just, right
δικαιοσύνη : *n.f.*, justice, righteousness
δικαστήριον : *n.n.*, court of justice
διοικέω : *v.*, administer, control
διπλοῦς : *adj.*, double
διώκω : *v.*, pursue
δοκέω : *v.*, seem (*δοκεῖ μοι impers.*, it seems to me, I think)
δόξα : *n.f.*, opinion, reputation
δόρυ : *n.n.*, spear-shaft, spear
δορυδρέπανον : *n.n.*, spear-sickle, halbert
δρέπανον : *n.n.*, curved sword, scythe
δοῦλος : *n.m.*, slave
δρόμος : *n.m.*, racing, running
δύναμαι : *v.*, be able
δυνατός : *adj.*, powerful, able
δυσμαθής : *adj.*, slow in learning, dull
δυστυχέω : *v.*, be unlucky, unfortunate
δωριστί : *adv.*, in the Dorian mode, in the Dorian manner
δῶρον : *n.n.*, gift

E

ἐάν (εἰ ἄν) : *conj.*, if (+ *subj*)
ἑαυτόν, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ : *reflex. pron.*, himself, etc.
ἐάω : *v.*, allow, concede, permit
ἐγκωμιάζω : *v.*, praise
ἐγώ : *pron.*, I
ἐγγύς : *adv.*, near
ἐθέλω : *v.*, wish, want
εἰ : *conj.*, if
εἰδέναι : *v.*, *inf.*, οἶδα
εἶδος : *n.n.*, class, kind
εἰδώς : *part.*, οἶδα
εἰκός : *adv.*, likely, (εἰκός ἐστι it is reasonable)
εἰκότως : *adv.*, fairly, reasonably
εἰμί : *v.*, be
εἴπερ : *conj.*, emphatic form of εἰ
εἶπον : *v.*, said (*serving as aor. to* φημί)
εἴρηκα : *v.*, have said (*serving as perf. to* φημί)
εἰρημένα : *perf. part. pass.*, what has been said (*see* φημί)
εἰρήνη : *n.f.*, peace
εἰς : *prep.*, into (+ *acc*)
εἷς : *num.m.*, one
εἰσηγέομαι : *v.*, introduce, explain
εἴτε...εἴτε : *conj.*, either...or
ἕκαστος : *adj.*, each, every one
ἑκάστοτε : *adv.*, on each occasion
ἑκάτερος : *adj.*, each (of two)
ἐκεῖ : *adv.*, there
ἐκεῖνος : *pron.*, that
ἐκλύω : *v.*, set free, deliver
ἔκφορος : *adj.*, to be made known, spread abroad
ἑκών : *adj.*, willing
ἐλάττων : *adj.*, (*comp.* μικρός) less
ἔλαφος : *n.m. and f.*, deer
ἐλέγχω : *v.* question, refute

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ἐλεύθερος : *adj.*, free
ἔλθειν : *v., serving as aor. inf. to* ἔρχομαι
ἕλκω : *v.*, drag
ἐλπίς : *n.f.*, hope
ἐμός : *possess. pron.*, my, mine
ἔμπειρος : *adj.*, experienced in, acquainted with
ἐμπίπτω : *v.*, fall into
ἕν : *num.n.*, one
ἐν : *prep.*, in (+ *dat.*)
ἔναγχος : *adv.*, just now, lately
ἐνάντιος : *adj.*, opposite, contrary
ἐναντιοῦμαι : *v.*, oppose, argue against
ἐνδεής : *adj.*, lacking
ἐνδείκνυμι : *v.*, indicate, show
ἕνεκα : *prep.*, because, on account of (+ *gen.*)
ἐνέχω : *v.*, hold fast
ἔνθα : *adv.*, (ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα) hither and thither
ἐνθένδε : *adv.*, hence, from the following
ἔνιοι : *adj.*, some
ἐνταῦθα : *adv.*, there, here
ἐντεῦθεν : *adv.*, from there
ἐντυγχάνω : *v.*, meet with, light upon
ἐξαμαρτάνω : *v.*, err, make a mistake
ἐξαπατάω : *v.*, deceive, deceive thoroughly
ἔξεστι : *v. impers.*, it is possible
ἐξετάζω : *v.*, examine
ἐξευλαβέομαι : *v.*, guard carefully against
ἐξευρίσκω : *v.*, discover, find out
ἑξής : *adv.*, successive, following
ἔξωθεν : *adv.*, outside
ἔοικα : *v.*, (*perf. with pres. sense*) seem, am likely
ἐπαγγέλομαι : *v.*, (*mid.*) profess
ἐπαΐω : *v.*, understand, perceive
ἐπαινέω : *v.*, approve, praise
ἔπαινος : *n.m.*, approval, praise
ἐπανορθόω : *v.*, restore, correct
ἐπεί, ἐπειδή : *conj.*, since, because
ἔπειτα : *conj.*, then, next
ἐπί : *prep.*, at, on (+ *gen.*); to, for, against (+ *acc.*); at, over, after, for (+ *dat.*)
ἐπιβαίνω : *v.*, set foot on
ἐπιβατεύω : *v.*, serve as a marine
ἐπιδείκνυμι : *v.*, exhibit, show
ἐπιδιακρίνω : *v.*, decide as an umpire
ἐπιεικῶς : *adv.*, fairly, tolerably
ἐπιθυμέω : *v.*, desire, long for
ἐπιθυμία : *n.f.*, desire
ἐπικρύπτω : *v.*, conceal
ἐπιλανθάνομαι : *v.*, (*mid.*) forget, lose thought of
ἐπιμέλεια : *n.f.*, care, concern
ἐπιμελέομαι : *v.*, care for (+ *gen.*)
ἐπιμένω : *v.*, continue in pursuit, remain firm
ἐπιμιμνήσκομαι : *v.*, make mention of, remember
ἐπίσκεψις : *n.f.*, investigation, inquiry
ἐπισπάω : *v.*, draw after, drag after
ἐπίσταμαι : *v.*, (*mid.*) know, understand
ἐπιστήμη : *n.f.*, knowledge, science
ἐπιστήμων : *adj*, skilled in, expert
ἐπιτήδειος : *adj.*, suitable, fit
ἐπιτηδές : *adv.*, fittingly, of set purpose
ἐπιτήδευμα : *n.n.*, pursuit
ἐπιτηδεύω : *v.*, pursue, practice
ἐπιτίθεμαι : *v.*, (*mid.*) attack
ἐπιτρέπω : *v.*, commit, entrust, allow
ἐπιφάνης : *adj.*, clear, evident
ἐπίφθονος : *adj.*, hateful, causing envy
ἐπιχειρέω : *v.*, attempt, undertake,
ἐργάζομαι : *v.*, work, make
ἔργον : *n.n.*, work, deed, fact
ἐρῶ : *v.*, will say (*fut.* εἴρω)
ἐρωτάω : *v.*, ask, enquire
ἑταῖρος : *n.m.*, companion, comrade
ἑτέρωθι : *adv.*, elsewhere

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ἔτι : *adv.*, further, still
ἑτοῖμος : *adj.*, ready, prepared
εὖ : *adv.*, well
εὐδόκιμος : *adj.*, famous, of good repute
εὐθύς (εὐθέως) : *adv.*, straight, immediately
εὔνους : *adj.*, kindly, friendly, well-disposed
εὔπορος : *adj.*, full of resources, ingenious, ready
εὑρετής : *n.m.*, inventor, discoverer
εὑρίσκω : *v.*, find
εὐσχημοσύνη : *n.f.*, elegance
εὐσχήμων : *adj.*, elegant
ἐφίημι : *v.*, let go, give up
ἐφοράω : *v.*, oversee, watch over
ἔχθρος : *adj.*, hostile
ἔχω : *v.*, have, hold
ἕωθεν : *adv.*, at dawn, early
ἕως : *conj.*, until, as long as

Z

ζάω : *v.*, live
ζητέω : *v.*, investigate, seek, search

H

ἤ : *conj.*, or, than, as
ἦ : *partic., indicates a question*
ἡγέομαι : *v.*, consider, believe
ἡδέως : *adv.*, gladly, pleasantly
ἤδη : *adv.*, already, now
ἥδομαι : *v.*, take delight in, be glad
ἡδονή : *n.f.*, pleasure
ἡδύς : *adj.*, sweet, welcome, pleasant
ἡλίκος : *adj.*, as old as, contemporary
ἡμεῖς : *pers. pron.*, we
ἡμέρα : *n.f.*, day
ἡμέτερος : *adj.*, our
ἧττων : *comp. adj.*, less

Θ

θάλαττα : *n.f.*, sea
θαμά : *adv.*, often
θάνατος : *n.m.*, death
θαρραλέος : *adj.*, daring, bold
θαρρέω : *v.*, be bold, courageous
θαυμάζω : *v.*, wonder at, marvel
θαυμαστός : *adj.*, wonderful, marvellous
θεάομαι : *v.*, gaze at, behold, view
θεός : *n.m.*, god
θέα : *n.f.*, viewing, spectacle
θεραπεία : *n.f.*, care, service, attendance
θεραπεύω : *v.*, serve, attend, take care of
θηρίον : *n.n.*, animal, beast
θρασύς : *adj.*, bold, rash
θρασύτης : *n.f.*, rashness

I

ἰαστί : *adv.*, in the Ionic mode
ἰατρός : *n.m.*, doctor
ἴδιος : *adj.*, private, personal, one's own
ἱερόν : *n.n.*, temple, sanctuary
ἴθι : *v. imperat.*, come!
ἱκανός : *adj.*, sufficient, adequate
ἵνα : *adv.*, where
ἵνα : *conj.*, in order that
ἱππεύς : *n.m.* horseman
ἱππικός : *adj.*, of horses
ἱππομαχία : *n.f.*, cavalry action
ἵππος : *n.m.* horse
ἴσθι : *v imperat.*, (οἶδα) know
ἴσως : *adv.*, perhaps

K

καθάπερ : *adv.*, just as
καθηγέομαι : *v.*, begin, lead, establish
καίτοι : *partic.*, and yet
κακός : *adj.*, bad, evil
κακουργός : *adj.*, detrimental, ill-doing
καλέω : *v.*, call
καλός : *adj.*, beautiful, excellent
καλῶς : *adv*, well, excellently
κάμνω : *v.*, be sick, be weary, toil
κάμπτω : *v.*, bend (*mid.*) submit
κάπρος : *n.m.*, boar

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καρτερέω : *v.*, be steadfast, endure
καρτέρησις : *n.f.*, patience, perseverence
καρτερία : *n.f.*, endurance
κατά : *prep.*, against (+ *gen.*); according to (+ *acc.*)
καταβαίνω : *v.*, go down, descend
καταγέλαστος : *adj.*, ridiculous
καταγελάω : *v.*, laugh at, deride
κατάδηλος : *adj.*, manifest, clear
καταισχύνω : *v.*, dishonour, put to shame
καταμανθάνω : *v.*, understand, perceive, learn
κατανοέω : *v.*, understand, observe
κατάστρωμα : *n.n.*, deck
καταφρονέω : *v.*, despise, look down on
κατέχω : *v.*, hold back, withold
κάτω : *adv.*, down
κελεύω : *v.*, order, request, ask
κενός : *adj.*, empty
κεραμεία : *n.f.*, potter's craft
κεχρημένος : *adj.* needy (see χράομαι)
κιθαρίζω : *v.*, play the lyre
κιθαρίστικος : *adj.*, of the lyre
κιθαριστίκη (τέχνη) = art of lyre playing
κινδυνεύω : *v.*, be in danger, be very probably, be likely
κίνδυνος : *n.m.*, danger
κοινός : *adj.*, common, public
κοινοῦμαι : *v.*, (*mid.*) undertake together, share
κοινωνία : *n.f.*, partnership, association
κοίνωνος : *adj.*, partner, companion
κολύμβω : *v.*, plunge, dive
κομίδῇ : *adv.*, exactly, just so
κομψεύω : *v.*, (*mid.*) be smart, be ingenious
κοσμέω : *v.*, adorn, decorate
κραιπνός : *adj.* swift
κρείττων : *adj., comp.* κρατύς stronger, superior, more powerful
κρίνω : *v.*, judge, decide
κρότος : *n.m.*, clapping, applause
κτάομαι : *v.*, acquire, possess
κτήμα : *n.n.*, possession
κύκλος : *n.m.*, circle
κυνηγέσιον : *n.n.*, hunt
κυνηγέτης : *n.m.*, hunter
κωλύω : *v.*, prevent, hinder

Λ

λαμβάνω : *v.*, take, receive, catch
λανθάνω : *v.*, escape notice
λέγω : *v.*, say, speak, tell, mean
λέων : *n.m.*, lion
ληρέω : *v.*, to speak foolishly
λίθος : *n.m.*, stone
λογίζομαι : *v.*, calculate, count
λόγος : *n.m.*, word, statement, story, argument, reason
λόγχη : *n.f.*, spear, troop of spearmen
λοιδορέω : *v.*, rebuke, reproach
λυδιστί : *adv.*, in the Lydian mode
λυπέω : *v.*, grieve
λύπη : *n.f.*, pain, grief
λύρα : *n.f.*, lyre
λυσιτελέω : *v.*, profit (λυσιτελεῖ μοι it profits me, *impers.*)
λύω : *v.*, loose, break up

M

μά : *partic. of exclamation, implying negative assertion*: (no) by Zeus!
μάθημα : *n.n.*, lesson, study, knowledge
μαθητής : *n.m.*, pupil
μακάριος : *adj.*, happy; *in address*, ὦ μακάριε my good sir
μακρός : *adj.*, long, high, deep
μάλιστα : *adv.*, especially, most of all
μᾶλλον : *adv.*, rather
μανθάνω : *v.*, learn, understand
μαντικός : *adj.*, prophetic; μαντική (τέχνη) = art of prophecy, divination
μάντις : *n.m.*, seer, prophet

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μαρτυρέω : *v.*, confirm, bear witness, testify
μάτην : *adv.*, in vain, idly
μάχη : *n.f.*, battle
μάχομαι : *v.*, fight
μέγας : *adj.*, great, much
μεθίημι : *v.*, let go, abandon, dismiss
μειράκιον : *n.n.*, lad, youth
μέλλω : *v.*, be about to, shall
μέλω : *v.*, be an object of care; μέλει (*impers.*) it is a care (to me, etc.)
μέντοι : *conj.*, however, but
μένω : *v.*, remain, stay
μέρος : *n.n.*, part, portion
μετά : *prep.*, with (+ *gen.*); after (+ *acc.*)
μεταθέω : *v.*, hunt, run after
μεταξύ : *adv.*, between, meanwhile
μετατίθημι : *v.*, change, transpose
μέτειμι : *v.*, be in, be among
μετέχω : *v.*, share in
μήν : *partic.*, certainly, yet
μήπω : *adv.*, not yet
μήστωρ : *n.m.*, author, counsellor
μισθός : *n.m.*, fee, pay, wages
μισόλογος : *adj.*, hating argument, discussion
μνήμη : *n.f.*, memory, remembrance
μόνος : *adj.*, alone, only
μόριον : *n.n.*, part, portion
μουσική : *n.f.*, music
μουσικός : *adj.*, musical, skilled in music
μωρός : *adj.*, foolish, stupid

N

ναί : *adv., used for strong affirmation*: yes, certainly
ναῦς : *n.f.*, ship
νεανισκός : *n.m.*, youth, young man
νέος : *adj.*, new (ὁ νέος young man)
νίκη : *n.f.*, victory
νοέω : *v.*, think, have in mind
νόμος : *n.m.*, law
νόσος : *n.f.*, disease, illness
νοσώδης : *adj.*, sickly, ailing
νοῦς : *n.m.*, mind, thought, reason
νῦν, νυνδή, νυνί : *adv.*, now

Ξ

ξένος : *n.m.*, stranger, guest

O

ὅδε : *dem. pron.*, this (man, etc.)
ὅθεν : *adv.*, whence, for which reason
οἷα : *adv.*, as (*acc.* οἷος)
οἶδα : *v.*, know
οἰκεῖος : *adj.*, related by family
οἰκέω : *v.*, live, dwell
οἰκία : *n.f.*, dwelling, house
οἶκος : *n.m.*, house, household
οἶομαι : *v.*, think, suppose
οἷος : *rel. pron.*, of what sort (οἷον = *adv.* just as)
ὀλίγος : *adj.*, small, little
ὀλιγωρέω : *v.*, neglect, pay no attention to, think little of
ὁλκάς : *n.f.*, merchantman, trading vessel
ὅλος : *adj.*, whole, entire
ὄμμα : *n.n.*, eye
ὁμολογέω : *v.*, agree to, acknowledge, confess
ὁμολογουμένως : *adv.*, by common consent
ὁμότεχνος : *adj.*, practice the same skill
ὀνίνημι : *v.*, profit, benefit
ὄνομα : *n.n.*, name
ὀνομάζω : *v.*, name, call
ὀνομαστός : *adj.*, famous, of note
ὅπη : *rel. adv.*, in what way, where
ὁπλιτικός : *adj.*, relating to heavy-armed soldier (τὸ ὁπλιτικόν the technique of using heavy arms)
ὅπλον : *n.n.*, weapon
ὅποι : *adv.*, to what place
ὁποῖος : *rel. adj.*, of what sort
ὁπόσος : *rel. adj.*, as much as
ὁπότερος : *rel. adj.*, which (of two)
ὅπου : *rel. adv.*, where

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ὅπως : *rel. adv.*, how, in what way, in order that
ὁπωστιοῦν : *adv.*, in any way whatever
ὁράω : *v.*, see
ὄργανον : *n.n.*, tool, implement
ὀρθός : *adj.*, straight, upright, safe
ὀρθόω : *v.*, set straight, raise, make famous
ὁρίζω : *v.*, (*mid.*) define, describe
ὁρμάω : *v.*, hurry, hasten, press on
ὅς : *rel. pron.*, who
ὁσιότης : *n.f.*, holiness, piety
ὅσος : *rel. pron.*, as much as
ὅστις : *indef. pron.*, whoever
ὅταν : *conj.*, whenever
ὅτι : *conj.* that, because
ὁτιοῦν : *indef. rel.*, anything whatever
οὐδαμῶς : *adv.*, in no way, by no means
οὐδείς : *num. adj.*, no one
οὐδέτερος : *adj.*, neither
οὐκέτι : *adv.*, no more, no longer
οὐκοῦν : *partic.*, surely (*in questions inviting assent*)
οὔκουν : *partic.*, certainly not
οὖν : *partic.*, so, therefore, then
οὖς : *n.n.*, ear
οὕτως : *adv.*, so, thus, simply
οὗτος : *dem. pron.*, this, that
ὄφελος : *n.n.*, advantage, use, aid
ὀφθαλμός : *n.m.*, eye
ὄχλος : *n.m.*, crowd, throng
ὄψις : *n.f.*, sight

Π

παιδεία : *n.f.*, education
παιδεύω : *v.*, teach, educate
παίδιον : *n.n.*, little child
παιδοτρίβης : *n.m.*, physical trainer
παίζω : *v.*, play, joke
παῖς : *n.m.* or *f.*, child
πάλαι : *adv.*, long, for long, long ago
παντάπασιν : *adv.*, altogether, wholly
πανταχῇ : *adv.*, everywhere, in every way
πάνυ : *adv.*, entirely, completely
πάντως : *adv.*, by all means
πάππος : *n.m.*, grandfather
παππῷος : *adj.*, of a grandfather, ancestral
παρά : *prep.*, from, by (+ *gen.*); by, at (+ *dat.*); along, by the side of (+ *acc.*)
παραγίγνομαι : *v.*, to accrue, be added to
παράδειγμα : *n.n.*, example, standard
παραθέω : *v.*, run beside
παρακαλέω : *v.*, exhort, invite
παρακελεύομαι : *v.*, recommend, encourage
παραλαμβάνω : *v.*, invite
παραμείβομαι : *v.*, pass by
παράπαν : *adv.*, altogether, absolutely
παρασιτέω : *v.*, dine with
παρασκευή : *n.f.*, preparation, resources
πάρδαλις : *n.f.*, leopard
παρέρχομαι : *v.*, pass by
παρίημι : *v.*, pass time
παροιμία : *n.f.*, proverb, maxim
παρρησία : *n.f.*, frankness
παρρησιάζομαι : *v.*, speak freely
πᾶς : *adj.*, all, every
πατήρ : *n.m.*, father
πατρικός : *adj.*, hereditary, paternal
πατρίς : *n.f.*, native land
πατρόθεν : *adv.*, from a father
παύω : *v.*, stop (*mid.* cease)
πείθομαι : *v.*, be persuaded, obey, believe
πεῖρα : *n.f.*, trial, experience
πειράομαι : *v.*, attempt, try, have experience of
πενία : *n.f.*, poverty
περί : *prep.*, about, around, concerning (+ *gen.*) in regard to (+ *dat.*); about, in the case of (+ *acc.*)

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περιάγω : *v.*, lead round, turn round
περίειμι (εἰμί) : *v.*, surpass, excel
περίειμι (εἶμι) : *v.*, go around, walk around
περιέρχομαι : *v.*, go around
περιπλευμονία : *n.f.*, inflammation of the lungs
περιφέρω : *v.*, carry back, carry round
πίθηκος : *n.m.*, monkey
πίθος : *n.m.*, large wine jar, pithos
πίνω : *v.*, drink
πίπτω : *v.*, fall
πιστεύω : *v.*, trust, put faith in, believe
πλεῖστος : *adj.*, (*superl.* πολύς) most, greatest
πλείων : *adj.*, (*comp.* πολύς) more
πλεονεκτέω : *v.*, gain advantage, have the better of
πλῆθος : *n.n.*, mass, crowd
πλήν : *conj. or prep.* + *gen.* except
πλησιάζω : *v.*, associate with
ποιέω : *v.*, make, do, act, compose
ποιητής : *n.m.*, poet, maker
πολεμικός : *adj.*, military, warlike
πολέμιος : *adj.*, opposed, hostile
πόλεμος : *n.m.*, war, battle
πόλις : *n.f.*, city, city-state
πολιτικός : *adj.*, political, of a citizen
πολύς : *adj.*, much
πολλάκις : *adv.*, often, perhaps
πολλαχῆ : *adv.*, in many places, for many reasons
πονηρός : *adj.*, useless, worthless
πόνος : *n.m.*, work, toil
πορίζω : *v.*, furnish, provide
ποτέ : *adv.*, at some time, ever
πότερον : *adv.*, whether
που : *adv.*, somewhere, somehow, (I suppose)
πούς : *n.m.*, foot
πρᾶγμα : *n.n.*, affair, work, trouble
πρᾶξις : *n.f.*, action, affair, matter
πράττω : *v.*, make, do
πρέπω : *v.*, be fitting, suitable
πρέσβυς : *n.m.*, old man (*also as adj.*, πρεσβύτερος etc.)
πρίν : *adv.*, before
προαιρέω : *v.*, choose, prefer
προαφίσταμαι : *v.*, give up in advance, desist before
προβάλλω : *v.*, put forward, propose
πρόγονος : *n.m.*, ancestor, forebear
προθυμέομαι : *v.*, am eager, strive
προΐστημι : *v.*, set over
προκαλέω : *v.*, call forth (*mid.* challenge)
πρόκειμαι : *v.*, be set before, lie before, be prescribed
προμηθέομαι : *v.*, use forethought, take care for, respect
προμήθεια : *n.f.*, foresight, forethought
προμηθής : *adj.*, provident
προξενέω : *v.*, introduce, recommend
προοιμιάζομαι : *v.*, say by way of preamble, preface
πρός : *prep.*, from before, in the presence of, in the name of (+ *gen.*); at, by, in addition to (+ *dat.*); to, towards, against, as regards (+ *acc.*)
προσαγορεύω : *v.*, call by name, address
προσβάλλω : *v.*, strike against, collide
προσδοκάω : *v.*, expect, wait for
προσδοκία : *n.f.*, expectation
προσέτι : *adv.*, besides, over and above
προσέχω : *v.*, turn (attention) towards
προσήκω : *v.*, belong to (*impers.*, προσήκει it is fitting)
πρόσθεν : *adv.*, before, formerly
προσθήκη : *n.f.*, addition, qualification
πρόσειμι : *v.*, approach
προσομιλέω : *v.*, associate with, converse with
προσποίησις : *n.f.*, claim, pretension

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προσποιοῦμαι : *v.*, pretend, lay claim to
προστατέω : *v.*, be guardian of, stand before
προστίθημι : *v.*, add
προσφέρω : *v.*, employ, use
πρότερον : *adv.*, before, earlier
προτίθημι : *v.*, set up, propose
πρῶτος : *adj.*, first
πτῶμα : *n.n.*, fall
πυνθάνομαι : *v.*, learn, hear, enquire
πύστις : *n.f.*, enquiry
πώποτε : *adv.*, ever yet
πῶς : *adv.*, how?
πως : *adv.*, somehow, in some way

P

ῥᾴδιος : *adj.*, easy
ῥᾷστος : *adj.*, (*superl.* ῥᾴδιος) easiest

Σ

σαφῶς : *adv.*, clearly
σημεῖον : *n.n.*, sign
σκέπτομαι : *v.*, consider, examine
σκέλος : *n.n.*, leg
σκευή : *n.f.*, equipment, tackle (of a ship)
σκέψις : *n.f.*, speculation, consideration
σκοπέω : *v.*, consider, examine, contemplate
σμικράς : *adj.*, small, little
σοφία : *n.f.*, wisdom
σόφισμα : *n.n.*, clever device, trick, contrivance
σοφίστης : *n.m.*, expert, sophist
σοφός : *adj.*, wise
σπουδάζω : *v.*, be in earnest, be eager for, be serious
σπουδαῖος : *adj.*, serious, good
σπουδή : *n.f.*, trouble, effort, esteem, regard
στόμα : *n.n.*, mouth
στοχάζομαι : *v.*, guess, aim at
στρατηγία : *n.f.*, general's office
στρέφω : *v.*, (*mid.*) twist, turn about
στρατόπεδον : *n.n.*, camp
συγγίγνομαι : *v.*, associate with
συγχωρέω : *v.*, concede, yield
συλλαμβάνω : *v.*, grasp, comprehend
σύλλογος : *n.m.*, meeting, assembly
συμβαίνω : *v.*, come to pass, happen, turn out
συμβουλεύω : *v.*, consult, advise
συμβουλή : *n.f.*, consultation, deliberation
σύμβουλος : *n.m.*, adviser, counsellor
σύμμαχος : *n.m.*, ally
συμπαραλαμβάνω : *v.*, take along with, call in for advice
σύμπας : *adj.*, the whole, all
συμπροθυμέομαι : *v.*, join eagerly in helping, zealously promote
συμφέρω : *v.*, agree
σύμφημι : *v.*, assent, approve
σύμφωνος : *adj.*, harmonious, agreeing
σύμψηφος : *adj.*, voting together, of one mind
συναναχωρέω : *v.*, retreat together, retire together
συνδιακινδυνεύω : *v.*, share in danger
συνδιατρίβω : *v.*, spend time with, occupy oneself with
συνδοκεῖ : *v. impers.*, it seems good (to me, you etc.) also
συνήθης : *adj.*, accustomed, usual
συνθεάομαι : *v.*, see together, spectate together
συνθεατής : *n.m.*, fellow spectator
συνίστημι : *v.*, introduce, recommend, bring together
σύνοιδα : *v.*, be conscious of, know (*imper.* σύνισθι)
συνουσία : *n.f.*, society, gathering
συσκοπέω : *v.*, contemplate together
συσσιτέω : *v.*, dine together
συχνάς : *adj.*, many, great number
σφεῖς (σφᾶς, σφῶν, σφίσι) : *reflex. pron.*, themselves

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σφενδονητικός : *adj.*, for slinging; σφενδονητική (τέχνη) the art of slinging
σφόδρα : *adv.*, exceedingly, earnestly
σχεδόν : *adv.*, almost, nearly
σχῆμα : *n.n.*, appearance
σχολή : *n.f.*, leisure
σῶμα : *n.n.*, body
σωφροσύνη : *n.f.*, temperance, discretion

T

τάξις : *n.f.*, rank, battle order, arrangement
τάττω : *v.*, rule, ordain, arrange
ταῦρος : *n.m.*, bull
τάχα : *adv.*, quickly, forthwith (τάχ' ἄν = possibly, probably)
τάχος : *n.n.*, speed
ταχυτής : *n.f.*, swiftness
τείνω : *v.*, extend, refer
τεκμαίρομαι : *v.*, judge, estimate
τελευτάω : *v.*, die, make an end
τέτταρες : *num.*, four
τέχνη : *n.f.*, art, skill, craft
τεχνικός : *adj.*, skilled
τέως : adv., for a time, meanwhile
τηλικόσδε : *adj.*, of such an age
τηλικοῦτος : *adj.*, *see* τηλικόσδε
τίθημι : *v.*, place, set, advance (an argument)
τιμάω : *v.*, honour, revere
τιμή : *n.f.*, honour, esteem
τίς : *interrog. pron.*, who?
τις : *indef. pron.*, someone, a certain one
τοιγάρτοι : *partic.*, for that very reason, therefore
τοιοῦτος : *dem. pron.*, of this kind, such
τόλμα : *n.f.*, daring, boldness
τολμάω : *v.*, dare, venture
τοξικος : *adj.*, of archery
τοξική (τέχνη) the art of the archer
τοσοῦτος : *adj.*, so great, so much
τότε : *adv.*, then
τοτέ : *adv.*, at one time, at times
τραγωδία : *n.f.*, tragedy
τρέχω : *v.*, run
τριήρης : *n.f.*, trireme
τρίτος : *adj.*, third
τρόπος : *n.m.*, manner, way
τροφή : *n.f.*, nurture, rearing
τρυφάω : *v.*, give oneself airs, run riot
τυγχάνω : *v.*, happen; *with pres. part.*, εἰμί (happen to) be

Y

ὑγιεινός : *adj.*, healthy, sound
υἱός : *n.m.*, son
ὑμεῖς : *pres. pron.*, you (*pl.*)
ὑμέτερος : *adj.*, your
ὑπαισχύνομαι : *v.*, be somewhat ashamed
ὑπακούω : *v.*, heed, regard
ὑπαλείφω : *v.*, anoint, spread on salve
ὑπάρχω : *v.*, begin, be (ὑπάρχει *impers.* + *dat.*, it is possible, for me, for you etc.)
ὑπέρ : *prep.*, on behalf of (+ *gen.*)
ὑπερφυῶς : *adv.*, exceedingly, greatly
ὑπηρετέω : *v.*, serve, be subordinate to
ὑπισχνέομαι : *v.*, promise
ὑπόλογος : *n.m.*, account, reckoning
ὑπομένω : *v.*, stand firm
ὑπομιμνήσκω : *v.*, remind
ὗς : *n.f.*, pig

Φ

φαίνομαι : *v.*, seem
φάρμακον : *n.n.*, drug, medicine
φάσκω : *v.*, say, assert
φαῦλος : *adj.*, worthless, mean
φέβομαι : *v.*, flee, be put to flight
φείδομαι : *v.*, spare
φέρω : *v.*, bear, bring
φεύγω : *v.*, flee, avoid
φημί : *v.*, say, assert, mean
φθέγγομαι : *v.*, speak, utter

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φθονέω : *v.*, envy, begrudge
φιλόλογος : *adj.*, fond of discussion
φιλονικία : *n.f.*, competitive spirit, rivalry
φίλος : *adj.*, dear, friendly (*ὁ φίλος* = a friend)
φιλοτιμέομαι : *v.*, strive after, be ambitious
φοβέομαι : *v.*, fear
φόβος : *n.m.*, fear
φοιτάω : *v.*, visit, frequent
φράζω : *v.*, declare, tell, explain
φρέαρ : *n.n.*, tank, well, cistern
φρόνησις : *n.f.*, wisdom, sense
φρόνιμος : *adj.*, sensible, prudent
φρυγιστί : *adv.*, in the Phrygian mode
φυγή : *n.f.*, flight
φυλάττω : *v.*, keep watch, (*mid.*) watch for, guard
φύω : *v.*, produce, put forth, be born (*πεφυκώς perf.*, by nature)
φωνή : *n.f.*, voice, sound

χ
χαίρω : *v.*, rejoice
χάλεπος : *adj.*, difficult, hard
χαλινός : *n.m.*, bridle
χαρίεις : *adj.*, accomplished
χάρις : *n.f.*, gratitude, favour, thanks
χειμάζομαι : *v.*, be tossed in a storm
χείρ : *n.f.*, hand
χείρων : *comp. adj.*, worse (*serving as comp. of κακός*)
χράομαι : *v.*, use
χρήμα : *n.n.*, thing (*pl.*) money
χρή : *v. impers.*, it is necessary, one ought
χρηστός : *adj.*, good, true, beneficial
χρόνος : *n.m.*, time
χωρίον : *n.n.*, place, terrain
χωρίς : *adv.*, apart, separately, of a different nature

ψ
ψυχή : *n.f.*, soul

Ω
ὦ : *mode of address* (e.g. *ὦ Σώκρατες*)
ὧδε : *adv.*, thus, in this way
ὡς : *conj.*, that since, as, how; *prep.*, towards (+ *acc.*)
ὡσαύτως : *adv.*, in like manner, just so
ὥσπερ : *adv.*, as, just as, like
ὠφέλιμος : *adj.*, profitable, advantageous

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This edition of Plato's short Dialogue, *Laches*, provides a detailed commentary on one of the most approachable and lively philosophical works in Greek. The concept of courage is the subject under discussion, in which Socrates questions and leads some prominent Athenian citizens to develop their ideas and recognise shortcomings. Two features of the work are particularly interesting: the argument and its setting draw upon and exploit the tensions in a wide range of 5th- and 4th-century BC cultural and social values, submitting them to criticism; secondly, Plato's ideas and linguistic expression inter-relate to provide a work which is ironically questioning rather than purely didactic.

This miniature masterpiece can only be fully appreciated through a reading of the original Greek text. The simplicity of language (accessible to students with just one or two years' Greek) belies the richness of texture, subtlety of characterisation and liveliness of style. *Laches* provides an introduction to Greek philosophy and culture through the work of one of its greatest thinkers and artists.

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